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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation analyzes how skills and health as two facets of human capital aect
labor market outcomes, education decisions and the intergenerational transmission of
inequality. Moreover, it elaborates on how dierences in skill and health arise using famines
as macroeconomic shocks to the formation of human capital. Throughout, the point of
view is an economic one. Skills and health are viewed as a means to generate direct or
indirect returns, e.g. in the form of higher wages or lower health care costs.
The thesis covers three aspects of the economics of human inequality: the formation of
skills and health, their impact on the transmission of inequality, and the eect of skills
on education or labor market outcomes. First, in a joint chapter with Remi Piatek, we
establish that individuals with a more internal locus of control earn higher wages, and that
this eect mainly operates through the channel of higher education. In the last chapter
of this thesis I show that paternal unemployment causally reduces ospring educational
attainment and that a child's subjective probability of school success is an important
mechanism through which this eect operates. Second, in two joint chapters with Gabriella
Conti, James Heckman and Arianna Zanolini on the one hand, and with Gerard van den
Berg on the other hand, we ask how dierences in skills and health capital aect next
generation outcomes. The rst of these chapters takes a closer look at the behavioral
channels of maternal smoking and education, while the second one refers to the biological
channel of epigenetic imprinting. Third, in a chapter with Gerard van den Berg and
Johannes Schoch, we investigate how nutritional shocks during childhood aect health
outcomes in adulthood.
Econometrically and and with respect to identication, the dissertation takes two dierent
approaches. In chapters two and three, factor structure models are implemented in a Roy
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model setting to address the problem of measurement error that arises if skills and health
are measured using imperfect proxies. The estimation and identication relies on a form
of matching on unobservables. In chapters four and ve, identication comes from an
exogenous variation. Famines are used as an instrument that exogenously shifts part of
the population into a state of adverse childhood conditions. Chapter six uses a combination
of both approaches.
The thesis combines research on two strands of ideas that are novel to the economic
literature. First, human capital is increasingly viewed as a broad and multifaceted concept
that does not only comprise IQ, schooling or other cognitive measures, but also personality
variables, mental and physical health. Second, nature and nurture are inseparable. The
genetic make-up, phenotype and character of an individual is inuenced by in utero and
childhood conditions, and life experiences cause epigenetic imprinting, which in itself is
heritable to subsequent generations.
From a policy perspective, economic research that incorporates multifaceted human
capital and the interaction of nature and nurture are needed. First, if human capital
is multidimensional policy makers need to know its facets which are most important
with respect to labor market outcomes and adult health. Second, if nurture determines
nature, research needs to identify sensitive and critical periods, as well as favourable and
unfavourable conditions for the development of human capital.
The second chapter of this dissertation contributes to the rst strand of literature. It
investigates how locus of control as a particular facet of human capital inuences labor
market success and establishes that individuals with an internal locus of control, i.e., who
believe that reinforcement in life comes from their own actions instead of being determined
by luck or destiny, earn higher wages. However, this positive eect only translates into
labor income via the channel of education. Factor structure modeling is implemented on
an augmented data set coming from two dierent samples. By so doing, we are able to
correct for potential biases that arise due to reverse causality and spurious correlation,
and to investigate the impact of premarket locus of control on later outcomes.
The third chapter combines research on multifaceted human capital and on the interaction
between nature and nurture. It focuses on newborn health outcomes as are an important
ring in the chain of intergenerational transmission of disadvantage. The chapter con-
tributes to the literature on the determinants of health at birth in two ways. First, we
2
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION
analyze the role of maternal endowments and investments (education and smoking in
pregnancy) in the probability of having a baby who is small for gestational age (SGA).
We both estimate the total impact of maternal endowments on birth outcomes, and we
also decompose it into a direct, \biological" eect and a \choice" eect, mediated by
maternal behaviors. Secondly, we estimate the causal eects of maternal education and
smoking in pregnancy, and we investigate whether women endowed with dierent traits
have dierent returns. We nd that cognition aects birth outcomes primarily through
education, that personality traits mainly operate by changing smoking behavior, and that
the physical tness of the mother has a direct, \biological" eect on SGA. We also nd
signicant heterogeneity in the eects of education and smoking along the distribution of
maternal physical traits, suggesting that women with a less healthy physical constitution
should be the primary target of prenatal interventions.
The fourth chapter stands at the crossroads of economics and human biology. It
investigates ndings from the recent biological literature according to which lifetime
experiences of one generation aect later generations through epigenetic imprinting.
Recent studies have found an association between an individual's famine exposure at ages
8-12 and her grandchild's longevity, as well as cardiovascular and diabetes mortality in a
single historical dataset. In this chapter, we investigate the validity of these ndings, by
analyzing the impact of the German famine of 1916-1918 on the children and grandchildren
of individuals who were aected by the famine. We nd that male second-generation
individuals are shorter if their mother has been aected and taller if their father has been
aected. Among the third generation, males tend to have higher mental health scores if
their paternal grandfather experienced the famine and females tend to have higher mental
health scores if their maternal grandmother was aected. We do not nd robust eects on
schooling as measured by the probability of obtaining a higher secondary school degree.
The fth chapter again focuses on the idea of human capital formation. It uses famines
as exogenous variation, but this time estimates the causal eect of a nutritional shortage
during childhood on adult health as opposed to the overall reduced form famine eect.
We estimate this average causal eect on adult height as a proxy for late life health
outcomes, by applying instrumental variable estimation, using data with self-reported
periods of hunger earlier in life, with famines as instruments. The data contain samples
from European countries and include birth cohorts exposed to various famines in the 20th
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century. We use two-sample IV estimation to deal with imperfect recollection of conditions
at very early stages of life. The estimated average causal eects often exceed famine eects
by a factor three.
The last chapter investigates the impact of an important economic shock, namely paternal
unemployment, on child education decisions. It uses exogenous variation in the local
unemployment rate to identify the unemployment eect and to this end combines German
representative household data with labor market information on 97 regions for the
years 1998-2009. I nd that paternal unemployment decreases the probability of upper
secondary school choice by around 18 percentage points. Further, paternal unemployment
has negative eects on measures of child self-condence, locus of control and mental
health. My results indicate that the subjective probability of school success is an important
mechanism through which paternal unemployment inuences a child's educational choices.
This nding is consistent with a theoretical framework where paternal unemployment
aects the return to education through the subjective probability of successful school
completion.
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Chapter 2
Maintaining (Locus of) Control?
Assessing the impact of locus of
control on education decisions and
wages1
2.1 Introduction
Does it make a dierence if you think you can make a dierence? Will it aect your decision
making, or even your productivity? In response to such kinds of questions, the economic
literature has recently come to acknowledge the considerable importance of personality
traits in explaining education choices, as well as a large variety of labor market outcomes.
The present chapter focuses on locus of control, one dimension of personality that measures
the extent to which individuals believe that what happens to them in life is related to
their own actions and decisions, or on the contrary to fate and luck. We contribute to the
existing literature on personality traits by investigating the impact of locus of control on
wages, while making a distinction between the direct|or productive|impact of locus of
control, and the indirect|or behavioral|impact that works through education decisions.
We nd that locus of control is an important predictor of the decision to obtain higher
education. Furthermore, we nd that premarket locus of control, dened as locus of control
1This chapter is joint work with Remi Piatek. A very similar version of this chapter is published as
IZA working paper number 5289.
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measured at the time of upper middle school|before the individual enters the labor
market|does not signicantly aect later wages after controlling for education decisions.
In light of the existing literature, which nds mostly positive eects of contemporaneous
locus of control measures on wages, this indicates that it is important to distinguish
between premarket skills and those that are already inuenced by labor market experience
and age. Last, simulation of our model shows that moving individuals from the rst to
the last decile of the locus of control distribution signicantly shifts the distribution of
schooling choices, thus indirectly aecting later wages.
From a methodological point of view, there are two major econometric problems at
stake in the economic literature on personality traits: measurement error and endogeneity
(Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Borghans et al., 2008). First, measurement error arises because
certain traits or characteristics are measured by questions or tests that are imperfect
proxies of the true latent ability. Yet, in general, most psychological measures are designed
to capture a particular latent trait or skill, such that factor analytical approaches can be
used to distinguish true latent abilities from measurement error (Borghans et al., 2008;
Heckman et al., 2006; Hansen et al., 2004). Second, endogeneity arises in the study of the
impact of locus of control on labor market outcomes for two reasons. On the one hand,
the results may be awed by reverse causality, as (anticipated) labor market outcomes
may aect locus of control (e.g., see Trzcinski and Holst, 2010; Gottschalk, 2005). For
this reason, locus of control measures may reect, rather than cause, the outcomes they
are supposed to predict (Borghans et al., 2008). In this case, the coecient on locus
of control is biased, because of nonzero covariance between the measures and the error
term. On the other hand, both outcomes and measures may be aected by past labor
market experiences, which are usually not accounted for. The consequence is, again, an
overestimation of the locus of control coecient due to spurious correlation.
In the literature, four main strategies have been adopted to address this endogeneity
issue. First, Duncan and Morgan (1981) and Duncan and Dunifon (1998) using the PSID,
extract measures of personality traits as measured 15-25 years prior to earnings. A
similar strategy has been adopted by Heckman et al. (2006), who use locus of control
measurements in the NLSY taken at age 14-22 to explain later outcomes. Second,
Bowles et al. (2001), using the National Longitudinal Survey of Young Women (NLSYW),
employ contemporary measurements of locus of control, which they purge of past wage
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inuences. Third, Osborne (2000) uses past skills to instrument for contemporaneous
skill measures. Last, Cunha and Heckman (2008) explicitly model development and
accumulation of skills as a technology of skill formation, in which investments in one
period aect the productivity of investments in subsequent periods. However, their focus
is mainly on early childhood development of skills, and not on the impact of labor market
experiences and various life-time shocks on skill development and income.
Using data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), we address the problem of
measurement error by extracting a latent factor reecting locus of control. In addition,
we account for the problem of reverse causality and truncated life-cycle data in that
we combine information on both young individuals, who have not yet entered the labor
market, and on older, working-age individuals. Our estimation approach follows the work
by Heckman et al. (2006); Hansen et al. (2004); Carneiro et al. (2003) in that we use
Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) methods to simulate the parameters of the model.
Specically, we use a Gibbs sampler with at priors that sequentially draws the parameters
of interest from their respective conditional distributions. Furthermore, we build on a
strategy developed in Cunha et al. (2005), which allows us to retrieve the distribution
of locus of control from a sample of young individuals, and to estimate its impact on
outcomes in a sample of older individuals.
The contribution of this chapter is twofold. First, we apply novel econometric methods
and show that Bayesian factor structure models can be a solution to endogeneity problems
if researchers are confronted with truncated life cycle data, as is very often the case in the
elds of personality and economics. Second, embedding our empirical results in a simple
theoretical framework, we establish that locus of control only aects the psychic cost of
education but is not directly rewarded on the labor market of young professionals.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 provides an overview of the existing literature
on locus of control. In Section 6.3, a simple framework is introduced to help understand
the potential impact of locus of control on education decisions and labor market outcomes.
Section 2.4 describes our estimation strategy relying on data set combination to identify
the full likelihood. The Bayesian approach used to sample the parameters of interest is
outlined, and an overview of the data is provided. Section 6.6 presents the results of our
analysis. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Locus of Control
Since the seminal works of Mincer (1958) and Becker (1964), human capital is dened as
the stock of knowledge and personal abilities an individual possesses, and is perceived as
a factor of production that can be improved through education, training and experience.
The focus usually lies on estimating returns to education, training, experience or cognitive
skills (Psacharopoulos, 1981; Card, 1999; Heckman et al., 2006).2 However, this concept
mainly refers to the cognitive abilities of an individual, while more recently other facets
of human capital have come to the forefront. Bowles and Gintis (1976) were among
the rst to point out what seems intuitively obvious: economic success is only partly
determined by cognitive abilities and knowledge acquired in schools. Personality, incentive-
enhancing preferences and socialization are other important components of human capital
(Heckman et al., 2006; Heineck and Anger, 2010).3 Furthermore, a vast literature in
experimental economics is currently emerging, which analyzes the economic impact of risk
aversion, reciprocity, self-condence and time preference (Dohmen et al., 2010; Falk et al.,
2006; Frey and Meier, 2004).
We decide to focus on locus of control, one of the measures of personality traits that is
prominent also in the economic literature (Heckman et al., 2006; Judge and Bono, 2001;
Andrisani, 1977, 1981; Osborne, 2000). Originally, locus of control is a psychological
concept, generally attributed to Rotter (1966), that measures the attitude regarding the
nature of the causal relationship between one's own behavior and its consequences. In
this concept, which is related to self-ecacy, people who believe that they have control
over their lives are called internalizers. People who believe that fate, luck, or other people
determine their lives, are termed externalizers. Generally, externalizers (in this taxonomy,
the low-ability types) do not have much condence in their ability to inuence their
environment, and do not see themselves as responsible for their lives. Therefore, these
individuals are generally less likely to trust their own abilities or to push themselves
through dicult situations. Conversely, internalizers (the high return personality types)
perceive themselves as more capable of altering their economic situation.
2See Gebel and Pfeier (2010); Pischke and Von Wachter (2008); Lauer and Steiner (2000);
Flossmann and Pohlmeier (2006) for estimates of returns to education or skills in the German context.
3For an overview of the interrelationships between dierent psychological and economic concepts, see
Borghans et al. (2008).
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Mostly on empirical grounds, many studies agree that locus of control aects a variety
of economic choices individuals make (behavioral impact). This is particularly true for
education decisions, which most researchers nd to be highly inuenced by locus of
control.4 For instance, Coleman and DeLeire (2003) present a model of locus of control
and education decisions, where locus of control is viewed as a behavioral trait that
aects education decisions, because it has an impact on personal beliefs about the eect
of education on expected earnings. Using the National Education Longitudinal Study
(NELS), the authors nd locus of control to have a high and signicant impact on
schooling decisions, as well as on ex-ante expected earnings conditional on schooling.
Similarly, recent evidence by Caliendo et al. (2010) on German unemployment data shows
that locus of control is a behavioral trait that aects the subjective probability of nding
a job, which in turn leads to an increased search eort and higher reservations wages.
Contrary to this, using the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY), Cebi (2007)
concludes that locus of control has a productive impact on labor market outcomes and
no eect on education choices.
Evidence on the eect of locus of control on labor market returns is mixed (productive
impact). For example, Andrisani (1977), using the National Longitudinal Study (NLS),
nds a positive eect of locus of control on several measures of earnings and occupational
attainment of young and middle-aged men. Yet, Duncan and Morgan (1981) nd mostly
non-signicant eects of locus of control on the change in hourly earnings of individuals
in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID). To our knowledge, an analysis of the
impact of locus of control on wages using German data has only been conducted by
Heineck and Anger (2010), as well as by Flossmann et al. (2007), with both studies nding
positive eects.5 We add to this literature by using factor structure models to account
for measurement error and endogeneity issues caused by the use of contemporaneous
measurements.
4Already 40 years ago, the famous Coleman report (Coleman, 1968) reported that locus of control
was not only an important predictor of academic performance, but even a more important determinant of
educational achievement than any other factor in a student's background (Coleman and DeLeire, 2003).
5Furthermore, Gallo et al. (2003) and Uhlendor (2004) use German data to investigate the impact
of locus of control on transitions from unemployment to employment.
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2.3 Empirical Model
Consider a simple model where each individual chooses between obtaining higher
education or not. Premarket locus of control, as imperfectly measured by a set of response
variables, is captured by a latent factor , which inuences both schooling decisions
and labor market outcomes. The concept of locus of control and its potential impact
on education decisions and labor market outcomes is explained in Section 6.3.1, while the
empirical setup of the model is detailed in Section 2.3.2.
2.3.1 How locus of control impacts education and labor market
outcomes
In this section, we present a theoretical framework for how premarket locus of control
may aect labor market returns. We assume that the role of locus of control for wages is
potentially twofold. First, it may indirectly aect wages through its eect on education
decisions, and secondly, it may have a direct inuence on labor market returns after the
education decision is controlled for.
In our study, locus of control is a latent variable, denoted by , that is continuously
distributed in the range ( 1;+1), where smaller values represent a more external locus
and larger values a more internal locus of control. We assume that an individual's psychic
costs of education and wage are both functions of . Hence, individuals with  !  1 are
likely to have higher psychic costs of education and earn lower wages, while individuals
with  ! +1 incur lower costs of obtaining a degree and earn more.
In a typical model of human capital investment, individuals decide on the level of education
based on the expected returns to the respective choice, net of the costs associated with
this choice. In this framework, locus of control may aect the perceived psychic costs of
education, e.g., because individuals with a more external locus of control believe ex ante
that they would need to work harder than internalizers to feel well-prepared for the exams
(behavioral impact). Furthermore, locus of control may be viewed as a skill with a direct
impact on wages, for example because employers value having employees who exhibit a
higher locus of control (productive impact).
Assume that there are two education levels, denoted by S = 0; 1, and that agents maximize
the latent net present value associated with education to make their decision. Let U
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denote this latent net present value. The arguments of this function will be specied
later. Hence, individuals attend higher education, S = 1, if:
U  0;
and S = 0 otherwise. The latent net present value from obtaining higher education is
a function of discounted future earnings and of education costs. If wages wst in period t
conditional on schooling s, as well as the costs of education C, can all be modeled in an
additively separable manner, we can specify:
w0t = Xwt0 + 0 + "0t;
w1t = Xwt1 + 1 + "1t;
C = XCC + C + "C ;
with E["1jXwt; ] = E["0jXwt; ] = E["C jXC ; ] = 0. Here s, s (with s 2 f0; 1g) and
C , C measure the impact of premarket locus of control  and observable characteristics
(Xwt; XC) on wages and education costs, respectively. Since locus of control is determined
before the individual enters the labor market, it does not depend on time t in our model.
Moreover, "st and "C are random and independent idiosyncratic shocks. The total net
present value from education, accounting for the discounted ow of ex post earnings, is
then:
U(Xw; XC ; ; ; t1) =
TX
t=t1
t (Xwt1 + 1 + "1t)
 
TX
t=0
t (Xwt0 + 0 + "0t)
  (XCC + C + "C) ;
(2.1)
where Xw = (Xw1; : : : ; XwT ), t1 represents the time required to achieve higher education,
T is the life horizon, and  denotes the discount rate, which for simplicity is assumed to
be constant over time.
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By dierentiating Equation (6.3) with respect to , it appears that a ceteris paribus change
in locus of control aects education decisions as follows:
@U(Xw; XC ; ; t1)
@
= 1
TX
t=t1
t   0
TX
t=0
t   C :
Given that 1 and 0 are independent of t, and making use of revealed education choices,
our goal is to identify 1, 0 and C . More precisely, we are investigating whether locus of
control enters the education decision and outcomes both directly as a skill, in which case
we would have 1 > 0 and 0 > 0, or only indirectly via the costs of education, in which
case C < 0. We cannot identify C directly, because we do not observe education costs.
However, we can make inference on the overall impact of locus of control on education
choices, and given the identication of 1 and 0, we can retrieve C . More specically,
if we nd that 1 = 0 = 0, we know that any impact of locus of control on education
choices must work through C .
The empirical model we specify in the next section is an approximation to this very simple
theoretical framework. By combining dierent subsamples and using revealed schooling
decisions, we are able to identify the impact of premarket locus of control on wages, and
thus to make inferences about its productive or behavioral impact, respectively.
2.3.2 Specication of the Model
To investigate the impact of premarket locus of control on schooling decisions and later
outcomes, we use a factor structure model in the spirit of Heckman et al. (2006), where
a single latent factor is assumed to capture the latent trait of interest. The overall
simultaneous equation model consists of dierent sets of equations using continuous,
dichotomous and ordered response variables. The latent factor is common across all
equations, and therefore represents the only source of dependence between the outcomes,
conditional on the observed covariates.
Education decision
Each agent is assumed to choose the level of schooling that maximizes her utility. The
utility derived from higher education S?, where higher education is dened as staying
in school beyond compulsory education, is supposed to linearly depend on a vector of
12
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personal characteristics XS and on the latent factor :
S = 1l[S? > 0];
S? = XSS + S + "S; "S  N (0; 1) ;
(2.2)
where S denotes the vector of parameters related to personal characteristics, S
represents the factor loading associated with , and "S is an idiosyncratic error term
assumed to be independent of the covariates and of the latent factor. The indicator
function 1l[] is equal to 1 if the corresponding condition is veried, and to 0 otherwise.
Conditional on , this model is a standard probit when the distribution of the error term
is assumed to be standard normal.
Labor market outcomes
Individuals with dierent levels of schooling become active on dierent segments of the
labor market, where their personal characteristics, as well as their level of locus of control,
may be valued dierently. Labor market outcomes are modeled as a two-stage process:
people rst select into the labor market, and then a wage equation is estimated for those
actually working. Observed characteristics and locus of control are allowed to play a role in
both stages. Estimating the two equations simultaneously makes it possible to correct for
potential sample selection bias that might aect the parameters if only the wage equation
for working people were estimated (Heckman, 1979).
The labor market participation decision is assumed to be a threshold-crossing model for
each level of education s 2 f0; 1g, where the latent utility of working (E?s ) linearly depends
on a set of covariates XE through a vector of parameters E;s, and on the latent factor 
with its associated factor loading E;s:
Es = 1l[E
?
s > 0];
E?s = XEE;s + E;s + "E;s; "E;s  N (0; 1) ;
(2.3)
The idiosyncratic error term "E;s is assumed to be standard normal and independent ofXE
and  for identication purposes. Nevertheless, this equation should not be regarded as a
usual employment equation, but rather considered in a broader sense. People participating
in the labor market (E = 1) are those who are actually active and declare a positive
wage, while the group of non-participating people encompasses unemployed people, but
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also adult individuals who are not on the market. Therefore, this equation should be
interpreted with care,6 and serves more as a technical means to tackle the selection
problem into the sample of people declaring a positive wage. For wages, a log-linear
specication with education group specic parameters is assumed:
Ys = XY Y;s + Y;s + "Y;s for s = 0; 1; (2.4)
where Ys represents the log hourly wage (lnws), XY is a set of observed covariates with the
associated vector of returns Y;s, Y;s denotes the return to locus of control, and "Y;s is an
idiosyncratic error term such that "Y;s ?? (;XY ). For the specication of the error term,
we relax the usual normality assumption by specifying a mixture of h normal distributions
with zero mean:
"Y;s 
hX
j=1
s;j N
 
s;j; !
2
s;j

; E["Y;s] =
hX
j=1
s;j s;j = 0; (2.5)
for s = 0; 1, where s;j, s;j and !
2
s;j denote, respectively, the weight, mean and variance
of mixture component j. Mixtures of normals are widely used as a exible semiparametric
approach for density estimation (Ferguson, 1983a; Escobar and West, 1995). In our
empirical application, we nd that a three-component mixture (h = 3) for the error
term of the wage equation is crucial to achieve a good t to our data. It allows us to
capture unobserved heterogeneity that arises because individuals work in dierent areas
or sectors of modern complex labor markets.7
Within this specication, premarket locus of control can aect labor market outcomes
both directly and indirectly. The direct eect is measured by the factor loadings E;s and
Y;s, for s = 0; 1, while the indirect eect operates through the schooling decision. Two
dierent models are considered. First, we estimate the employment and wage equations
without conditioning on education, to capture the total eect of locus of control on wages.
To achieve this, individuals from both schooling groups are pooled, and the subscript s is
therefore dropped from Equations (2.3) to (2.5). In a second stage, both direct and indirect
eects are separately accounted for by specifying the model as stated above. Comparing
6Especially for the people who achieve higher education, since in this subsample some individuals
who do not participate in the labor market are still enrolled in the education system.
7In a frequentist approach, Dagsvik et al. (2011) also nd that Gaussian mixtures improve the t of
heavy-tailed log earnings distributions compared to normal distributions.
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the results from these two approaches turns out to be instructive to understand through
which channels premarket locus of control aects labor market outcomes.
A measurement system for locus of control
In our data, as in most empirical applications, variables measuring latent locus of control
come from a psychometric test using Likert scales with a small number of categories.
Although techniques to deal with ordinal variables in a multivariate context have a long
history in statistics and are now well-documented (see Joreskog and Moustaki, 2001, for
a survey of dierent approaches), a widespread approach in empirical research consists
of ignoring ordinality and treating the manifest items as continuous. This can however
distort the results in several ways, especially when the number of categories is limited,
and/or the distributions of the answers show high kurtosis.
In this chapter, the ordinal nature of the K measurements is explicitly accounted for by
specifying that each individual has a latent level of agreementM?k with the corresponding
statement k of the corresponding test, for k = 1; :::; K. This latent level of agreement is
assumed to linearly depend on some covariates XM and on the factor , and is discretized
by a set of cut-points fkg to produce the observed measurement, with C dierent
alternative ordered answers as follows:
Mk = c if k;c 1 M?k < k;c; c = 1; :::; C;
M?k = XMM;k + M;k + "M;k; for k = 1; :::; K; (2.6)
where M;k denotes the vector of parameters associated with XM , M;k represents the
factor loading, and the idiosyncratic error term "M;k is assumed to be standard normal
and independent of  and XM . Assuming standard normality for the error term is the
usual solution adopted to guarantee invariance of the latent response variable to scale
transformation. As for the cut-points, they are such that k;0 =  1 < k;1 = 0 < ::: <
k;C 1 < +1 = k;C .
Latent factor for locus of control
To complete the specication of the model, one last distributional assumption is required
for the latent factor . In a similar framework, Carneiro et al. (2003); Hansen et al. (2004)
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achieve nonparametric identication of the latent factors thanks to some independence and
support assumptions. When the measurement system consists of a combination of discrete
and continuous outcomes, they rst nonparametrically identify the joint distribution of
the observed and latent measurements, before turning to the identication of the latent
factors and error terms using a theorem proposed by Kotlarski (1967) and extended in
Cunha et al. (2010). In our case, this identication strategy cannot be applied, insofar
as the measurements are all discrete. Nonparametric identication of the latent factor
distribution, as well as of the error term distributions, would only be possible if we rst
managed to nonparametrically identify the joint distribution of the latent measurements.
However, the lack of variability and of exclusion restrictions for each measurement make
nonparametric identication and the use of more exible distributional assumptions such
as mixtures impossible. For these reasons, and for the sake of simplicity, we specify a
normal distribution and make the following independence assumption:
  N  0; 2 ;  ?? (X; ");
where X = (XS; XE; XY ; XM) and " = ("S; f"E;sg; f"Y;sg; f"M;kg).
Since the variance of the latent factor is not constrained, we need to impose one restriction
to set the scale of . For this purpose of identication, we x one of the factor loadings
to a given value in the measurement system.
2.4 Estimation Strategy
In this section, we present the identication strategy that relies on data set combination
in Section 2.4.1, as well as our estimation method and data in Section 6.5. The parameters
of interest are simulated through the implementation of Bayesian Markov chain Monte
Carlo techniques.
2.4.1 Combining data sets to identify the model likelihood
Ideally, we would have access to a data set where individuals are observed at dierent
periods of their life cycle. The likelihood of the model for such an hypothetical sample
16
CHAPTER 2. MAINTAINING (LOCUS OF) CONTROL?
can be expressed as
L( jS;E; Y;M;X) =
Z

1Y
s=0

Pr(S = sjXS; ;  ) f(EsjXE; ;  )f(YsjXY ; ;  )
1l[S=s]

KY
k=1
f(MkjXM ; ;  ) dF(); (2.7)
where  represents the vector containing all model parameters, f() invariantly denotes
a density function, and F() is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the latent
factor  on the support . In our case, this would require information on people's labor
market outcomes and personal background, as well as on their premarket locus of control.
Estimation based on the likelihood (2.7) would be straightforward.
Unfortunately, the structure of the GSOEP only oers this opportunity for a subsample
of the population, which turns out to be too small to conduct any relevant analysis.
Although the GSOEP is a longitudinal study, youth are surveyed since 2000 only, and
many of them still have not entered the labor market in 2008. We therefore have to face
a major dilemma: on the one hand, we have a large data set of working-age people (adult
sample), but without any information on their locus of control at the time of schooling. On
the other hand, a sample of 17-year-olds is available (youth sample), including premarket
locus of control measurements, but labor market outcomes only for a very small group
of mostly low-educated individuals. The adult and the youth samples can nevertheless
be combined to overcome this problem. We rely on an idea implemented in Cunha et al.
(2005), which consists of identifying one part of the likelihood in each subsample, getting
rid of the unobserved response variables by integrating them out of the likelihood.
To understand the mechanisms of the data set combination, consider the following sketch
of proof. First, derive the contribution to the likelihood of a person with higher education.
Since her future labor market participation and wage cannot be observed, they are
integrated out to provide
Z

Pr(S = 1jXS; ;  )
ZZ
f(E1jXE; ;  )f(Y1jXY ; ;  ) dFE1(E1) dFY1(Y1)


KY
k=1
f(MkjXM ; ;  ) dF()
=
Z

Pr(S = 1jXS; ;  )
KY
k=1
f(MkjXM ; ;  ) dF();
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where FW () represents the cdf of the corresponding random variableW . As a consequence,
the parameters of the measurement system and of the schooling equation can be identied
from the youth sample. However, due to the small sample size of youth who already earn
a wage on the labor market, identication and estimation of the parameters of the labor
market participation and wage equations from this sample is impossible.
In a similar fashion, consider a person without higher education from the adult sample,
whose measurements for premarket locus of control are not observed. Her contribution to
the likelihood is
Z

Pr(S = 0jXS; ;  ) f(E0jXE; ;  )f(Y0jXY ; ;  )

(
KY
k=1
Z
f(MkjXM ; ;  ) dFMk(Mk)
)
dF()
=
Z

Pr(S = 0jXS; ;  ) f(E0jXE; ;  )f(Y0jXY ; ;  ) dF();
and is obtained by integrating out the locus of control measures. Full identication of the
model is clearly infeasible in this subsample, since no observations on premarket locus of
control are available for the adults. However, since we are combining the two data sets
and estimating the overall model simultaneously, the distribution of the latent factor is
already identied from the youth sample.
Full identication of the model rests on the education equation, which is the only source
of common information for most of the sample, and therefore the bridge between the two
samples. Although our model can in theory be identied from two non-overlapping samples
of youth and adults, in practice we found it helpful to use all available information|i.e.,
measurement, schooling and labor market information|for the small sample of individuals
for whom both labor market outcomes and locus of control measurements are available.
2.4.2 Estimation
A fully Bayesian approach is used for the estimation of our model. Since the equations are
independent once  is conditioned on, the estimation can be divided into several pieces,
and MCMC methods are particularly suited for this kind of problem. In the wake of
Cunha et al. (2005); Carneiro et al. (2003); Hansen et al. (2004), we use a Gibbs sampler
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that sequentially draws the parameters of interest from their respective conditional
distributions, using at priors to remain as general as possible.8
Data augmentation procedures (Tanner and Wong, 1987) make it possible to simulate
the latent outcomes of the measurement system, of the schooling and labor market
participation equations, as well as the latent factor .9 Besides the practical convenience
of the approach, augmenting the observed data with the latent variables has another
major advantage in our case: the simulated latent factors and outcomes can be saved
during the sampling process, and used for post-processing analyses, such as simulations.10
In Section 2.5.2 for instance, these simulated variables are used to assess the t of the
model, and to conduct some formal tests.
Bayesian inference for ordinal variable models can be challenging. Slow convergence and
high autocorrelation of the parameter chains are typical symptoms of the algorithm failing
to cover the entire posterior distribution of the parameters. As noted by Cowles (1996),
the high correlation between the cut-points and the latent response variable results in a
poor mixing of the Markov chain for the parameters of Equation (2.6). In the end, this can
lead to overinated standard errors of the parameters, or even worse, to wrong estimates
(in terms of bias) if the chain is not long enough to provide a representative sample of
the conditional distribution. To remedy this problem, several technical improvements
have been proposed.11 We opt for the group transformation approach introduced by
Liu and Sabatti (2000), which speeds up convergence and enhances the mixing of the
chain, while being less computationally burdensome than other methods. We run a chain
of 1,010,000 iterations for each gender. After a burn-in period of 10,000 iterations, 10,000
iterations are saved every 100th sweep of the Gibbs sampler for post-processing inference.
We observe a fast convergence to the stationary distribution, and a good mixing of the
chain thanks to the implementation of the group transformation.
8For technical details on the Gibbs sampler in this framework, see BLINDED, 2010 where all posterior
distributions are derived.
9Data augmentation procedures are increasingly used in applied labor market and education research
(for recent examples see Horny et al., 2009; Koop and Tobias, 2004; Li, 2006).
10See van Dyk and Meng (2001) for a review of data augmentation.
11Cowles (1996) introduces a Hastings-within-Gibbs step in the algorithm to draw the cut-points
and the latent response variable simultaneously, while Nandram and Chen (1996) propose a simple
reparameterization that proves to be particularly eective, especially in the three-category case.
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Sample construction
We draw a combined sample of 1,534 youth (age 17-24) and 1,192 `young adults' (age 26-
35) from recent waves of the GSOEP. The special feature of the youth sample is that for
these youth, premarket measures of locus of control were administered when they were 17
years of age. In the German education system, individuals decide at around the age of 17
whether to nish their studies with a vocational high school certicate, or to continue their
schooling with academic high school credentials. Only the latter entitles agents to attend
higher education. Hence, our binary education variable reects this choice of obtaining a
vocational or an academic high school degree. Summary statistics of the education variable
in the two samples are presented in Table 2.5. For a small part of our youth sample (about
280 individuals), also wage and employment information is available. However, because
these individuals can be at most 24 years of age, most of them did not achieve higher
education. Furthermore, separate estimations by gender and schooling considerably reduce
the available sample size. Hence, as explained in the previous section, we augment the
youth sample with a second sample of young adults, whose education and labor market
outcomes can be assumed to be generated by the same data generating process. Summary
statistics on wages and employment participation of the combined sample can be found
in Table 2.6. The table displays that males earn higher wages than females, and that the
observed wage gap between high and low educated individuals is higher for males than for
females. The low levels of labor market participation arise because many individuals still
participate in education or training. To fully account for gender dierences in the impact of
locus of control on education decisions and outcomes, all estimates are obtained separately
for males and females.
In order to be able to identify dierent parts of the likelihood from dierent samples,
we make the assumption that both samples are generated by the same underlying data
generating process (DGP). Specically, we assume that if premarket locus of control and
labor market outcomes were available for both youths and adults, we would expect to
obtain the same estimated coecients. This assumption is restrictive in the sense that
Table 2.5 shows that among the youth sample, there is a slightly higher fraction of highly
educated individuals. In order to deal with this problem, we include age and cohort
dummies as covariates in the education, employment and wage equations, so as to capture
possible time trends or cohort eects.
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Locus of control measurements
Table 2.1: Locus of control questions and descriptive statistics
Males Females
Variables Mean SD Mean SD
Q1 My life's course depends on me 3.55 0.63 3.51 0.59
Q2 I have not achieved what I deserve 2.05 0.85 1.92 0.79
Q3 Success is a matter of fate or luck 2.22 0.81 2.29 0.77
Q4 Others decide about my life 2.18 0.83 2.12 0.83
Q5 Success is a matter of hard work 3.48 0.62 3.51 0.57
Q6 In case of diculties, doubt about own abilities 2.08 0.81 2.31 0.85
Q7 Possibilities in life depend on social conditions 2.69 0.78 2.72 0.75
Q8 Abilities are more important than eort 3.02 0.71 3.05 0.69
Q9 Little control over what happens to me 1.92 0.75 1.95 0.76
Q10 Social involvement can help inuence social conditions 2.48 0.87 2.51 0.77
# Observations 760 774
In the GSOEP youth questionnaire, locus of control is measured by a 10-item question-
naire. Each question is answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (\disagree completely")
to 4 (\agree completely"). Table 2.1 gives an overview of the questions and items we use.
We check whether, given these measurements, locus of control can indeed be represented
by a single factor. Conducting a principal component analysis, and calculating the
eigenvalues of the correlation matrix, we nd two eigenvalues larger than 1. Hence, the
Kaiser criterion (eigenvalue<1) is violated. However, the scree plot analysis displayed in
Figure 2.6 reveals an early attening of the curve, suggesting no more than one or two
underlying factors. Furthermore, locus of control is usually conceptualized as referring
to a unidimensional continuum, ranging from external to internal. Hence, we think that
we are making a reasonable decision by extracting a single factor. A scatter plot of the
respective factor loadings (Figure 2.7), with the rst two principal factors on the axis,
shows that some items load very highly on the extracted locus of control factor (factor 1),
while some other items have a loading close to zero (Q1, Q5, Q8 and Q10). Furthermore,
the items with a close to zero loading are items that capture an internal attitude, while
the other items mostly capture the external dimension of locus of control. Consequently,
we can draw two conclusions from this exploratory factor analysis. First, researchers who
use an index, constructed for example as the standardized mean of the items, instead of a
latent factor, force each of the measurement items to enter the index with an equal weight.
Doing this yields a locus of control measure that is awed by measurement error, and the
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coecients are likely to be biased downward due to attenuation bias. Second, in this
chapter we mostly capture the external attitude dimension of locus of control. For ease of
interpretation, in our empirical application we normalize the model such that lower scores
of the latent factor are associated with an external locus of control, and higher scores with
an internal locus of control. To ensure that our results are not distorted by the inclusion
of those items that have a low loading on the locus of control factor, we have conducted
robustness checks using only those items loading highly on the rst factor. We nd that
the use of the externalizing items only does not have a major impact on the results.12
Table 2.2: Samples and included covariates for the measurement
system, education, employment and wage equations
Type Meas. Educ. Empl. Wage
Samples
Youth sample X X (X) (X)
Adult sample | X X X
Covariates
Number of siblings D X | | |
% of time in broken family C X X | |
Father dropout B X X X X
Father grammar school B X X X X
Mother dropout B X X | |
Mother grammar school B X X | |
Region: North B X X X X
Region: South B X X X X
Childhood in large city B X X X X
Childhood in medium city B X X X X
Childhood in small city B X X X X
Track recommendation (highest) B X | | |
Track recommendation (lowest) B X | | |
Local unemployment rate C | | X X
Local unemployment rate (edu) C | X | |
Age of individual C | | X X
Cohort 26/30 B | X | X
Cohort 31/35 B | X | X
Married B | | X X
Number of Children C | | X X
Note: B = Binary, C = Continuous, D = Discrete. Local unemployment rate (edu) denotes the local
unemployment rate when the education decision is made.
12Results of the robustness check using only the externalizing items can be obtained from the authors
upon request.
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Covariates
Table 2.2 summarizes the covariates used for our analysis, and also shows how the
two samples are linked by the schooling equation. To account for family background,
socioeconomic status and labor market conditions, we control for a large range of
background variables, as well as for local unemployment rates at the time of education
decisions and labor market outcomes, respectively. In addition, Germany has an education
system where tracking already takes place after the fourth grade. Hence, to proxy cognitive
skills, and to account for the fact that these cognitive skills might aect the items revealing
premarket locus of control, we include the primary school teacher track recommendation as
a control variable in the measurement system. Because locus of control is estimated from
the residual variance net of covariates in the measurement system, covariates included
in the measurement equation are a means to purge locus of control of their inuence.
However, the inclusion of track recommendation only proxies cognitive skills and the
resulting track type. It cannot account for other conicting eects such as school quality.
Hence, locus of control, as identied in this chapter, only captures premarket locus of
control, and not necessarily pre-compulsory-school locus of control. Thus we control for
track recommendation, parental education and a large set of other background variables
to capture school quality, home investment and cognitive ability. Summary statistics of
control variables in the measurement and outcome equations can be found in Tables 2.7
and 2.8.13
2.5 Empirical Results
The results are presented and discussed in two stages. We rst provide a description of
the main ndings in Section 2.5.1, with an emphasis on the statistical signicance of the
impact of locus of control on the dierent outcomes, and on the t of our model. Then, we
gain more insights in Section 2.5.2 by conducting some simulations that make it possible
to better grasp the magnitude of the impact of locus of control.
13A detailed description of the coding of all variables can be obtained from the authors upon request.
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2.5.1 MCMC results
Factor loadings. The factor loadings express how the dierent measurements and
outcomes are aected by the latent factor. The larger the magnitude of the loadings,
the higher the contribution of the corresponding measurements to the distribution of the
latent factor. In the education, employment and wage equations, the loadings measure
the impact of the factor on the respective outcomes. Cross-model comparisons should
however be carefully done: the factor loadings of the dierent models cannot be directly
compared, as their magnitude and their sign depend on the normalization retained to
set the scale of the factor. We normalize the factor loading of the fourth indicator to  1
in all models, which is a way of anchoring the factor distribution in a real measurement
(Cunha and Heckman, 2008).14 However, contrary to Cunha and Heckman (2008), who
anchor the factor in earnings, we cannot give an interpretable metric to the latent factor,
because of the ordinal nature of the measurement. Moreover, the respective item of the
questionnaire used for the normalization might be perceived dierently by males and
females, and gender comparisons are therefore not straightforward.
Table 2.3 summarizes the estimation results for the factor loadings of the dierent models.
The results of the measurement system are in line with our expectations. Typical questions
associated with an external locus of control such as `Success is a matter of fate or luck'
(Q3) or `I have not achieved what I deserve' (Q2) have negative factor loadings, whereas
statements reecting an internal locus of control, such as `My life's course depends on
me' (Q1), have a positive factor loading. Also, the heterogeneity of these factor loadings
is worth noting, as well as the fact that some of them are not signicantly dierent from
zero.
In the outcome system of equations, the factor loading of the education equation is always
signicant and positive, indicating an actual impact of locus of control. When we do not
control for education [columns (1) and (3)], wages appear to be aected by locus of
control, whereas this impact vanishes when education is controlled for [columns (2) and
(4)]. Hence, with respect to the theoretical framework laid out in Section 6.3.1, we can
conclude that the impact of premarket locus of control on w0t and w
1
t , denoted by 0
and 1 respectively, is zero. However, we nd that locus of control does have an impact
14The fourth indicator is a typical externalizers' statement, hence the normalization to a negative
integer.
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on education decisions (P (S = 1)), and thus on wages in the end. Hence, reverting to
Equation (6.3), we can conclude that locus of control does not aect education decisions
via higher expected wages (0,1), but instead through its impact on the cost of education
C .
So far, no rm conclusions have been made as to the magnitude of the impact of locus
of control on education decisions and overall wages. In the following Section 2.5.2, the
simulations we conduct make it possible to unravel and quantify the actual impact of
locus of control on the dierent outcomes of interest.
Model t to actual data. Our model provides a good t to the data, and especially
to the distribution of wages. Figure 2.1 displays the observed distribution of wages,
along with their posterior predictive distribution for the dierent specications. The
actual distribution is quite well approximated by the posterior predictive distribution,
particularly in the case where the two schooling groups are pooled for the estimation of
the wage equation (panels 2.1a and 2.1b). When the wage equation is estimated by level
of schooling (panels 2.1c, 2.1d , 2.1e and 2.1f), the t is somewhat less good. Nevertheless,
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests we conduct to compare the actual distribution and the
posterior predictive distribution never reject the null hypothesis of equal distribution.
This result is in great part due to the use of normal mixtures for the error term, allowing
for a exible approximation of the true distribution.
To assess the goodness of t to the education decision, Table 2.22 shows the proportion
of correct predictions of education achievement for each decile of the latent factor
distribution. The t appears good overall, especially for the lower deciles of the
distribution.
2.5.2 Simulation of the model
To shed more light on the implications of our model, we need to go beyond the mere
interpretation of the factor loadings. Their statistical signicance reveals an impact of
locus of control on the outcomes, but is quite uninformative regarding the magnitude of
this impact (McCloskey and Ziliak, 1996; Ziliak and McCloskey, 2004). Since the eects
of premarket locus of control are intertwined and potentially operate through dierent
channels on wages, the best way to understand our model is to simulate it.
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Figure 2.1: Goodness-of-t check for wages: posterior predictive (dashed) vs. actual
distribution (solid) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equal distributions.
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Notes:Model estimated by conditioning labor market outcomes on education (panels 2.1c to 2.1f) and without conditioning
on education (panels 2.1a and 2.1b). Kernel density estimation implemented using a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth selected
using Silverman's rule of thumb (Silverman, 1986) with the variation proposed by Scott (1992). Wages predicted from their
posterior distribution using 1,000 replications of the sample. Shaded area represents 95% condence interval of posterior
predictive distribution. Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: Two-sample KS-test with null hypothesis that the actual sample and the
posterior predictive sample have the same distribution. p-values in brackets. Exact p-values could not be computed due to
ties in the distribution of actual wages.
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Figure 2.2: Latent factor distribution by levels of education: people with higher education
(S = 1) and without higher education (S = 0).
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Notes: Simulation from the estimates of the model using 1,000 replications of the posterior sample. Model estimated without
conditioning labor market outcomes on education. Predicted levels of education used (Pr(S = 1) > :5). Kernel density
estimation implemented using a Gaussian kernel with bandwidth selected using Silverman's rule of thumb (Silverman,
1986) with the variation proposed by Scott (1992). Kolmogorov-Smirnov test: Two-sample KS-test with null hypothesis
that the two distributions are the same. p-values in brackets. Exact p-values could not be computed due to ties in the
distribution of the latent factor.
Figure 2.2 plots the estimated posterior distribution of the latent factor by levels of
education, and shows that people who achieve higher education have a more internal locus
of control. For males, the gap between the two schooling groups is even wider, revealing
some gender dierences in the way locus of control inuences education decisions. The
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test conrms that the discrepancy between the two distributions is
statistically signicant for both genders.
To get more insight on the impact of premarket locus of control on later outcomes, we can
investigate how the wage of a given individual would be aected if she were exogenously
moved along the distribution of the latent factor, for a given set of observed characteristics
XY (Heckman et al., 2006). For this purpose, we compute the expected wage for dierent
quantiles of the distribution of the factor, conditional on a given set of covariates XY . The
Gibbs algorithm we implement to estimate our model generates a sample of the model
parameters from their conditional distribution that can be used as follows to approximate
the expected wage for each quantile q of the factor distribution:
1
M
MX
m=1

XY 
(m)
Y + q
(m)
 
(m)
Y

;
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Figure 2.3: Higher education probability for each decile of the factor distribution
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Notes: Simulation from the estimates of the model using 10,000 replications of the posterior sample. Model estimated
conditioning labor market outcomes on education. 95% condence band between dashed lines.
for a set of M simulated parameters (
(1)
Y ; 
(1)
Y ); : : : ; (
(M)
Y ; 
(M)
Y ). The quantile of the
latent factor q
(m)
 also has a superscript (m), since it depends on the variance of the factor

2(m)
 , and therefore varies during the MCMC sampling. Similarly, the schooling and labor
market participation probabilities in the qth quantile of the latent factor distribution can
be approximated by:
1
M
MX
m=1


XS
(m)
S + q
(m)
 
(m)
S

;
1
M
MX
m=1


XE
(m)
E + q
(m)
 
(m)
E

;
respectively, where () denotes the cdf of the standard normal distribution. More
specically, the simulations we present rely on the deciles of the distribution. In the
following, our simulations are performed for the mean individual of the corresponding
sample.
From Figure 2.3, locus of control appears to have a large impact on the schooling decision,
since moving the mean individual from the rst to the last decile of the distribution results
in a 0.30 point increase in the probability of achieving higher education for males, and
a 0.23 point increase for females. Similarly, Figure 2.4 shows that in the group of people
who did not achieve higher education, locus of control has a huge impact on labor market
participation. This eect is more or less linear for females, whereas for males the concavity
of the curve indicates that people in the low deciles are more aected than people in the
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Figure 2.4: Labor market participation for each decile of the factor distribution
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Notes: Simulation from the estimates of the model using 10,000 replications of the posterior sample. Model estimated
conditioning labor market outcomes on education. 95% condence band between dashed lines.
higher deciles of the distribution. Concerning wages, Figure 2.5 shows that if the mean
individual could be moved exogenously from the rst to the 9th decile of the locus of
control distribution, this would corresponds to an increase in hourly wages of roughly
4.40 Euros for the mean male individual, and of roughly 2.20 Euros for the mean female
individual.
At rst sight, the eect of locus of control on education choice and labor market outcomes
seems large. For instance, the mean male individual would earn 36% more in the last
decile than in the rst one. However, it is unrealistic to see an individual move all the
way across the distribution. People are more likely to make small moves from one decile
to the adjacent ones, and Figures 2.3 to 2.5 show that in the middle of the distribution,
the locus of control eect is much smaller.
2.5.3 Some remarks on the results
In summary, we nd an eect of locus of control on schooling probabilities, where
males are more aected than females. Moving the mean individual in the distribution
of the latent factor substantially changes her/his wage. However, this overall eect only
operates through the channel of schooling. This nding that premarket locus of control
inuences schooling is in line with Coleman and DeLeire (2003), although in their paper
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Figure 2.5: Mean log wage for each decile of the factor distribution
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Notes: Simulation from the estimates of the model using 10,000 replications of the posterior sample. Model estimated
without conditioning labor market outcomes on education. 95% condence band between dashed lines.
the mechanism through which locus of control aects schooling is dierent, as it only
works through wage expectations.
Our results seem somewhat contrary to the more direct link between locus of control and
wages that been found in some of the literature (Heckman et al., 2006; Heineck and Anger,
2010). Three dierent answers can be put forward to address this apparent contradiction.
First, the term `noncognitive skills' is very often used as a generic expression encompassing
a lot of dierent personal abilities and traits, sometimes leading to confusion. A compar-
ison of results is possible only if the same concept is used. For instance, Heckman et al.
(2006) nd a signicant eect of noncognitive skills on wages. However, they use a single
underlying factor for noncognitive skills constructed from two psychometric tests, namely
the Rosenberg self-esteem scale and the Rotter scale. This composite factor thus captures
a dierent dimension than our factor, especially since it loads more on the self-esteem scale
than on the locus of control scale in their empirical study. Second, and more importantly,
we focus on premarket locus of control as a measure of locus of control that is independent
of labor market experience. As a consequence, our ndings dier from the results presented
by Heineck and Anger (2010) who nd a strong and signicant impact of locus of control
on wages, even after controlling for education. One reason could be that the authors do
not estimate separate models by education level. More likely, however, the dierence in
results arises because of the use of contemporaneous measurements in their study, while
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we focus on the impact of premarket locus of control. Third, we only look at a sample of
young labor market entrants. At this stage, wage setting is likely to be merely a function
of formal qualications. Hence, only after individuals have entered the labor market, a
complex dynamic interaction process begins. While working on-the-job, individuals learn
about their abilities, while at the same time employers adapt their knowledge about
an individual's locus of control. As a result, a positive interdependence between locus
of control and wages may arise (such as the one found by Heineck and Anger, 2010).
Additional analyses not displayed in this chapter show that the correlation between locus
of control and wages does indeed increase with age and experience of the agents. Whether
this is the result of reverse causality or learning of employers is an interesting topic left
for future research. One explanation may be that although early locus of control does not
inuence wages directly, it may inuence late locus of control which in turn is directly
rewarded on the labor market. We leave it for future research to nd out whether there
exists a constant and invariable component to personality traits in general, and to locus of
control in particular. Such a component may be extracted using dynamic factor models,
and would require repeated measurements of locus of control over large parts of the life-
cycle.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we use Bayesian factor structure models to investigate how locus of control
inuences education decisions and wages. Using advanced econometric methods, we show
that such recent methods can serve as a solution measurement error and endogeneity
problems, especially if researchers are confronted with truncated life cycle data, as is very
often the case for research at the intersection of psychology and economics.
We establish that an individual's premarket locus of control substantially raises the
probability of choosing higher education. We also show that locus of control inuences
wages through schooling, but that there is no direct impact on wages once schooling is
controlled for. Thus, in a framework where schooling decisions depend on relative lifetime
earnings returns for each schooling level, net of the costs of obtaining either level of
education, we can infer from our results that premarket locus of control, as measured
at the age of 17, is not directly rewarded as a skill on the labor market. Instead, it is a
personality trait that inuences the non-pecuniary costs of education. Our work conveys
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important policy implications. If some personality traits, such as locus of control, inuence
the cost of education but not outcomes directly, these individual characteristics may keep
individuals from studying who, once they reach the labor market, are no less successful
than other individuals. If these individuals are at high risk of dropping out of school, early
personality tests and targeted mentoring of students with an external locus of control are
a means to countervail skill shortages in society.
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2.A Data Addendum
Our data come from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), a representative
longitudinal micro-dataset that contains a wide range of socio-economic information on
individuals in Germany, comprising follow-ups for the years 1984-2008. Information was
rst collected from about 12,200 randomly selected adult respondents in West Germany
in 1984. After German reunication in 1990, the GSOEP was extended to around 4,500
persons from East Germany, and subsequently supplemented and expanded by additional
samples. The data are well-suited for our analysis in that they allow us to exploit
information on a wide range of background variables, locus of control and wages, for a
representative panel of individuals. Furthermore, the inclusion of a special youth survey,
comprising information on 17-year-olds, allows us to obtain background variables and
locus of control measures for individuals who have not yet entered the labor market.
2.A.1 Combining samples
Our focus is to analyze the impact of locus of control and to purge our estimates of
measurement error and endogeneity problems. Hence, to investigate how locus of control
aects schooling decisions and wages, respectively, we would ideally need a sample of
individuals for whom locus of control measures are collected at several points in time:
rst, at the time when individuals make education decisions, and second, at a time just
before they start the respective job for which labor market returns can be observed. In
this way, we would obtain locus of control measures that are truly exogenous, and not
inuenced by previous on-the-job labor market experience. However, we only have access
to one measure of what we term `premarket' locus of control. This measure is taken when
individuals are 17 years of age, just after compulsory schooling, but before they enter
the labor market.15 We then combine the sample of youth for which we have `premarket'
locus of control measures with a sample of young adults for whom we observe labor market
outcomes. We draw our samples on the basis of selection criteria that are explained in the
following.
15Locus of control measures have also been collected for a cross section of young adults in 2007, but
we disregard this information, as we suspect it to be awed by previous labor market experience.
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Youth sample
Our youth sample is composed of 1,534 individuals born between 1984 and 1991, all
of which are children of GSOEP panel members. A comprehensive set of background
variables, schooling choices, as well as locus of control measures of these individuals, have
been collected in the years 2001-2008, when the subjects were 17 years of age. After the
rst interview at age 17, all subjects are subsequently interviewed on a yearly basis until
early adulthood. For example, in 2008, the oldest youth are 24 years of age. An exception
to the age rule was made for the 2001 wave, such that some subjects were already 18 or 19
years of age when rst completing the questionnaire. We exclude these individuals from
our sample. Besides, to ensure that our results are not awed by post 1991 schooling and
labor market adjustments, all individuals who went to school in East Germany (the former
German Democratic Republic) have been excluded. Last, we exclude all individuals with
missing locus of control measures, missing schooling information, or missing information
among the covariates.
Adult sample
The adult sample used for our analysis comprises information on 1,192 individuals, aged
26-35, who are drawn from all West German representative subsamples We construct a
cross-section of individuals based on the most recent information available from the waves
2004-2008. Hence, most of our information on the adult sample stems from the 2008 wave.
However, if some important pieces of information on certain individuals in that wave are
missing, they are lled up with information from 2007. If the information in the 2007
wave is also missing, information from 2006 is used, and so on.
We want to ensure that labor market outcomes and cognitive measures are not related
to language problems, post 1991 adjustments, or discrimination. Hence, we exclude
non-German citizens, individuals who did not live in West Germany at the time of
reunication, as well as individuals whose parents do not speak German as a mother
tongue. We also exclude handicapped individuals and individuals in vocational training.
Furthermore, we exclude individuals with missing schooling information, because the
schooling equation is crucial as it links our two samples and ensures identication. Also,
individuals with missings among the control variables are dropped from the sample.
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2.A.2 `Premarket' locus of control
In the GSOEP, locus of control is measured by a 10-item questionnaire. However, the
number of possible answers diers between the years 2001-2005, where a 7-point scale
was used, and the years 2006-2008, where a 4-point item scale was used. To make the
questionnaire comparable across samples, we transform the 7-point scale into a 4-point
scale by assigning the middle category (4) either to category 2 or 3 of the 4-item scale,
depending on the most probable answer. For example, if in the 2005 sample most youth
answered \completely agree," people who answered \indierent" in the 2006 sample are
assumed to tend toward the \slightly agree" answer. After transforming answers to have
the same scale, each question is answered on a Likert scale ranging from 1 (\completely
disagree ") to 4 (\completely agree").
2.A.3 School choice
We group schooling into two broad categories: higher education and lower education.
Individuals are classied as being highly educated whenever they have some kind of
academic qualication. That is, to qualify as highly educated, individuals need to have
passed at least those exams that mark the completion of secondary schooling, and which
are obtained in tracks with an academic orientation (German high school diploma (Abitur)
obtained either at Gymnasium or Gesamtschule). To identify the level of schooling
obtained, we use the international Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial
Nations (CASMIN) Classication, which is a generated variable available in the GSOEP.
We dene individuals as being highly educated when their attained education level
corresponds to CASMIN categories (2c, 3a, 3b). Similarly, individuals are low-educated if
their education status is classied according to CASMIN classication categories (1b, 1c,
2a, 2b). Furthermore, for a subsample of youth who have not completed their education
at the time of the last interview, we replace their nal education status with their aspired
(planned) level of education.
2.A.4 Wage construction and labor market participation
Wages are constructed by using most recent wage information available from the GSOEP.
Whenever occurring, missing wage information was substituted by wage information
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obtained in one of the earlier years. Wages have been ination adjusted to match 2008 wage
levels (ination rates obtained from Eurostat). Wages are assigned a missing whenever
the respective individual is indicating not to have a regular (full time or part time) job.
We exclude other types of employment such as marginal employment, to ensure that we
are not including typical student jobs.
Hourly wages have been constructed by dividing gross monthly wages by the actual
number of hours worked in the last month before the interview. Log hourly wages are
then obtained by taking the natural logarithm of the hourly wage variable. To account for
outliers, we trim hourly wages below the rst and above the ninety ninth percentiles. All
individuals who indicate a positive wage and are full- or part-time employed are classied
as labor market participants.
2.A.5 Covariates
In our measurements system, schooling equation and outcome equations, we control for
a large set of background variables. The locus of control factor distribution is identied
from the covariance structure of the unobservables of the model. Hence, any controls in
the measurement system purge our measures of locus of control of any eects which are
captured by the covariates. Thus, the covariates in place should be uncorrelated with the
latent trait we want to capture, since in our model the latent factor has to be uncorrelated
with these covariates by construction. In the following, a brief description of the dierent
categories of covariates is provided.
Parental education and investment
Parental education variables have been constructed in the form of dummy variables
for higher secondary degree (German Gymnasium), lower secondary degree (German
Hauptschule or Realschule), dropout and other degree. This information was collected
using the Biography Questionnaire, which every person answers when she is rst
interviewed in the GSOEP.
Apart from parental education, Parental investment is proxied by two variables: broken
home and number of siblings. Our broken home variable reects the percentage of
childhood time spent in a broken home until the age of 15. This information was also
obtained from the Biography Questionnaire. Last, the number of siblings is obtained for
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the youth by counting the number of siblings living in the household. If an individual has
many brothers and sisters, this may indicate that parental time is spread among more
individuals, and that overall parental investment is lower.
Region dummies and city size
Because school quality and availability, culture and incomes may vary between large and
small municipalities, we control for the size of the city where agents spent most of their
childhood. Hence, we specify dummy variables for large city, medium city, small city and
countryside. Furthermore, we specify four region variables to represent the current region
of residence. Hereby, the German Lander are classied as follows:
 North: Berlin, Bremen, Hamburg, Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein,
 South: Bavaria, Baden-Wurttemberg,
 West: Hessen, North Rhine-Westphalia, Rhineland-Palatinate, Saarland,
 East: Brandenburg, Mecklenburg Western Pomerania, Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt,
Thuringia.
Unemployment rates
We construct unemployment rates at two dierent points in time. First, we use overall
German unemployment at the time when individuals are 17, to have a rough measure of the
business cycle when schooling decisions are made. Second, we use region (Lander) specic
unemployment rates at the time when labor market outcomes are observed. The latter
are important to explain the participation decision, as well as local wage rates. All local
unemployment rates are obtained from the Federal Employment Oce (Bundesagentur
fur Arbeit), and overall unemployment from the German Federal Statistical Agency
(Bundesamt fur Statistik).
Marital status and number of children
We construct a dummy variable for whether someone is married by looking at her current
marital status. Furthermore, we identify the number of dependent children by counting
all children for which child benet payments (Kindergeld) are received by the household.
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These variables are important, because previous studies show that being married and the
number of dependent children have a positive impact on labor market participation and
wages for males, and a negative one for females (see, e.g., Hill, 1979, among others).
Track recommendation after elementary school
We acknowledge that both schooling decisions and locus of control measures may
be correlated with cognitive skills. Hence, in order to proxy cognitive skills, and to
account for the fact that schooling decisions may depend on prior track attendance, we
include an individual's track recommendations after elementary school. In Germany, track
recommendations are given to every student during 4th grade by their elementary school
teachers. In some of the German Lander, track recommendations are non-mandatory (but
generally adhered to). In some other Lander, track recommendations are compulsory.
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Figure 2.6: Scree plot: all measurements versus 6 `external' items only
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Scree plots
Figure 2.7: Scatterplot of loadings: all measurements versus 6 `external' items only
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Table 2.5: Proportion of people with higher education (all samples)
Variables Mean SD N
Females (youth sample) 0.518 0.500 774
Males (youth sample) 0.459 0.499 760
Females (adult sample) 0.461 0.499 592
Males (adult sample) 0.368 0.483 600
2.B Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.6: Descriptive statistics: labor market outcomes by schooling
High education Low education
Variables Mean SD N Mean SD N p-value
Labor market participation (males) 0.49 0.50 472 0.71 0.45 617 0.00
Hourly wage (males) 16.03 7.16 228 11.58 4.67 435 0.00
Labor market participation (females) 0.49 0.50 553 0.58 0.49 558 0.00
Hourly wage (females) 12.89 4.86 269 10.35 4.00 316 0.00
Source: GSOEP, cross section using most recent information from the waves 2004-2008. Own calculations. Notes:
p-values of a two-sided t-test for dierences in means are reported.
Table 2.7: Descriptive statistics: covariates in the measurement system
Males Females
Variables Mean SD Mean SD
Childhood in large city 0.20 0.40 0.22 0.42
Childhood in medium city 0.19 0.40 0.19 0.40
Childhood in small city 0.29 0.45 0.25 0.44
North 0.26 0.44 0.24 0.43
South 0.31 0.46 0.34 0.47
Recommendation: grammar school 0.39 0.49 0.45 0.50
Recommendation: general secondary school 0.17 0.38 0.13 0.34
Number of siblings 0.98 1.27 1.01 1.22
Broken home 0.24 0.43 0.24 0.43
Father grammar school 0.29 0.45 0.33 0.47
Father dropout 0.03 0.16 0.04 0.19
Mother grammar school 0.23 0.42 0.25 0.44
Mothers dropout 0.01 0.10 0.03 0.16
# Observations 760 774
Source: GSOEP, cross section using most recent information from the waves 2004-2008. Own calculations.
Notes: p-values of a two-sided t-test for dierences in means are reported.
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2.C Identication of the Model
The overall model consists of K + 5 submodels, with the latent factor  as only source
of unobserved correlation between them. Let  be the set of all parameters. Stated as
such, our model is not identied. The lack of identication has dierent sources. Some are
typical in latent variable models and can be xed by imposing appropriate restrictions
(section 2.C). Others are due to the structure of our data set, and more specically to
the fact that the overall model is not identied if we use the two samples separately.
Identication only arises from the combination of the two samples (Section 2.4.1).
Identifying restrictions
Independence assumption of the factor The latent factor is assumed to be
independent of the covariates and of the error terms:
 ?? (X; "); (2.8)
where X = (XS; XY ; XM) and " = ("S; f"Y;sg; f"M;kg). This assumption is standard in
factor analysis and is required for identication.
Ordinal models The rst problem with these models is the invariance of the
measurements to location transformations of the latent M. Adding any constant term
to equation (2.6) and shifting the thresholds  by the same quantity will not alter the
observed measurements. This problem is typically solved by setting the rst nite cut-
point 1 to zero. In case no intercept term is included in the equation, this restriction is
redundant. The second problem is the invariance to scale transformations. Multiplying
the latent measurements by a constant will modify the covariance matrix, but will
leave the likelihood unchanged if the cut-points are multiplied by the same constant.
To better understand this point, consider the (K  1)-vector of latent measurements
M = (M1 ; :::;M

K)
0 and stack the corresponding equations to obtain the following system:
M = (IK 
XM)M + #;
# = M + "M ;
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where M = (
0
M;1; :::; 
0
M;K)
0, M = (M;1; :::; M;K)0 and "M = diag Kk=1 f"kg. Because of
the independence assumption (2.8), the covariance matrix of the error term # is
V[#] =
0BBBBBBBBB@
2M;1
2
 + 
2
"M;1
M;1M;2
2
 
2
M;2
2
 + 
2
"M;2
M;1M;3
2
 M;2M;3
2
 
2
M;3
2
 + 
2
"M;3
...
...
. . .
M;1M;K
2
 M;2M;K
2
 : : : 
2
M;K
2
 + 
2
"M;K
1CCCCCCCCCA
(2.9)
The invariance to scale transformations problem is usually solved by xing the diagonal
elements of the covariance matrix to one. This restriction sets the scale of the latent
measurements, and thus enables parameter identication from the polychoric correlation
matrix. In our case, the structure of the covariance matrix is well-dened. Since the
measurements are independent conditional on the controls XM and on the factor , it
is sucient to restrict the variances of the error terms to one to achieve identication
(2"M;1 = ::: = 
2
"M;K
= 1). With this restriction, there exists no scale transformation of
the measurements yielding the same likelihood other than the identity transformation.
The last identication issue concerns the factor loadings. Looking at the covariance matrix
(2.9), it becomes clear that only the ratios of the factor loadings can be identied from
the covariances, for example:
Cov(M1 ;M

2 jXM)
Cov(M1 ;M

3 jXM)
=
M;2
M;3
: (2.10)
The factor loadings are thus identied up to a multiplicative constant. This is a typical
problem in factor analysis which can be easily solved by xing one of the loadings to one,
so as to set the scale of the latent factor . In the ratio (2.10), x for instance M;3 to
one to identify M;2. With M;2 in hand, M;1 can then be retrieved from the following
relation:
Cov(M1 ;M

4 jXM)
Cov(M2 ;M

4 jXM)
=
M;1
M;2
;
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and all the other loadings can be identied by domino eect in the same way. Once the
factor loadings have been identied, the variance of the latent factor 2 can be recovered
from any element of the covariance matrix (2.9).
Dichotomous model If the latent factor  is treated as given, the schooling choice in
equation (2.2) can be regarded as a simple probit model. The variance of the error term
"S is xed to one to ensure the identiability of the parameters. For the factor loading S
to be identied, the same argument as before can be applied using the covariance between
the latent utility of schooling S and any latent measurement Mk .
Specication of latent factor distribution and error terms distributions
In their seminal papers, Heckman and co-authors (see e.g. Hansen et al. (2004), among
others) achieve nonparametric identication by means of some independence and support
assumptions. When the measurement system consists continuous outcomes, they rst
nonparametrically identify the joint distribution of the observed and latent measurements
before turning to the identication of the latent factors and error terms using a theorem
proposed by Kotlarski (1967). In our case, this identication strategy cannot be applied,
insofar as we only dispose of discrete measurements. Nonparametric identication of the
latent factor distribution as well as of the error term distributions would only be possible
if we rst managed to nonparametrically identify the joint distribution of the latent
measurements. This preliminary stage appears to be dicult when dealing with discrete
variables, if not impossible. In our case, there is actually no chance to nonparametrically
identify this joint distribution, because the covariates used are sparse and common
across measurement equations. The lack of variability for each measurement prevents
any nonparametric identication. For this reason, we will use a fully parametric approach
in our empirical application.
Following Heckman et al. (2006), and to remain as exible as possible, a mixture of
normals is specied for the distribution of the factor. Mixtures of gaussian distributions
are widely used in applied work to approximate unknown densities (Escobar and West,
1995). This popularity is rooted in the seminal work of Ferguson (1983b) who showed
that normal mixtures with a large number of components can approximate virtually any
distribution. In most applications, only a small number of components can be estimated to
keep the likelihood tractable. The use of mixtures instead of the usual gaussian distribution
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for the factor makes it possible to capture some features of the latent factor distribution
which would otherwise be neglected, thus reducing the bias in the estimation of the factor
loadings.
For the sake of simplicity, standard normal distributions are assumed for the error terms of
the schooling and measurement equations. For the wage equation, a mixture of normals is
used to introduce more exibility. The use of a normal mixture allows more exibility in
accounting for wage heterogeneity, and proves to be very helpful. Another alternative
would be to introduce a second latent factor in the wage equation to capture this
unobserved heterogeneity. In our case, we only have two equations in the adult sample
and the identication of a second latent factor would be problematic.
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2.D Estimation Results
Table 2.9: Shooling choice { males,
common wage equation
Schooling
cst 0.1912
(0.1309)
nb siblings -0.1250
(0.0389)
broken family -0.2835
(0.1162)
father secondary school -0.1750
(0.1064)
father grammar school 0.9739
(0.1351)
mother secondary school -0.3475
(0.1047)
mother grammar school 0.6228
(0.1514)
north -0.0013
(0.1169)
south -0.2238
(0.1076)
large city 0.2390
(0.1343)
medium city 0.1034
(0.1318)
small city 0.1301
(0.1172)
cohort 26/30 -0.3253
(0.1403)
cohort 31/35 -0.2576
(0.1366)
factor 0.3062
(0.0890)
precision 1.0000
(0.0000)
Table 2.10: Common wage equation {
males
Wage
cst 2.4501
(0.1591)
unemp rate -0.0040
(0.0168)
large city 0.0854
(0.0696)
medium city -0.0651
(0.0629)
small city 0.0738
(0.0655)
north -0.0857
(0.0631)
south 0.0274
(0.0836)
cohort 31/35 0.1661
(0.0482)
factor 0.1738
(0.0672)
precision 4.8042
(0.9731)
Note: Estimates obtained with 100,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard deviations in
brackets.
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Table 2.12: Schooling choice { males, wage
equation by schooling
Schooling
cst 0.1919
(0.1292)
nb siblings -0.1272
(0.0384)
broken family -0.2798
(0.1137)
father secondary school -0.1736
(0.1046)
father grammar school 0.9717
(0.1325)
mother secondary school -0.3386
(0.1026)
mother grammar school 0.6115
(0.1479)
north -0.0059
(0.1149)
south -0.2176
(0.1065)
large city 0.2332
(0.1311)
medium city 0.1015
(0.1294)
small city 0.1237
(0.1150)
cohort 26/30 -0.3175
(0.1378)
cohort 31/35 -0.2523
(0.1331)
factor 0.2093
(0.0812)
precision 1.0000
(0.0000)
Table 2.13: Wage equation by schooling {
males
Wage 0 Wage 1
cst 2.3595 2.6903
(0.1892) (0.2784)
unemp rate -0.0032 -0.0082
(0.0208) (0.0278)
large city -0.0045 0.0460
(0.0895) (0.1097)
medium city -0.0835 -0.0644
(0.0721) (0.1076)
small city 0.1048 -0.0698
(0.0763) (0.1108)
north -0.0491 -0.1546
(0.0749) (0.1084)
south 0.0417 0.0178
(0.0952) (0.1452)
cohort 31/35 0.1191 0.2138
(0.0558) (0.0863)
factor -0.0002 -0.0139
(0.0888) (0.0901)
precision 4.9933 3.2207
(1.1684) (0.9281)
Note: Estimates obtained with 100,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard deviations in
brackets.
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Table 2.15: Shooling choice { females,
common wage equation
Schooling
cst 0.6001
(0.1398)
nb siblings -0.1560
(0.0383)
broken family -0.4022
(0.1136)
father secondary school -0.0588
(0.1126)
father grammar school 1.0399
(0.1388)
mother secondary school -0.4182
(0.1088)
mother grammar school 0.5096
(0.1558)
north -0.3204
(0.1191)
south -0.2768
(0.1100)
large city -0.0379
(0.1318)
medium city 0.0772
(0.1361)
small city 0.0168
(0.1237)
cohort 26/30 -0.3119
(0.1389)
cohort 31/35 -0.0365
(0.1410)
factor 0.4840
(0.1093)
precision 1.0000
(0.0000)
Table 2.16: Common wage equation {
females
Wage
cst 2.3756
(0.1743)
unemp rate 0.0009
(0.0195)
large city -0.0412
(0.0767)
medium city 0.0654
(0.0715)
small city 0.0361
(0.0660)
north -0.0928
(0.0715)
south 0.0676
(0.0918)
cohort 31/35 0.0614
(0.0517)
factor 0.2125
(0.0812)
precision 5.2990
(0.9568)
Note: Estimates obtained with 100,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard deviations in
brackets.
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Table 2.18: Shooling choice { females, wage
equation by schooling
Schooling
cst 0.6050
(0.1377)
nb siblings -0.1578
(0.0378)
broken family -0.4041
(0.1120)
father secondary school -0.0687
(0.1108)
father grammar school 1.0359
(0.1370)
mother secondary school -0.4173
(0.1071)
mother grammar school 0.5052
(0.1543)
north -0.3181
(0.1180)
south -0.2755
(0.1083)
large city -0.0399
(0.1298)
medium city 0.0747
(0.1339)
small city 0.0136
(0.1222)
cohort 26/30 -0.3082
(0.1367)
cohort 31/35 -0.0357
(0.1383)
factor 0.4178
(0.1077)
precision 1.0000
(0.0000)
Table 2.19: Wage equation by schooling {
females
Wage 0 Wage 1
cst 2.4813 2.4444
(0.2609) (0.2444)
unemp rate -0.0186 0.0018
(0.0296) (0.0272)
large city -0.0739 0.0233
(0.1099) (0.1068)
medium city 0.0528 0.0821
(0.1025) (0.0983)
small city -0.0191 0.0710
(0.0965) (0.0900)
north -0.0450 -0.0752
(0.0978) (0.1068)
south -0.0741 0.1291
(0.1304) (0.1267)
cohort 31/35 -0.0554 0.1223
(0.0730) (0.0719)
factor -0.0617 -0.0430
(0.1394) (0.1102)
precision 4.2845 5.0350
(1.0479) (1.1527)
Note: Estimates obtained with 100,000 draws from the posterior distribution. Standard deviations in
brackets.
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2.E Goodness-of-t Tests
Table 2.21: Goodness-of-t test for log wages
(Kolmogorov-Smirnov test)
Males Females
(1) (2) (3) (4)
overall 0.026 0.027
(0.745) (0.799)
S = 0 0.085 0.055
(0.072) (0.398)
S = 1 0.042 0.047
(0.418) (0.479)
Notes: Model estimated by conditioning labor market outcomes on
education [(2) and (4)] and without conditioning on education [(1) and
(3)]. Two-sample K-S test with null hypothesis that the actual sample
and the posterior predictive sample have the same distribution. p-values
in brackets. Exact p-values could not be computed due to ties in the
distribution of actual wages.
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Chapter 3
Maternal Endowments, Investments,
and Birth Outcomes
3.1 Introduction
Maternal cognitive, social and health endowments are important determinants of prenatal
behaviors and a ring in the chain of the intergenerational transmission of inequality.
Using UK data from the National Child Development Study (NCDS), the top panel of
Figure 3.1 shows that mothers at the lowest quartile of the distribution of cognitive skills
are almost 10 percentage points more likely to give birth to Small for Gestational Age
(SGA)2 babies than mothers in the upper quartile of the distribution.3 Similarly, mothers
with low social skills and mothers with less healthy physical constitution are more likely
to give birth to small for gestational age babies than their counterparts in the upper tail of
the distribution. These maternal endowments can aect newborn health either directly, or
through prenatal choices, such as education and smoking.4 The bottom panel of Figure 3.1
shows that both choices are highly correlated with the probability of giving birth to an
SGA baby. These gures only show correlations. In practice, we need to understand causal
mechanisms to develop eective policies. This is our aim in this chapter.
1This chapter is joint work with Gabriella Conti, James J. Heckman and Arianna Zanolini.
2SGA is dened in this chapter as being below the 10th percentile of the distribution of birthweight
by gestational age.
3Endowments here are latent factor scores predicted from measurements of cognitive skill, social skill
and physical constitution, respectively. All details of our estimation are reported in Section 2.
4Unfortunately, we are unable to examine other maternal prenatal behaviors due to data limitations.
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Figure 3.1: Probability of being born small for gestational age (SGA), by maternal traits
and treatment status
Cognitive Social Physical Constitution
Incidence of ’Small for Gestational Age’ by Maternal Traits
P e
r c
e n
t  S
G
A
0 .
0 0
0 .
0 5
0 .
1 0
0 .
1 5
0 .
2 0
0 .
2 5
0.201 0.129 0.184 0.131 0.229 0.094
<25 %
>75 %
E=1 S=0 E=0 S=0 E=1 S=1 E=0 S=1
Incidence of SGA by Smoking in Pregnancy and Education
P e
r c
e n
t  S
G
A
0 .
0 0
0 .
0 5
0 .
1 0
0 .
1 5
0 .
2 0
0 .
2 5
0.106 0.141 0.212 0.239
Post−compulsory, non−smoking
Compulsory, non−smoking
Post−compulsory, smoking
Compulsory, smoking
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these gures are
based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates.
60
CHAPTER 3. MATERNAL ENDOWMENTS, INVESTMENTS, AND BIRTH
OUTCOMES
First, examining the eects of maternal endowments on newborn health is important
because it helps us understanding how intergenerational transmission of disadvantage
arises. On the one hand, more disadvantaged mothers (Currie (2009), Finch (2003),
Kramer et al. (2001)) tend to give birth to babies in poorer health. On the other hand, in
a circle of intergenerational transmission of disadvantage, infants with worse health also
have worse labor market outcomes, lower test scores, poorer health later in life and even a
higher probability of themselves giving birth to babies with worse health. This relationship
persists even after controlling for maternal characteristics, environments, and for genetic
endowments (Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004), Royer (2009), Oreopoulos et al. (2008),
Currie and Hyson (1999)). In this chapter, we study how disadvantage is transmitted from
mother to child, and consider low maternal cognitive, social and physical endowments as
one particular form of disadvantage.
Critically, we go beyond simply assessing the relationship between maternal endowments
and newborn health, to examine the mechanisms behind it. We both estimate the total
impact of maternal endowments on birth outcomes, and we also decompose it into a
direct, \biological" eect, and into a \choice" eect, which is mediated by maternal
behaviors. Additionally, we estimate the causal eects of maternal education and smoking
in pregnancy, and we investigate whether women endowed with dierent traits have
dierent returns.
The chapter is structured as follows. We discuss the relationship of our work with the
previous literature in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3 we present our model and estimation
strategy. We describe our data in Section 3.4, and discuss our results in Section 6.6.
Section 6.7 concludes.
3.2 Previous Literature
[Literature]
Our work is related to several dierent literatures. The rst strand of literature
we refer to is the one studying the eects of early endowments. Maternal endow-
ments have been found to be predictive of risky behaviors (Carneiro et al. (2007),
Heckman et al. (2006), Conti et al. (2010)) and of child health (Rubalcava and Teruel
(2004), Bhargava and Fox-Kean (2003), Currie and Moretti (2007)), both in the eco-
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nomic and in the medical/epidemiologic literature. The latter has mostly focused
on the link between maternal birth weight and height and ospring birth weight
(Gluckman and Hanson (2004b), Subramanian et al. (2009), Kramer (1987)). However,
none of these papers analyzes the mechanisms through which maternal endowments
operate. Nonetheless, the importance of accounting for them has long been recognized.
For example, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983) report that not accounting for unobserved
parental health endowments leads to a substantial under-estimation of the benets of
early prenatal care, while Fertig (2010) and Tominey (2007) nd that selection explains
between a third and a half of the association between prenatal smoking and birth weight.
The second strand of literature we contribute to is the one examining the eects of
maternal prenatal behaviors on newborn health. Such literature reports estimates of
varying magnitude of the negative eects on the baby, especially for what concerns
prenatal smoking behavior. On the one hand, using panel data methods, prenatal smoking
has been found to reduce birth weight on average by 150-250 grams (see e.g. Abrevaya
(2006); Almond et al. (2005)). On the other hand, using instrumental variable (IV)
techniques and maternal xed eects, the magnitude of the eect is reduced to 50g
(Lien and Evans (2005), Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1991), Walker et al. (2009), Abrevaya
(2006)). Smoking also increases the probability of low birth weight by 2% to 7% (Abrevaya
(2006), Almond et al. (2005), Evans and Ringel (1999), Tominey (2007), Walker et al.
(2009)) and reduces the length of gestation by around 0.3-0.7 weeks (Abrevaya (2006),
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1991)).
A third strand of literature our work is related to is the one on the eects of education.
Such literature has not reached a consensus yet on the eectiveness of educational policy
as health policy. On the one hand, Currie and Moretti (2003) nd that one extra year of
maternal education, instrumented with college openings, reduces the probability of having
a child with low birth weight by 1 percentage point; this is consistent with what found
in Chou et al. (2010). On the other hand, Carneiro et al. (2007) and McCrary and Royer
(2011) nd no signicant impact of education on birth weight. Also, Currie and Moretti
(2003) nd that one extra year of education decreases the probability of smoking in
pregnancy by 6 percentage points (equivalent to a 30% reduction). An eect of similar
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magnitude is found in Carneiro et al. (2007), while McCrary and Royer (2011), using age
at school entry policies, nd less evidence of an eect. It is well known, however, that
instrumental variable estimators only identify a Local Average Treatment Eect (LATE),
which measures the eect for those individuals induced into the treatment by the change
in the instrument. If the eects of a treatment vary across individuals (given observed
variables) and the agents act on the basis of their idiosyncratic returns, then marginal
and average ex post returns will not be the same (see McCrary and Royer (2011) for a
discussion of this in relation to maternal education and child health).
Methodologically, our approach is close to that in a series of papers by Li and Poirier
(Li and Poirier, 2003b,a; Li et al., 2003), in which the authors estimate a structural
equations input-output model using Bayesian methods. However, they neither explicitly
model maternal endowments, nor the mechanisms through which they aect the health
of the newborn.
Our chapter also diers from the majority of the literature on the causes and consequences
of health at birth, because we use Small for Gestational Age (SGA), instead of low
birth weight, as measure of newborn health.5 The literature on the long term impact
of SGA in the medical eld is instead very long: SGA has been found to be associated
with adult educational attainment, income and also with height (Strauss, 2000), cognitive
outcomes in adolescence (Ido et al., 1995), height in adolescence (Frisancho et al., 1994),
as well as hypertension at 50 years (Spence et al., 2012). SGA is arguably a better
indicator of fetal growth than low birth weight, because it identies babies who are
small even after accounting for the time spent in utero.6 Indeed, the term SGA is often
used interchangeably with Intrauterine Growth Restriction (IUGR) (Meyer et al. (2009),
Karlberg et al. (1995)); however, SGA does not necessarily imply IUGR, and vice versa
5Among the papers in economics which control for the time spent in the womb, see
Behrman and Rosenzweig (2004) and Oreopoulos et al. (2008).
6Note that this is eectively one of the advantages of using twin-based designs: since twins have the
same gestational age, any dierence in birth weight between them is informative about dierences in fetal
growth.
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(Lee et al. (2003)).7
In the following section we describe how we account for all these mechanisms into a unied
modeling and estimation framework, which allows us to investigate the channels through
which disadvantage is transmitted through generations.
3.3 Model
In this chapter we estimate a sequential selection model with a factor structure,8 building
upon, and expanding, the approach of Hansen et al. (2004), Heckman et al. (2006) and
Conti et al. (2010). In our model, women rst choose whether to continue education
beyond the minimum compulsory level, and then, conditional on the educational choice,
they choose their prenatal smoking behavior, which ultimately aects the probability
of delivering a SGA baby.9 We model both maternal choices and newborn outcomes as
function of observable characteristics and latent traits. Maternal endowments  =(C ,
S, P ) are composed of cognitive (C) and social skills (S)
10 of the mother, as well as her
physical constitution (P).11
While the inclusion of cognitive and personality traits in economic models of behavior is
well-established by now, the use of a maternal factor to capture the biological propensity
to have a baby of a certain size (given the constraint imposed by the physical constitution
of the mother) is new.12 Additionally, it is based on a solid economic and medical
7We re-estimate all the models in this chapter using low birthweight instead of SGA, present the full
results in Appendix C, and discuss them in the chapter when signicant dierences with the SGA results
emerge.
8Factor models have become increasingly used in the economics literature (see e.g. Goldberger (1972);
Joreskog and Goldberger (1975) and more recently Heckman et al. (2006); Conti et al. (2010); Piatek
(2010); Heckman et al. (2011)).
9In a previous version of the chapter, we also modeled the pregnancy choice. However, its inclusion
does not aect the results, so it has been omitted. This suggests that there are no other (observed or
unobserved) determinants which aect the pregnancy choice, outside from those already included in the
model.
10We use the term \social skills" for consistency with the previous literature in Economics and for
simplicity, but the scale we use more specically measures behavioral problems and social adjustment,
as we will detail in Section 3.4. Social skills could alternatively be called socio-emotional endowments or
social abilities.
11Note that the number of latent factors in our model is specied a priori; see Conti et al. (2012)
for a model in which the number of latent of factors and the measurements they are proxied by is not
pre-specied.
12See however Conti et al. (2010) for the use of a health factor.
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literature, which establishes that maternal birth weight and height aect the health
of the newborn (Lumey and Stein, 1997). For example, using the same data that we
use, Hennessy and Alberman (1998) show that maternal physical constitution is a key
determinant of SGA. It is by now well documented that conditions in utero are determined
by factors going back two generations (Kuzawa and Quinn (2009)) and that maternal
phenotype embodies her own cumulative environmental experiences which are in turn
transmitted through biological vectors to the fetus, determining its health (Kuzawa,
2005). Consistent with this literature, we use maternal height in childhood and her
birthweight, and grandmaternal height, as measurements for this factor, and we interpret
it as a proxy for healthy physical constitution, arising from good fetal environments.13
Importantly, controlling for maternal physical constitution also allows us to interpret the
eects of maternal choices on the probability of delivering a small for gestational age baby
as the result of environmentally-driven growth restrictions, rather than of a biological
predisposition.
3.3.1 The measurement system
We assume that the observed measurements of maternal endowments are a function of
observable characteristics XC ; XS, XP (proxies for early family environments), and of
latent traits =(C , S, P ), where C indicate cognitive skills, S social skills and P
physical constitution. The measurements are dedicated, but the factors are allowed to be
correlated (Cov(i; j) 6= 0) 8 i 6= j. These traits are assumed to be fully determined at
the time of the measurement (age eleven of the mother) and imperfectly observed by the
researcher, but known to the mother.
13As described in the next section, we also condition on maternal weight, in order to avoid capturing
the eect of a higher body mass, which is associated with bigger stature.
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For individual i and measurement n, the cognitive skill and physical constitution
measurement systems are:
MCn;i = XCn;iCn + CnC;i + Cn;i for n = 1; :::; NC
and
MPn;i = XPn;iPn + PnP;i + Pn;i for n = 1; :::; NP ;
respectively.
Social skill measures are binary, so we write the measurement system in terms of a latent
index structure:
MSn;i = XSn;iSn + SnS;i + Sn;i for n = 1; :::; NS;
MSn;i = I[M

Sn;i > 0];
where XCn;i, XSn;i, XPn;i, are vectors of covariates and Cn, Sn and Pn are factor
loadings, for the nth measurement of the cognitive, social skill and physical constitution
factors, respectively.14 MCn, MSn and MPn are sets of measurements specic to each
trait T = fC; S; Pg. Continuous measurements are normalized to have mean zero and
variance 1. Since the scale of each factor is arbitrary, we set the factor loading in the rst
measurement equation specic to each factor to unity to set the scale (C1 = 1, S1 = 1
and P1 = 1). Furthermore, we assume E[Tn] = 0 8  and Tn ?? T 0m 8 m;n and
T 6= T 0 . Last, to ensure identication we require NT > 2.15
3.3.2 The educational choice
We model the binary choice of obtaining compulsory (E = 0) versus post-compulsory
education (E = 1) using a standard latent index model to characterize the decision rule:
14Factor loadings are allowed to dier across equations, so that measurements are given dierent
weights.
15Identication of a model with three correlated factors is laid out in Appendix A of Conti et al.
(2009).
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Ei = 1 [E

i > 0], where E

i is the net utility derived from post-compulsory schooling, and
Ei is the observed choice.
16 Latent utility from education is determined by observable
covariates and by the latent factors. We model utility as a linear function of observable
covariates and latent factors, with additive separability in the error term:
Ei = ZE;iE + UE;i
where ZE;i is a vector of observed characteristics and UE;i is a random variable that
determine an individual's latent utility from education, and ZE ?? UE. UE;i is itself a
linear and additive function of the latent factors and of an idiosyncratic error term:
UE;i = CEC;i + SES;i + PEP;i + E;i:
The idiosyncratic error terms are assumed to be independent of the observables and of
the latent factors, i.e. E ?? (C ; S; P ; ZE). Furthermore, they are independent of the
idiosyncratic error terms of all the other equations (i.e. E ?? j 8 j 6= E):
3.3.3 The smoking choice
Conditional on education, we then model the choice to smoke during pregnancy (S).17
For mothers, this decision is the result of a utility maximization process, where both the
health of the newborn and her own consumption of cigarettes are arguments of her utility
function.18 The net utility from smoking for a mother with education level E 2 f0; 1g is:
SEi = Z
E
S;i
E
S + U
E
S;i for E 2 f0; 1g;
where, as before, ZES;i is a vector of observed characteristics, and U
E
S;i is a random variable
which aects the mother's utility from smoking, with ZES ?? UES . The latter is specied
16So agents select into the treatment if the net utility from doing so is positive.
17Note that the Surgeon General Report on Smoking and Health came out in January 1964, when our
mothers were 5 years old. Hence, we assume that the adverse eects of smoking were known by the time
they were pregnant with their rst child.
18The model we have in mind is one like in Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983). Here, the child birth weight
(H), in addition to consumption of non-health (X) and health goods (Y), enter the utility function,
denoted by U = U(X;Y;H). Newborn health is produced according to H =  (Y; I; ), using health
consumption goods (Y), health investment goods (I) and parental endowments  as inputs. In their
framework, maternal endowments are all captured by , and maternal smoking is one of the components
of Y which enter both the health production function and the utility function.
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as: UES;i = 
E
CSC;i + 
E
SSS;i + 
E
PSP;i + 
E
S;i for E 2 f0; 1g, where, as before, ES ??
(C ; S; P ; Z
E
S ).
3.3.4 Birth Outcomes
Finally, we model the probability of delivering a baby who is small for gestational age,
xing the education and smoking choice. We focus on outcomes of rstborn children only,
since extending the analysis to higher order parities would require to model the fertility
choice (since the decision to give birth to a second child might be a function of the health of
the rst child), which is beyond the scope of this chapter. Let P(SGAE;Si jXE;SSGA;i; C ; S; P )
denote the conditional probability of delivering a SGA baby for the two education and
smoking statuses, respectively. Furthermore, assume SGAE;Si = 1
h
SGAE;Si > 0
i
, where:
SGAE;Si = X
E;S
SGA;i
E;S
SGA + U
E;S
SGA;i
and
UE;SSGA;i = 
E;S
CSGAC;i + 
E;S
SSGAS;i + 
E;S
PSGAP;i + 
E;S
SGA;i :
for E 2 f0; 1g and S 2 f0; 1g, XE;SSGA ?? UE;SSGA, E;SSGA ?? (C ; S; P ; ZE;SSGA), and
XE;SSGA is a vector of observables. The baby SGA outcome for individual i can thus
be written in switching regression representation (Quandt, 1972) as follows: SGAi =
Ei

S1i SGA
1;1
i + (1  S1i )SGA1;0i

+ (1  Ei)

S0i SGA
0;1
i + (1  S0i )SGA0;0i

.
3.3.5 Identication and Estimation
Identication in our model is based on the following conditional independence assumption:
(SGA0; SGA1) ?? ((E; S)jX;Z; C ; S; P );
where (SGA0; SGA1) are potential outcomes for the untreated and treated state,
respectively.19 This is a standard matching assumption, with the dierence that a subset of
19In practice, we have two sequential treatments and four potential outcomes, however here we refer
only to two for simplicity.
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the matching variables () is imperfectly observed, and proxied by several measurements
with error.
We implement the conditional independence assumption estimating the sequential
selection model with a factor structure, as described in the previous section, by means of
Bayesian methods. However, we also provide evidence from a stepwise approach, where
factor scores are estimated in a rst step and then used as observed covariates in the choice
and outcome models in a second one.20 As mentioned, we use Markov Chain Monte Carlo
(MCMC) methods to estimate the parameters of our sequential selection model.21 In
MCMC estimation, the latent factors are sampled from their joint posterior distribution
in each iteration.22 These draws are then treated as additional data in the estimation of
the other model parameters. The estimation follows Carneiro et al. (2003); Hansen et al.
(2004) and is described in those papers.23
Finally, we make the following assumptions on the latent factors and the error terms:
1. The distribution of  = (C ; S; P ) is exibly approximated by a trivariate mixture
with two components.24 The probability density function is:
f(C ; S; P )  p1N(1; V1) + p2N(2; V2);
where 1 and 2 are vectors of dimensions (3  1), and V1 and V2 are matrices
of dimensions (3  3). We do not restrict the variance-covariance matrices to be
diagonal, so as mentioned we allow the underlying factors to be correlated.
20Here we apply the method proposed by Iwata (1992) to correct for attenuation bias, and we use
bootstrapped standard errors. All the details of this alternative method are provided in Section D in the
Appendix.
21We prefer Bayesian MCMC methods to classical Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) for its
computational convenience.
22We run 100,000 iterations in total, of which we discard the rst 20,000 as burn-in period, and we
then retain one out of 40 of the remaining 80,000.
23We use a Bayesian MCMC sampler and code written mostly by Karsten Hansen, Salvador Navarro
and Sergio Urzua.
24It has been shown that mixtures of normals are able to closely approximate any smooth density
(Ghosal and Van Der Vaart, 2001).
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2. The idiosyncratic errors25 associated with binary choice and outcome models are
assumed to be distributed as follows:
E;i; 
E
S;i; 
E;S
SGA;i; Sn;i  N(0; 1) for E 2 f0; 1g and S 2 f0; 1g:
The idiosyncratic errors of the continuous cognitive and physical constitution
measurements equations are assumed to be distributed as follows:
Cn;i; Pn;i  N(0; 2) for n = 1; :::; NC and n = 1; :::; NP :
3. Uninformative normal priors with mean and precision zero are used for all factor
loadings.
We can then write the density of outcomes given observables as:
f(SGA;E; S;MC ;MS;MP jX;Z);
where f(:) is the joint density of choices, outcomes and measurements. Written in terms
of unobservables, the density is:
Z Z Z
C ;S ;P
f(SGA;E; S;MC ;MS;MP jX;Z; tC ; tS; tP )dF(tC ; tS; tP );
where F(:) denotes the joint cumulative distribution function associated with unobserved
cognitive, social and physical endowments. Notice that, conditional on unobserved
factors and observed characteristics, (E; S;MC ;MS;MP ) are independent, and the sample
likelihood simplies accordingly.
3.4 Data
We use data from the British National Child Development Study (NCDS), which follows
a cohort of individuals born in Great Britain during the week of March 3-9, 1958. The
female members of this cohort are the mothers we study. The rst wave of the NCDS,
25Dened as uniquenesses in relation to the measurement equations of factor models, see Aigner et al.
(1984).
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called the perinatal mortality survey, was administered at birth, and collected a rich array
of information on birthweight, gestational age and other birth health conditions, as well as
family background characteristics. Subsequent follow-ups were conducted in 1965, 1969,
and 1974. Each administered a parental interview, a medical and a school questionnaire,
as well as an achievement test battery including measures on cognitive and social skills at
ages 7, 11, and 16. Additional follow-ups were conducted in 1981 (age 23), 1991 (age 33),
and 2001 (age 43), and administered questions on fertility, partnerships, employment, and
children outcomes.
By restricting our sample to all the female cohort members with nonmissing information
on the covariates and at least three measurements for each factor, we are left with a
sample of 3,217 observations.
3.4.1 Measurements
The measurements we use to proxy maternal endowments have been collected in the
age 11 sweep. On of the advantages of the NCDS data is the availability of measures of
cognition, personality and health long before the post-compulsory educational choice we
model takes place, at a time when the schooling system in the U.K. is still homogeneous.26
The tests to measure cognition (which can be considered relatively stable at 11 years)
were designed by the National Foundation for Educational Research in England and Wales
(NFER). They include an IQ-type test with verbal and non-verbal subscales, a 35-items
reading comprehension test, and a 40-items arithmetic/mathematics test.
As measures of social skills, we use items from the Bristol Social Adjustment Guide
(BSAG).27 This test evaluates the type and extent of behavioral disturbance in children
as rated by the children's teachers, who were asked to indicate whether their pupils
26Then, at age 11 all pupils had to undertake an exam (now abolished almost everywhere) { the
so-called \11-plus" { to be admitted to a selective school.
27We preferred the BSAG over the Rutter scale, which also measures behavioral adjustment problems
and was administered at age 11, because this latter was administered to the mother, and Achenbach et al.
(1987) have shown that teacher assessments are better predictors of childhood problems than parental
ones. Achenbach et al. (1987) estimated correlations between child behavioral problems and assessments
of teachers, parents, health visitors, and of the children themselves, and found them to be higher for
teachers.
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scored positively on a range of 146 items of social adjustment, behavior and attitudes.
The behaviors were then recoded into 12 so-called `syndromes': inconsequential behavior,
nervous symptoms, anxiety towards adults, anxiety towards children, writing o adults,
hostility towards adults, miscellaneous symptoms, restlessness, unforthcomingness,28
depression and withdrawal.29 All the items have been recoded, so that the variables we
use take the value of 1 in case of absence of a particular syndrome.
Finally, to proxy for the maternal physical constitution factor, we use maternal height
at age 11, maternal birth weight, and the adult height of the grandmother. Importantly,
we control for maternal weight at age 11 in the measurement system (as described in the
next section), to isolate the impact of a healthy physical constitution (reecting a good
early nutritional environment) from that of a bigger body mass which is associated with
being taller. We provide evidence of the validity of this factor in capturing the eect of
a healthy early nutritional environment when comparing its eects on the probability of
delivering a SGA versus a low birth weight baby in Section 6.6.
Summary statistics for all the measurements are displayed in Table 3.1. They show, not
surprisingly, that women who have chosen to continue education beyond the compulsory
level and not to smoke in pregnancy are endowed with better traits under all the dierent
dimensions.
28Unforthcomingness describes a collection of behaviors characterizing a child's unassertiveness,
interpersonal and academic passivity, and avoidance of competition (McDermott and Watkins, 1981).
29Withdrawal describes behaviors reecting general social detachment or induced isolationism
(McDermott and Watkins, 1981).
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3.4.2 Outcome variables and covariates
Our main outcome of interest is the probability of having, by the age of 33,30 a rstborn
child who is small for gestational age. As argued above, we believe SGA to be a more
appropriate measure of newborn health than low birth weight, as reecting in utero
conditions: conditioning on gestational age allows to identify those children who are small
not because born early, but because restricted in their growth.31
An obvious issue which arises when using SGA, however, is the presence of measurement
error, since at the time the survey was carried out, the use of ultrasounds to check
accuracy was still not diused. In the NCDS data, gestational age is computed based
on the mother's self-report of the date of her last menstrual period (LMP), which is then
checked against general practitioner records (Jeeris et al., 2002). This recall problem has
been pointed out both in the medical (Campbell et al. (1985); Chervenak et al. (1998);
Kramer et al. (1988); Harville et al. (2010)) and in the economic literature (Royer, 2009).
However, error in recall is mostly problematic for gestational periods longer than 42
weeks and for very early deliveries, while for deliveries within the 37-41 weeks range
the accuracy has been shown to be high (Poulsen et al. (2011), Wingate et al. (2007),
Mustafa and David (2001)). In our main specication we restrict our sample to deliveries
occurred between 26 and 42 weeks of gestation (we limit this range further in Appendix C.3
of the paper); in doing so, we retain 97% of the women.32 The distribution of gestational
age is calculated using a growth chart published by Fenton (2003)33 in BMC Pediatrics,
which is based on a meta-analysis of published reference studies. We adopt the most
common denition used in the literature and dene a baby to be SGA if she lies below
the 10th percentile of the birthweight by gestational age distribution. Table 3.2 shows
that 14% of the children in our sample are small for gestational age; this relatively high
30In our sample, 75% of the women have given birth at least once by this age, and, given the historical
period of our sample, this reasonably approximates all women who will ever give birth.
31As already mentioned, we re-estimate all the models in this chapter using low birthweight instead
of SGA. While all the results are presented in Appendix C, in the text we only refer to them when they
signicantly dier from those using SGA.
32Results for the complete sample are very similar and are available upon request.
33The chart is the most recent version of Babson and Benda (1976), which is the most common
chart used in neonatology reference books. Dierent specications using dierent charts or using the 5th
percentile to dene SGA did not change the results in any signicant way, as documented in Appendix
C.3.
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prevalence is caused in part by the fact that rstborn34 children are, ceteris paribus, more
likely to be SGA than later born children (see e.g. Shah (2010) for a meta study on the
association between parity and pregnancy outcomes). We provide extensive robustness
tests in Appendix C (by restricting the sample to full-term babies and adopting dierent
denitions of SGA) which conrm our main results.
The educational decision (derived from the 1981 questionnaire) is dened as staying-on
after the minimum compulsory school-leaving age. We see from Table 3.2 that in our
sample about 35% of the women have continued schooling beyond age 16, and that this
percentage is halved among the smokers. Finally, the decision to smoke during pregnancy
after the rst trimester35 is also derived from the 1981 questionnaire, so it is asked
retrospectively. While we are not worried about selective recall bias, still there is the
possibility of women \lying" to the interviewer; however, if present, this should bias our
results downwards.
The covariates we include in the measurement equations to control for family background
characteristics are specied in Table 2.2.36 We also include additional variables in the
choice equations: regional smoking prevalence at the time the mother was pregnant and
whether the grandmother was herself a smoker at the time she was pregnant for the
smoking choice, and local labor market conditions (the change in the unemployment rate)
in the region of residence at the time of the educational decision. Summary statistics for
the covariates and outcomes of our model are reported in Table 3.2.
3.5 Empirical Results and Simulations
We now present our results. In this section we rst provide the estimated posterior means
of the coecients and we describe our simulation algorithm (Section 3.5.1). We then
present and comment the results of the simulation exercise in three parts. First, we present
how mothers sort into education and smoking decisions on the basis of their traits, and also
34As mentioned above, we focus on rstborn children only.
35Women might not know they are pregnant in the rst weeks of gestation, so smoking might not be
a choice then.
36Note that some covariates are excluded from the choice and outcome equations due to insucient
variation to identify their eects, given the smaller sample sizes in the conditional models.
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the eects of these traits on the choices (Section 3.5.2). Second, we show in Section 3.5.3
the results from our decomposition exercise of the overall eects of the maternal traits
(displayed in the top panel of Figure 3.1) into the channels through which they operate.
Third, we present the treatment eects of education and smoking (Section 3.5.4), we
decompose the observed SGA dierences by choice (displayed in the bottom panel of
Figure 3.1) into selection and causal components, and we examine heterogeneity in the
treatment eects.
3.5.1 MCMC results and Simulation Algorithm
The posterior means of the factor loadings in the measurement system, which reect the
correlation between the measurements and the latent factors, are reported in Table 3.3.
We notice that the copying designs test contributes to the cognitive factor less than the
other tests; that the social skills factor is mostly reecting lack of hostile behavior rather
than of anxious one;37 and that the maternal physical constitution factor has the loading
with the biggest magnitude on maternal height at age 11.
We then use the estimated distributions of parameters and the data38 to simulate
counterfactual choices and outcomes, in order to shed more light on the eects of
maternal traits, the mechanisms through which they operate, and the treatment eects
of smoking and education. More specically, the Bayesian MCMC algorithm we use for
estimation generates a sample of size K model parameters from their conditional posterior
distributions that we can use to simulate (binary) outcomes for each individual according
to the following expression:
y^i =
1
K
KX
k=1
Pr(U(k)y;i  0jXy;i; y(k); y(k);i(k))
=
1
K
KX
k=1
1 [(Xy;iy(k) + y(k)i(k) + ) > 0] ; (3.1)
37The items have been recoded, so that they take the value of 1 in case of the absence of a particular
syndrome.
38We randomly draw with replacement individuals from our sample. This randomly drawn data has
the same sample size as the actual data. Then, for each individual, we make K = 10 draws from the
posterior distributions of the parameters, so to take estimation uncertainty into account.
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where 1 [] denotes the indicator function and  is drawn from a normal distribution.
Furthermore, given independence between the factors and the covariates, we can simulate
outcomes for each individual at each percentile of the factor distribution, according to the
following:
y^ip ; =
1
K
KX
k=1
1 [(Xi(k) + (k)p;i(k) + ) > 0] for p = 1; :::; 99: (3.2)
Furthermore, we can use the predicted probabilities from the choice equations to weight
the predicted outcomes, so to generate expected outcomes for each individual, conditional
or unconditional on choices.
The rst thing we do using these simulated outcomes is to assess whether our model
provides a good t to the data. To do so, we compare the simulated means of the education
and smoking decisions, and of child SGA, to the ones in the data. As shown in Table 3.4,
the means are not statistically signicantly dierent from each other; additionally, also the
proportion of outcomes correctly predicted by the model is remarkably high, especially
considering the small number of observations we have in the conditional SGA equations.
Table 3.4: Model t
Simulated Data Dierence P-val Chi2 % correcly predicted
Education 0.343 0.346 0.003 0.425 0.612
Smoking(E=1) 0.130 0.112 -0.018 0.969 0.732
Smoking(E=0) 0.294 0.304 0.011 0.839 0.631
SGA(E=1, S=1) 0.194 0.212 0.018 0.274 0.669
SGA(E=0, S=1) 0.227 0.239 0.012 0.916 0.646
SGA(E=1, S=0) 0.098 0.106 0.008 0.920 0.758
SGA(E=0, S=0) 0.143 0.141 -0.002 0.882 0.713
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates are
based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates. Table displays model t.
3.5.2 The Intergenerational Eects of Maternal Traits
In order to examine the eects of maternal traits, we rst compute and report the average
marginal eects of a one standard deviation change in each of them on the outcomes.
As shown in Table 3.5, both cognitive and social skills are signicant determinants of
the educational choice. However, social skills are the only traits which are signicant
determinants of the smoking choice. Lastly, neither cognitive nor social skills are signicant
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determinants of the probability of delivering a SGA baby, after conditioning on the
education and smoking choices: the physical constitution of the mother, nonetheless,
remains a strong determinant, in particular for women with a low level of education.
Importantly, this is no longer the case when we use low birth weight rather than SGA as
measure of newborn health: this suggests that our maternal physical constitution factor
is indeed capturing the capacity of the mother to deliver a healthy baby, rather than the
sheer size of her body (see Table C-1 in the Appendix for the LBW results).
Table 3.6: Correlation of maternal
traits
Cognitive Social Body Size
Cognitive 1.000 0.369 0.172
Social 0.369 1.000 -0.003
Body Size 0.172 -0.003 1.000
Note: National Child Development Study
(NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample
on which these estimates are based consists of all
female cohort members that have no missings in
any of the covariates.
In order to understand better the sorting decisions of the mothers, Figure 3.2 and
Figure 3.3 display the marginal distributions of cognitive, social skills and physical
constitution, conditional on the education and smoking choices.39 We rst notice that the
spread of the distributions of the three endowments is dierent: the standard deviations
amount to 0.84 for cognition, 1.62 for social skills, and to 0.35 for the maternal physical
constitution factor; this has implications when considering the impacts of interventions
aimed at changing the relative position of individuals along these distribution. Second,
we see that mothers with higher cognition, better social skills and a healthier physical
constitution sort into post-compulsory education, as conrmed by a Kolmogorov-Smirnov
test. Additionally, women with a higher level of cognition and better social skills decide
not to smoke after the third trimester of pregnancy; maternal body tness, instead, seems
to play no role. As mentioned in Section 3.3, we also estimate the model using a stepwise
39The unconditional joint distributions are presented in Figure 3.11, Figure 3.12 and Figure 3.13 in the
Appendix. The correlations among traits are displayed in Table 3.6. We see that the correlation between
cognitive and social skills is 0.369, the one between the cognitive and the physical traits is 0.172, while
maternal social and physical traits are basically uncorrelated.
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approach, in which factor scores are computed in a rst step and then used as observed
covariates in the choice and outcome models in a second step using Iwata's (1992) method
to correct for measurement error.40 As we can see in Table 3.7, the results we obtain are
remarkably similar to those obtained using Bayesian estimation.
40This procedure is described in details in Section D in the Appendix.
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Table 3.3: Factor loadings in measurement system
Cognitive Skills Social Skills Body Size
Verbal IQ 1 - -
Non-verbal IQ 0.912 - -
(0.01)
Reading comprehension 0.795 - -
(0.02)
Mathematics 0.904 - -
(0.02)
Copying desings test 0.345 - -
(0.02)
Inconsequential behavior - 0.564 -
(0.04)
Nervous symptoms - 0.369 -
(0.04)
Anxiety acceptance, adults - 0.207 -
(0.02)
Anxiety acceptance, children - 0.436 -
(0.04)
Hostility towards children - 0.686 -
(0.06)
Writing o adults - 0.575 -
(0.04)
Hostility towards adults - 0.876 -
(0.07)
Miscellaneous symptoms - 0.574 -
(0.04)
Restlessness - 0.663 -
(0.06)
Unforthcomingness - 0.335 -
(0.03)
Depression - 1 -
Withdrawal - 0.519 -
(0.04)
Maternal height age 11 - - 1.757
(0.2)
Materal birthweight - - 1
Grandmaternal height - - 1.09
(0.11)
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on
which these estimates are based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in
any of the covariates. Table displays factor loadings in the measurement system. Standard errors in
brackets.
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Table 3.5: Average marginal eects of a 1 SD change in the latent
factors
Cognitive Skills Social Skills Body Size
Education 0.152 0.039 0.016
(0.046) (0.014) (0.013)
Smoking(E=1) -0.011 -0.063 0.003
(0.022) (0.04) (0.026)
Smoking(E=0) -0.004 -0.056 0.014
(0.013) (0.021) (0.016)
SGA(E=1, S=1) -0.008 0.075 -0.149
(0.1) (0.127) (0.206)
SGA(E=0, S=1) 0.027 -0.023 -0.11
(0.027) (0.025) (0.054)
SGA(E=1, S=0) 0.003 -0.012 -0.053
(0.02) (0.018) (0.026)
SGA(E=0, S=0) -0.015 0.009 -0.046
(0.012) (0.015) (0.021)
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample
on which these estimates are based consists of all female cohort members that have no
missings in any of the covariates. Table displays the average marginal eects of a 1 sd shift
in latent factors. Standard errors in brackets.
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Finally, simulated decisions and outcomes by quantiles of the endowments distributions
are displayed in Figure 6.7, Figure 3.5 and Figure 3.6. As compared to what seen before,
they allow us to assess the eects of an exogenous shift in each maternal endowment in
turn at dierent parts of their distribution (so to detect nonlinearities in those eects),
while holding the other two at their means, rather than the average marginal eect of one
standard deviation change (as seen in Table 3.5). Additionally, we compute the eects
of maternal endowments on choices and outcomes, rather than the conditional ones.41
Figure 6.7 shows that women with higher cognitive skills are more likely to obtain post-
compulsory education. In fact, an early childhood intervention which moves a girl from
the 20th to the 80th percentile of the cognitive skill distribution (holding the other two
endowments at the mean), would increase her probability of obtaining post-compulsory
education from 20% to around 50%. For social skills and physical constitution the eect
is of a smaller magnitude, but still signicant.42
41See the next section for a decomposition of the total eect into a direct and an indirect one, i.e. one
working through the two channels of education and smoking.
42This latter result is consistent with the literature on height and education (Magnusson et al. (2006);
Case and Paxson (2010)).
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Figure 3.4: Eect of traits on education
The effect of cognitive skills on the probability of 
 obtaining post−compulsory education (by quantile)
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The effect of social skills on the probability of 
 obtaining post−compulsory education (by quantile)
quantile
p r
o b
a b
i l i
t y
0.25
0.30
0.35
0.40
20 40 60 80
Legend
social skills
CI
The effect of physical constitution on the probability of 
 obtaining post−compulsory education (by quantile)
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Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates
are based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates. Overall eect of traits on
outcomes when xing the other traits at their respective means.
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Figure 3.5: Eect of traits on smoking during pregnancy
The effect of cognitive skills on the probability of 
 smoking (by quantile)
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The effect of social skills on the probability of 
 smoking (by quantile)
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The effect of physical constitution on the probability of 
 smoking (by quantile)
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Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates
are based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates. Overall eect of traits on
outcomes. Overall eect of traits on outcomes when xing the other traits at their respective means.
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Figure 3.6: Eect of maternal traits on child SGA
The effect of cognitive skills on the probability of 
 SGA (by quantile)
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The effect of social skills on the probability of 
 SGA (by quantile)
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The effect of physical constitution on the probability of 
 SGA (by quantile)
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Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates
are based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates. Overall eect of traits on
outcomes. Overall eect of traits on outcomes when xing the other traits at their respective means.
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Second, the decision to smoke during pregnancy is predominantly inuenced by social
skills, as can be seen from Figure 3.5. We nd that an intervention which moves a girl
from the 20th to the 80th percentile of the social skills distribution (holding the other two
endowments at the mean), would halve her probability to smoke during pregnancy (from
0.30 to 0.15), while a shift of the same magnitude along the distribution of cognitive skills
would reduce this probability only by 0.05.43
Third, Figure 3.6 displays the overall eect of maternal traits on the probability of giving
birth to a small-for-gestational-age baby.44 We nd that an early nutritional intervention
which moves a girl from the 20th to the 80th percentile of the distribution of her physical
constitution more than halves the probability of delivering a SGA baby (from 0.20 to
less than 0.10). Importantly, we nd a much smaller eect when using low birthweight
as measure of newborn health: a similar intervention would reduce the probability of
delivering a LBW baby by only 3 (rather than 10) percentage points (see Figure C-
1 in the Appendix). This reassures us about the validity of our measures of SGA as
proxying for fetal health, and of maternal physical traits as capturing the tness of the
mother in delivering healthy babies. Then, the corresponding eects of interventions to
promote cognitive or social skills are much smaller, with a comparable shift (from the
20th to the 80th percentile) in the respective distributions only yielding a 1 percentage
point reduction in the probability of delivering a SGA baby, which is also less precisely
estimated.45 Interestingly, we detect nonlinearities in the eects of maternal endowments,
with the bigger gains occurring for women at the bottom of their respective distributions.
In the next subsection we then decompose the eects of maternal endowments on the
probability of having a SGA baby into the components which operate through the
education and smoking channels, and a residual direct eect.
43On the other hand, the eects of an early nutritional intervention arising from a movement of a
similar magnitude on the woman's physical constitution are not precisely estimated.
44In order to compute the overall eects of skills on child SGA we integrate education and smoking
variables as well as covariates out, according to P (SGAj = p) =
R
X
P1
E=0
P1
S=0 P (SGAj = p; X =
x;E = e; S = s)P (S = sjX = x; = p; E = e)P (E = ejX = x; = p)dFx:
45The attentive reader might have noticed that the eect of physical traits on the probability of
smoking in pregnancy is much smaller than the one estimated in Table 3.5. The reason is the small and
positive correlation between the cognitive and physical traits, which have opposite eects on smoking
behavior { so that, when they are both allowed to vary (like in Table 3.5), they counterbalance each
other out.
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3.5.3 Understanding the Mechanisms through which Maternal
Endowments Aect Newborn Outcomes
In order to describe our decomposition exercise, we rst establish some notation. Let the
conditional probabilities of giving birth to a SGA baby, of smoking during pregnancy (S)
and of staying on in education beyond the compulsory level (E) be written as, respectively:
P (SGA = 1jX = x; = ; E = e; S = s); (3.3)
P (S = 1jX = x; = ; E = e); (3.4)
P (E = 1jX = x; = ); (3.5)
where X is a vector of predetermined characteristics (which include dierent subsets of
variables, as detailed in Table 2.2, and  is the vector of the three maternal endowments.
We rst compute these probabilities using simulation (as described in the previous
section), and then we apply the product rule to disentangle how a change in maternal
endowments aects the newborn SGA through the dierent channels, as follows:
Total eectz }| {
@P (SGA = 1jX = x; = )
@t
=
Eect through educationz }| {
1X
S=0
1X
E=0
P (S = sjX = x; = ; E = e)P (SGA = 1jX = x; = ; E = e; S = s)
 @P (E = ejX = x; = )
@t
+
Eect through smokingz }| {
1X
S=0
1X
E=0
P (E = ejX = x; = )P (SGA = 1jX = x; = ; E = e; S = s)
 @P (S = sjX = x; = ; E = e)
@t
+
Residual eectz }| {
1X
S=0
1X
E=0
P (E = ejX = x; = )P (S = sjX = x; = ; E = e)
 @P (SGA = 1jX = x; = ; E = e; S = s)
@t
:
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where t = C; S; P , alternatively. This formula shows that maternal traits can aect the
newborn SGA in three ways: indirectly through the education (summand 1) and smoking
(summand 2) choices, and directly (summand 3).46
The results of this decomposition exercise are presented in Table 3.17 and Figure 3.7.
We nd that 70% and 95% of the overall eect on newborn SGA of cognitive and social
endowments, respectively, passes through choices. More specically, 68% of the overall
eect of cognitive skills passes through the channel of education, and only 2% of it
works by aecting smoking behavior. Moreover, 30% of the overall eect of cognitive
skills on newborn SGA is a residual, i.e. it is likely to work through other behaviors not
included in our model, such as prenatal nutrition.47 Then, 64% of the eect of social
skills works through the smoking choice, while 30% through education. On the contrary,
maternal physical constitution has a direct, \residual" eect on newborn health, i.e. it is
not mediated by education or smoking decisions. Figure 3.7 displays the same information,
but in terms of percentage points reduction in the probability of having a SGA baby, and
the respective contributions of the three maternal endowments to it. Importantly, when we
repeat the decomposition exercise using LBW as outcome (Figure C-2 in the Appendix),
we nd a signicant residual eect of both cognition and social skills on low birth weight.
The lack of biological plausibility of this result reassures us again about our choice of
outcome as more genuinely capturing the rate of fetal growth.
46In practice we compute average partial derivatives, and investigate the impact of a one standard
deviation change in the respective factor. Note that we could also investigate a large movement along
the factor distribution using nite dierences (i.e. neglecting cross-dierences), according to the following
formula:
P (SGA = 1jX = x; = ) =
1X
S=0
1X
E=0
[P (S = sjX;; E = e) P (SGA = 1jX = x; = ; E = e; S = s)
 P (E = ejX = x; = )]
+ P (E = ejX = x; = ) P (SGA = 1jX = x; = ; E = e; S = s)P (S = sjX = x; = ; E = e)
+ P (E = ejX = x; = ) P (S = sjX = x; = ; E = e)P (SGA = 1jX = x; = ; E = e; S = s)
+ P (S = sjX = x; = ; E = e)P (E = ejX = x;)P (SGA = 1jX = x; = ; E = e; S = s)
+ P (E = ejX = x; = )P (S = sjX = x; = ; E = e)P (SGA = 1jX = x; = ; E = e; S = s)
+ P (SGA = 1jX = x; = ; E = e; S = s)P (E = ejX = x; = )P (S = sjX = x; = ; E = e)
+ P (E = ejX = x; = )P (S = sjX = x; = ; E = e)P (SGA = 1jX = x; = ; E = e; S = s)] :
47In other words, smarter women might have healthier babies because of better nutrition.
Unfortunately, we are unable to model other maternal behaviors due to data limitations.
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Table 3.17: Decomposition of the eects of
maternal endowments on newborn SGA
Cognitive Skills Social Skills Body Size
Education 0.681 0.302 0.005
Smoking 0.02 0.64 -0.02
Factor residual 0.30 0.06 1.01
TOTAL 1.00 1.00 1.00
Note: Numbers in cell show the percentage of the overall eect of each
maternal trait which works through the education and smoking choices,
and the residual eect. National Child Development Study (NCDS),
Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates are
based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any
of the covariates.
We now move to the estimation of a variety of treatment eects of education and smoking
in the next section.
3.5.4 The Treatment Eects of Education and Smoking
In this section, we investigate the causal impact of education and smoking on the
probability of having a baby who is small for gestational age. First, we compute the
average treatment eects (ATE) of education and smoking, which can alternatively be
interpreted as the average eect of the treatment for a person randomly selected from
the population, or as the expected change in the average outcome if the treatment was
exogenously given to every individual.48 Formally, the ATE of maternal education on
newborn SGA is dened as:
E

SGAE=1   SGAE=0 = Z Z ESGAE=1   SGAE=0jX; dFX;; (3.6)
where SGAE=1 and SGAE=0 denote the potential outcomes in terms of the probability
of delivering a SGA baby, for mothers with and without post-compulsory education.
The well-known fundamental problem of causal inference states that both potential
outcomes are never observed for a single individual, but only either (SGAE=1jX;; E = 1)
or (SGAE=0jX;; E = 0). Here we make use of the following matching assumption
E

SGAE=0jX;; E = 0 = ESGAE=0jX;; E = 1 to simulate counterfactual outcomes
48In the following we present the formal denitions of treatment eects and we describe the details of
their estimation only for the eect of education on newborn SGA. The eects of education on smoking
and of smoking on child SGA can be dened analogously.
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and estimate treatment eects. In practice, using draws from the posterior distributions
of the parameters and of the factors, as well as from the covariates (X) information from
our sample, we compute the ATE as follows:
E
h
\SGAE=1   \SGAE=0
i
=
1
NK
KX
k=1
NX
i=1

m^e=1(Xi;i(k); 	(k))
  m^e=0(Xi;i(k); 	(k))

(3.7)
where 	 denotes a vector of all parameters but the factors, and m^e denotes the model
prediction of me(X;	) = E[SGAjX;; E = e] and N denotes the number of individuals
in the sample.
The second treatment eect we estimate is the Average Treatment eect on the Treated
(ATT). This measures the impact of the treatment on an individual drawn at random
from the population and actually been treated (in our case, who selected into education).
The ATT of maternal education on newborn SGA is thus dened as:49
E

SGAE=1   SGAE=0jE = 1 = Z Z ESGAE=1   SGAE=0jX;; E = 1 dFX;jE=1;
We compute the ATT as follows:
E
h
\SGAE=1   \SGAE=0jE = 1
i
=
1
N1K
KX
k=1
N1X
i:e=1

m^e=1(Xi;i(k); 	(k))
  m^e=0(Xi;i(k); 	(k))

: (3.8)
Lastly, we dene and estimate the average marginal treatment eect (AMTE), which
is the average eect of the treatment for the marginal person, i.e. the person who is
indierent between participation (E = 1) and nonparticipation (E = 0) into the treatment
(Carneiro et al., 2010). The AMTE is dened as:
E

SGAE=1   SGAE=0j jZEE + UEj < 

=
Z Z
E

SGAE=1
  SGAE=0jX;; jZEE + UEj < 

dFX;:(3.9)
49The Average Treatment Eect on the Non-Treated (ATNT) can be analogously dened as:
E

SGAE=1   SGAE=0jE = 0 = Z Z ESGAE=1   SGAE=0jX;; E = 0 dFX;jE=0;
and can be computed as follows: 1N0K
PK
k=1
PN0
i:e=0

m^e=1(Xi;i(k);	(k))  m^e=0(Xi;i(k);	(k))

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with ZE and UE being the observed and unobserved determinants of the educational
choice, as dened in Section 3.3, and  close to zero.50 The AMTE is computed as follows:
E
h
\SGAE=1   \SGAE=0j jZEE + UEj < 
i
=
1
Nmar
KX
k=1
NmarX
i:mar

m^e=1(Xi;i(k); 	(k))
 m^e=0(Xi;i(k); 	(k))

: (3.10)
where mar denotes the marginal individual.
Table 3.18: Treatment eects of smoking and education
ATE ATT ATNT AMTE
EDU on SMOKING in Pregnancy -0.098 -0.094 -0.1 -0.1
(0.01) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01)
EDU on SGA probability -0.016 -0.02 -0.014 -0.016
(0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
SMOKING on SGA probability 0.111 0.099 0.115 0.11
(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample
on which these estimates are based consists of all female cohort members that have no
missings in any of the covariates. The numbers in columns 2-5 are the treatment eects, as
specied: ATE=Average Treatment Eect; ATT=Average Treatment Eect on the Treated;
ATNT=Average Treatment Eect on the Non-Treated; AMTE=Average Marginal Treatment
Eect. The last column displays the average outcome for the untreated group. Standard errors in
brackets.
The estimated treatment eects are reported in Table 3.18.51 The important message that
we learn from this table is that the various average treatment eects are not statistically
signicantly dierent from each other, suggesting the absence of evidence of sorting on
health gains: in other words, when deciding whether to continue education beyond the
compulsory level, or whether to smoke in pregnancy, women do not take the unobserved
components of health of the baby into account. Additionally, when we use LBW rather
than SGA as outcome (see Table C-2 in the Appendix), we nd treatment eects of
smoking which are half the magnitude, once more reassuring us of our choice of using
SGA as a better indicator of health at birth.
50The value chosen for  is 0.3, with the net utility taking values from -6 to +6. Using this metric,
15% of individuals in our sample are dened to be \at the margin".
51We can also calculate partial treatment eects, for example by xing the education treatment
assignment when calculating the average treatment eect of the smoking treatment: E

SGAS=1E=1
  
E

SGAS=0E=1

. For the sake of brevity these results are not presented here.
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In order to gain a better understanding of the magnitude of these average treatment
eects, we now decompose the dierence in means between the outcomes of treated and
untreated women, shown in the bottom panel of Figure 3.1. The observed dierence in
the occurrence of SGA between high and low educated mothers can be decomposed into
average treatment eect, sorting gain and selection bias according to:52
observed dierencez }| {
E[SGAjE = 1]  E[SGAjE = 0] =
ATE +
sorting gainz }| {
(ATT   ATE) +
selection biasz }| {
E

SGAE=0jE = 1  ESGAE=0jE = 0 :
The sorting gain is the dierence between the ATE and the ATT, and it is informative
as to whether individuals sort into a treatment based on their expectations about their
idiosyncratic gains or losses. The results of this decomposition exercise are presented in
Table 3.19 and graphically displayed in Figure 3.8. We nd stark dierences between
the two treatments. On the one hand, the dierences in prenatal smoking behaviors and
newborn health that we observe between high- and low-educated women are only partially
due to education: selection accounts for between 40% and 60% of this dierence. On the
other hand, the dierence in the probability of delivering a SGA baby observed between
women smoking and non-smoking in pregnancy (which amounts to 11 pp) can be entirely
attributed to the harmful eects of smoking. Although we do not decompose it, it is
worth noticing that the selection bias component reects dierences in the distributions
of observables and latent endowments, as well as dierences in their support.53
3.5.5 Treatment Eects Heterogeneity
We now go beyond mean impacts and investigate whether education and smoking policies
have dierent eects along the distribution of maternal endowments. This is important,
since, when allocating public resources under constraints, policy makers will need to know
who benets the most from a given policy, so to allow a more eective targeting. In
52The observed dierence in smoking between high- and low-educated women, and in the occurrence
of SGA between smokers and non-smokers, can be dened analogously.
53Support dierences in the trait distributions between treated and nontreated individuals become
apparent when looking at Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3. Heckman et al. (1997) show that the selection
bias component can be further decomposed into components due to diering supports of X and  for
the treated and nontreated groups, into diering distributions of X,  over the same support in the
two groups, and into dierences in outcomes that are present even after controlling for observables and
unobservables.
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practice, we compute average treatment eects for individuals at dierent quantiles of the
distributions of each of their latent traits in turn, while xing the other two at their mean
value. For example, to calculate the eect of education on the probability of delivering
a SGA baby for a woman with an average endowment of physical and social traits, but
below the 20th percentile of the cognitive skills distribution, we compute:
E
h
\SGAE=1   \SGAE=0
i
=
1
NK
KX
k=1
NX
i=1

m^e=1(Xi; C(p0 20)(k); S(k); BS(k); 	(k))
 m^e=0(Xi; C(p0 20)(k); S(k); BS(k); 	(k))

:
The results of this exercise are presented in Table 3.22 and displayed in Figure 3.9.
We make several observations. First, although not by a large magnitude, the treatment
eect of education on smoking is bigger at the top of the distribution of each of the
maternal endowments. However, we nd no signicant evidence of heterogeneity in the
eect of education and of smoking on the probability of delivering a SGA baby along the
distribution of cognitive and social skills. This is a relevant dierence with respect to the
results we obtain when using low birth weight instead of SGA as measure of newborn
health (see Figure C-3 in the Appendix), where we nd that the treatment eect of
education on the probability of delivering a low birth weight baby is signicantly higher
at the bottom of the maternal traits distribution. Nonetheless, we nd signicant evidence
of treatment eect heterogeneity along the distribution of physical traits, which suggests
the presence of complementarities.
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Figure 3.7: Decomposing the eects of maternal endowments on newborn SGA
Cognitive Social Physical Constitution
Effect of a one standard deviation change in maternal traits by channel
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Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates are
based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates. The length of the bar \Total"
shows the overall reduction in the probability of delivering a SGA baby which is associated with a one standard deviation
increase in each of the three maternal endowments. The respective contributions of the various channels are shown in the
bars \education", \smoking" and \residual", respectively.
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Figure 3.8: Decomposition of the observed dierences in the outcomes into causal and
selection components
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Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates are
based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates.
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Table 3.22: Heterogeneity in average treatment eects of smoking and education
along the distribution of maternal traits
<20% 20-39% 40-59% 60-79% >=80%
EDU on SMOKING in Pregnancy (C) -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12
EDU on SMOKING in Pregnancy (S) -0.08 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.11
EDU on SMOKING in Pregnancy (BS) -0.09 -0.10 -0.11 -0.11 -0.12
EDU on SGA probability (C) -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
EDU on SGA probability (S) -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04
EDU on SGA probability (BS) 0.02 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02
SMOKING on SGA probability (C) 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.08
SMOKING on SGA probability (S) 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.11
SMOKING on SGA probability (BS) 0.28 0.16 0.08 0.04 0.01
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates
are based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates. The table shows the
average treatment eect of education on smoking (rows 1-3) and on newborn SGA (rows 4-6), and of smoking on
SGA (rows 7-9) at dierent quantiles of the traits distribution (with the other two traits in turn xed at their mean
values).
On the one hand, we nd that the eect of education in reducing the probability of having
a SGA baby is bigger for mothers with a healthier physical constitution. On the other
hand, smoking during pregnancy has a much more detrimental eect for mothers with a
poor physical constitution; this eect declines along the distribution, and it only has a
small and insignicant impact for females who are physically very t. Interestingly, these
women are also more likely to choose smoking during pregnancy (see Figure 3.5).54 This
nding is consistent with a model where there is heterogeneity in health endowments and
women sort into utility-generating risky prenatal behaviors by acting upon knowledge of
the consequences of their choices: in other words, those women with a better physical
constitution are both more likely to smoke, and at the same time less likely to suer from
the adverse consequences of their behavior, in terms of a reduction in their newborn's
health.55 Our results have important policy implications: they suggest that anti-smoking
policies should target women who are physically more prone to have smaller babies, since
these are the women whose newborns suer most from prenatal smoking.
54Note that both results have been obtained while xing the other two endowments at their means,
in turn.
55See, for example, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1983).
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3.6 Conclusions and Policy Implications
This chapter has presented novel evidence on the impact of maternal cognitive, social
and physical endowments on newborn health. We have used a sequential selection model
with a factor structure to analyze the role of maternal endowments and investments
(education and smoking in pregnancy) on the probability of having a baby who is small
for gestational age (SGA). We have estimated the total impact of maternal endowments
on birth outcomes, and we have also decomposed it into a direct, \biological" eect and
a \choice" eect, mediated by maternal behaviors. Then, we have estimated the causal
eects of maternal education and smoking in pregnancy, and we have investigated whether
women endowed with dierent traits have dierent returns. We have found that cognition
aects birth outcomes primarily through education, that personality traits mainly operate
by changing smoking behavior, and that the physical tness of the mother has a direct,
\biological" eect on SGA. We have also found signicant heterogeneity in the eects of
education and smoking along the distribution of maternal physical traits, suggesting that
women with a less healthy physical constitution should be the primary target of prenatal
interventions.
Table 3.23: Treatment eects equivalents in terms of standard
deviations of the trait distribution
ATE Cognitive (sd) Social (sd) Body Size (sd)
Education -0.016 1.771 3.235 0.244
Smoking 0.111 -12.156 -22.2 -1.676
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. Columns 2-4
display the equivalent of the treatment eect in standard deviations of the endowment
distribution. For example, in order to achieve the same eect as a policy that moves
everybody from compulsory to post-compulsory education, every individual would need
to be endowed with 1.8 sd higher cognitive abilities.
What is then the most eective policy to close the SGA gap by education (4 percentage
points) and smoking (11 percentage points)? On the one hand, our results show that a
one standard deviation increase in cognitive, social and physical endowments reduce the
probability of giving birth to a SGA baby by around 1, 0.5 and 6.5 percentage points,
respectively. Additionally, we have found that these endowments operate through dierent
mechanisms: cognitive ability predominantly through education, social skills by aecting
the smoking choice, while the physical constitution of the mother directly aects the
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health of the newborn. Indeed, our decomposition exercise has shown that 70% and
95% of the gap in SGA between women at the bottom and at the top quartiles of
the cognitive and social endowments distributions, respectively, is explained by maternal
choices: Figure 3.10 shows that, once we condition on them, no gap in the probability of
delivering a SGA baby remains. On the contrary, the SGA dierential between women
endowed with a poor and with a healthy constitution increases once we condition on
the prenatal smoking choice: this occurs because the physical constitution of the mother
has both a direct, positive eect on the health of the newborn, and it is also positively
associated with her prenatal smoking decisions. On the other hand, we estimate that the
average treatment eect of continuing education beyond the minimum compulsory leaving
age and of smoking after the third trimester of pregnancy on the probability of delivering
a SGA baby are -1.6 and 11 percentage points, respectively.
These results allow us to compare the eectiveness of three dierent policies in reducing
the prevalence of SGA: an early childhood intervention providing both a stimulation and
a nutritional component, an educational policy, and a smoking cessation intervention. In
Table 3.23, we compare them by computing the change in terms of standard deviations of
the endowments distributions that an early childhood intervention would have to achieve
in order to cause the same change in the prevalence of SGA as an educational policy
or a smoking cessation intervention.56 What we learn is that a nutritional intervention
which improves the physical constitution of the mother appears to be a very eective
option. Furthermore, when analyzing heterogeneity in the treatment eects, we nd
evidence of substitutability: a prenatal antismoking intervention is more eective (in
terms of reduction in the probability of delivering a SGA baby) for those women
with a poor physical constitution. Of course, a comparison of the overall benets of
the two interventions, and of their respective costs, is necessary before drawing any
denite conclusion. However, these results suggest that prenatal interventions, such as
home-visiting programs, aimed at (among other things) reducing the prevalence of risky
behaviors in pregnant women, and targeting low-income mothers, seem to be an eective
way to compensate for maternal endowments dierentials, and to guarantee a healthy
start of life for the next generation.
56So, for example, it shows that an educational policy can achieve the same outcome as an intervention
which raises IQ by 1.8 SD.
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Figure 3.10: Dierence in SGA after conditioning on maternal traits and choices
Cognitive Social Physical Constitution
Incidence of ’Small for Gestational Age’, after conditioning on choices
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Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. Graph displays outcomes for individuals
with endowments in the highest/lowest quartile of the distribution after conditioning on education and smoking.
Conditional SGA probabilities are weighted by unconditional smoking and education probabilities according
to:
P
E
P
S [P (SGA = 1jX = x; = >75; E = e; S = s)  P (SGA = 1jX = x; = <25; E = e; S = s)]P (S = sjE =
e)P (E = e)
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3.A Detailed results
This Appendix shows an extended version of Tables 3.3 and 3.5 which includes the
estimated coecients on all the covariates.
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3.B Factor Distributions
Figure 3.11: Joint distribution of cognitive and social skills
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Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates are
based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates.Notes: Joint mixture distribution
of traits.
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Figure 3.12: Joint distribution of cognitive skills and physical constitution
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Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates are
based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates.Notes: Joint mixture distribution
of traits.
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Figure 3.13: Joint distribution of social skills and physical contitution
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Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates are
based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates.Notes: Joint mixture distribution
of traits.
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3.C Robustness tests
3.C.1 Using low birth weight instead of small for gestational age
as measure of newborn health
As already mentioned in Section 3.4.2, size at birth reects two factors: gestational length
and the rate of fetal growth. Hence, if birth weight or low birth weight (less than 2,500
grams at birth) are used as indicators of fetal health as manifested at birth, this leads to
confounding eects of growth and maturity. Hence, we use SGA as our main outcome.
However, in order to make our results comparable to much of the previous literature, we
have re-estimated all our models using low birth weight as an outcome. In our sample,
the prevalence of low birth weight is around 7%, therefore lower than the prevalence of
SGA. Around 90% of babies who are normal weight are also categorized as normal size
for gestational age. However, only a little more than 50% of the babies who are low birth
weight are also SGA.
What we learn from this robustness exercise is that, while using LBW as an outcome
leaves the main qualitative results unchanged, it does lead to dierences in the impact
of maternal physical constitution, in the size of the treatment eect of smoking and in
the heterogeneity results. We have already discussed these results in the chapter in the
dierent sections where relevant, and we present all of them here now for completeness.
First, Table 3.28 reports the results on the eects of maternal traits on her choices and
newborn outcomes (the corresponding SGA Table is 3.5): we notice that, while the eects
of the cognitive and social skills are very similar (both quantitatively and qualitatively)
to those obtained when using SGA as outcome, the physical constitution of the mother is
not a signicant determinant of the probability of delivering a low birth weight baby, after
conditioning on the education and smoking choices. We then examine the total impact
of maternal traits on newborn outcomes: Figure 3.14 shows that the biggest dierence
with respect to the SGA results is in the eect of maternal physical constitution, while
cognition has no eect on the probability of delivering a LBW baby, and social skills a
very similar one to the one obtained when using SGA as an outcome. In particular, an
early nutritional intervention which would move the mother from the 20th to the 80th
percentile of the physical traits distribution would be associated with a reduction in the
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Table 3.28: Average marginal eects of a one standard deviation change in
maternal traits
Cognitive Skills Social Skills Physical Constitution
Education 0.153 0.039 0.015
(0.045) (0.015) (0.013)
Smoking(E=1) -0.012 -0.061 0.003
(0.022) (0.038) (0.026)
Smoking(E=0) -0.003 -0.056 0.011
(0.013) (0.021) (0.015)
LBW(E=1, S=1) 0.07 -0.005 -0.056
(0.163) (0.074) (0.164)
LBW(E=0, S=1) 0.003 -0.007 -0.039
(0.017) (0.017) (0.026)
LBW(E=1, S=0) 0.01 -0.004 -0.008
(0.015) (0.012) (0.015)
LBW(E=0, S=0) -0.003 -0.011 -0.007
(0.009) (0.009) (0.01)
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these
estimates are based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates.
Standard errors in brackets. E=education; S=smoking; LBW=low birth weight.
probability of delivering a LBW baby of only 3 pp, in contrast to the 10 pp obtained when
using SGA as outcome (Figure 3.6).
We then decompose the channels through which maternal traits aect LBW, and we report
the results in Figure 3.15. As compared to the results obtained using SGA (Figure 3.7),
we nd a signicant residual eect of both cognition and social skills on low birth weight.
The lack of biological plausibility of these results reassures us again about our choice of
SGA as the main outcome as more genuinely capturing the rate of fetal growth.
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Figure 3.14: Eect of maternal traits on newborn LBW
The effect of cognitive skills on the probability of 
 LBW (by quantile)
quantile
p r
o b
a b
i l i
t y
0.05
0.06
0.07
0.08
0.09
20 40 60 80
Legend
cognitive skills
CI
The effect of social skills on the probability of 
 LBW (by quantile)
quantile
p r
o b
a b
i l i
t y
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
20 40 60 80
Legend
social skills
CI
The effect of physical constitution on the probability of 
 LBW (by quantile)
quantile
p r
o b
a b
i l i
t y
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
20 40 60 80
Legend
physical constitution
CI
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates are
based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates. When computing the overall
eect of each trait in turn on the probability of delivering a LBW newborn, the other two traits are xed at their respective
means.
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Figure 3.15: Decomposing the eects of maternal endowments on newborn LBW
Cognitive Social Physical Constitution
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Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates are
based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates. The length of the bar \Total"
shows the overall reduction in the probability of delivering a LBW baby which is associated with a one standard deviation
increase in each of the three maternal endowments. The respective contributions of the various channels are shown in the
bars \education", \smoking" and \residual", respectively.
Table 3.30: Treatment eect of smoking and education
Treatment eect of ATE ATT ATNT AMTE
education on smoking in pregnancy -0.096 -0.092 -0.098 -0.097
(0.01) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01)
education on the probability of -0.008 -0.002 -0.011 -0.009
delivering a LBW baby (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
smoking on the probability of 0.051 0.052 0.051 0.052
delivering a LBW baby (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these
estimates are based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates. The
numbers in columns 2-5 are the treatment eects, as specied: ATE=Average Treatment Eect; ATT=Average
Treatment Eect on the Treated; ATNT=Average Treatment Eect on the Non-Treated; AMTE=Average
Marginal Treatment Eect. Standard errors in brackets.
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Table 3.31: Decomposition of the eects of
maternal endowments on newborn LBW
Cognitive Skills Social Skills Body Size
Education 354 9 2
Smoking -10 8 -2.5
Factor residual -444 83 100.5
TOTAL 100 100 100
Note: Numbers in cell show the percentage of the overall eect of each
maternal trait which works through the education and smoking choices,
and the residual eect. National Child Development Study (NCDS),
Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these estimates are
based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any
of the covariates.
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We nally compute the treatment eect of education and smoking on the probability of
delivering a LBW baby (Table 3.30), and we investigate the presence of heterogeneous
eects (Table 3.16). While the treatment eects of education are comparable to those
obtained when using SGA as outcome, we nd that smoking increases the probability
of delivering a LBW baby by around 5pp, which is half of the eect found for SGA
(Table 3.18). Lastly, the heterogeneity results reveal that the eect of education on the
probability of delivering a LBW baby is signicantly higher at the bottom of the cognitive
and social skills distribution, while it has basically no impact at the top (instead, we
found homogeneity in the eects of maternal education along the cognitive and social
skills distributions when using SGA as outcome, see Figure 3.9); comparable to those
obtained when using SGA as an outcome are, instead, the treatment eects of smoking
on LBW along the distribution of maternal traits (see again Figure 3.9).
3.C.2 Restricting sample to full term deliveries
As mentioned in Section 3.4.2, our main outcome of interest SGA (Small for Gestational
Age) can be measured with error. There are two main reasons: 1) the variable is based on
the recall of the last menstrual period (LMP) and 2) the charts for SGA are constructed
based on the distribution of live birth at any point in gestation. The problem related
with the rst source of measurement error is minimized for full term deliveries. The
intuition is simply that the lesser the expected date (as based on the LMP) and the
actual date coincide, the higher the probability that the expected date was wrong. In
fact, for deliveries in the 37-41 weeks range, up to 96% of them happen within one
week of the expected date (Strauss (2000), Poulsen et al. (2011), Wingate et al. (2007),
Kramer et al. (1988), Mustafa and David (2001)). The second problem leads to consistent
underestimation of SGA infants in early deliveries, because SGA is dened as being below
the 10% of the distribution of birth weight by gestation for live births. Yet, most healthy
infants will not be born premature, so problem 2) is comparable to a missing data problem
(Hutcheon and Platt, 2008) and would also be minimized by restricting the sample to
deliveries in the 37-41 weeks range. Hence, restricting the sample to full term births would
minimize the problems discussed above, but at the same time would have the important
drawback of loosing important variation from the data, by discarding all the premature
births.
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Table 3.34: Average marginal eects of a one standard deviation change in
maternal traits
Cognitive Skills Social Skills Physical Constitution
Education 0.156 0.038 0.017
(0.045) (0.015) (0.015)
Smoking(E=1) -0.024 -0.069 0.001
(0.026) (0.044) (0.032)
Smoking(E=0) -0.009 -0.059 0.029
(0.015) (0.024) (0.02)
SGA(E=1, S=1) 0.009 0.11 -0.17
(0.121) (0.173) (0.253)
SGA(E=0, S=1) 0.02 -0.012 -0.097
(0.031) (0.028) (0.049)
SGA(E=1, S=0) -0.001 -0.028 -0.061
(0.024) (0.025) (0.056)
SGA(E=0, S=0) -0.018 0.004 -0.044
(0.014) (0.016) (0.022)
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these
estimates are based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates.
Standard errors in brackets. E=education; S=smoking; SGA=small for gestational age. Sample is restricted
to full-term babies (37-41 weeks of gestation).
While the results in the chapter are based on a sample which includes all gestational
ages, in this appendix we have also re-estimated all the models by restricting the sample
to full-term deliveries. As shown in Tables 3.3457 and 3.35,58 the results are comparable.
This suggests that the presence of measurement error in SGA does not constitute a serious
issue in our data.59
3.C.3 Using dierent references for birth weight by gestation
The last robustness test that we perform refers to the use of a dierence reference chart,
since there is no one unique chart for birth weight by gestational age that is unanimously
recognized as the gold standard. We have chosen the one most commonly adopted in the
literature: the Babson and Benda's chart, as updated by Fenton. This is also the table
featured in standard Neonatology manuals in the USA (e.g, see Gomella et al. (1999)).
Another common chart recommended for the USA is the one proposed in Alexander et al.
(1996). There exists a debate on whether charts should be population specic or if
57This corresponds to Table 3.5 in the main text.
58This corresponds to Table 3.18 in the main text.
59We thank Heather Royer for suggesting us to perform this robustness test.
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Table 3.35: Treatment eect of smoking and education
Treatment eect of ATE ATT ATNT AMTE
education on smoking in pregnancy -0.079 -0.086 -0.075 -0.08
(0.011) (0.01) (0.011) (0.011)
education on the probability of -0.004 -0.016 0.002 -0.004
delivering a SGA baby (0.01) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01)
smoking on the probability of 0.118 0.094 0.125 0.114
delivering a SGA baby (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these
estimates are based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates. The
numbers in columns 2-5 are the treatment eects, as specied: ATE=Average Treatment Eect; ATT=Average
Treatment Eect on the Treated; ATNT=Average Treatment Eect on the Non-Treated; AMTE=Average
Marginal Treatment Eect. Sample is restricted to full-term babies (37-41 weeks of gestation). Standard errors
in brackets.
instead there should be one, universal chart. The latter approach has been adopted for
children, in which case the WHO growth charts are recognized as the standard. Charts
for fetal growth, instead, tend to be population specic and even tailored to maternal
characteristics (Gardosi, 2006), because of the well-known impact of maternal physical
constitution on newborn weight.60
Importantly, the dierence between the USA and the UK reference charts is minimal.
Nonetheless, in order to provide one more check of the robustness of our results, we have
also re-estimated all the models using the latest birth weight by gestational age charts for
Great Britain, which are constructed on the basis of births from Scotland (Bonellie et al.,
2008), and are the latest tables adopted in ocial publications.61
As expected, the results, reported in Tables 3.36 and 3.37, are very similar to those
obtained by using the US charts { which reassures us once more of the robustness of our
ndings.
60Notice we do not need to use a \tailored" growth chart since we explicitly include maternal physical
constitution in our model.
61The classical UK reference chart is outdated (Thomson et al., 1968), and these are constructed on
the basis of a much bigger number of births than the original ones.
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Table 3.36: Average marginal eects of a one standard deviation change in
maternal traits
Cognitive Skills Social Skills Physical Constitution
Education 0.153 0.04 0.016
(0.045) (0.014) (0.013)
Smoking(E=1) -0.012 -0.062 0.001
(0.023) (0.039) (0.026)
Smoking(E=0) -0.004 -0.055 0.013
(0.012) (0.021) (0.016)
SGA(E=1, S=1) -0.045 -0.004 -0.125
(0.092) (0.101) (0.169)
SGA(E=0, S=1) 0.015 -0.022 -0.088
(0.024) (0.022) (0.042)
SGA(E=1, S=0) -0.005 0.005 -0.043
(0.018) (0.019) (0.032)
SGA(E=0, S=0) -0.015 0.006 -0.042
(0.012) (0.013) (0.023)
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these
estimates are based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates.
Standard errors in brackets. E=education; S=smoking; SGA=small for gestational age. SGA is dened
using Bonellie et al. (2008) table.
Table 3.37: Treatment eect of smoking and education
Treatment eect of ATE ATT ATNT AMTE
education on smoking in pregnancy -0.097 -0.094 -0.099 -0.098
(0.01) (0.009) (0.01) (0.01)
education on the probability of -0.002 -0.013 0.004 -0.004
delivering a SGA baby (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008)
smoking on the probability of 0.104 0.105 0.104 0.105
delivering a SGA baby (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Note: National Child Development Study (NCDS), Birth cohort 1958. The analytical sample on which these
estimates are based consists of all female cohort members that have no missings in any of the covariates. The
numbers in columns 2-5 are the treatment eects, as specied: ATE=Average Treatment Eect; ATT=Average
Treatment Eect on the Treated; ATNT=Average Treatment Eect on the Non-Treated; AMTE=Average
Marginal Treatment Eect. Standard errors in brackets. SGA is dened using Bonellie et al. (2008) table.
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3.D Three-Step Estimation Procedure
As mentioned in Section 3.3 we use Bayesian MCMC methods to estimate the parameters
of our sequential selection model with a factor structure; however, we also present results
from a stepwise procedure which uses factor scores as proxies for factors, similar to the
one in Heckman et al. (2013a). The advantage of using factors scores instead of a simple
(unweighted) sum of measures is that the weights (loadings) are not required to be uniform
across items, but instead reect the estimated correlation between each item and the
latent factor. We perform the following three steps. First, we estimate the parameters of
the measurement system. Second, we predict factor scores for each individual, using the
estimated parameters obtained in the rst step. Third, we include these predicted scores
as observed covariates in choice and outcome equations.
While this three-step approach avoids poor convergence, multiple local maxima, and
instability of the model with respect to estimated parameters, as compared to full
maximum likelihood estimation, the method produces biased coecients in the outcome
equations of the model. If not bias-corrected, coecients are plagued by attenuation
bias by a standard errors-in-variables argument (Croon, 2002). We correct for this bias
following a procedure due to Iwata (1992), which is similar to the one described in
Lu and Thomas (2008) and employed in Heckman et al. (2013a). However, our method
slightly diers from theirs, as we correct the factor scores before using them in the outcome
system; additionally, our method has the advantage that it can also be applied to some
nonlinear models, like the probit, which we use.
3.D.1 Factor Score Prediction
Here we detail the second step of our three-step estimation procedure. Let's start by
assuming a linear relationship between the vector of measurements (M) and the vector of
factors (), so that the measurement system for agent i, i 2 f1; :::; Ng can be written as:
Mk;i =
PS
s=1 k;ss;i + k;i; for k = 1; :::; K and s = 1; :::; S
or in matrix notation Mi = i + "i. Denote the covariance matrices of "i and
Mi as V ["i] = , and V [Mi] = 
. Furthermore, assume that i ?? k;i and that
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j;i ?? k;i 8 k 6= j. Hence, "i are mutually independent uniquenesses that capture
the stochastic measurement error component and  is a matrix of factor loadings.
Furthermore, denote E[0] =  and assume E[] = 0 and E["] = 0 to set the
location of the factors. Hence, the covariance matrix of the measurements can be written
as 
 = 0 + . In practice, we assume that each factor loads on a distinct set
of measurements (so-called \dedicated"), so that  is also distinct for each system of
measurements. Furthermore, we set the scale of the factors by normalizing the factor
loading of the rst measurement equation for each factor equal to 1. Last, we set K  3
for each factor to ensure identication.
After having estimated the covariance matrices and the parameters of the vector  in
a rst step, we now aim to estimate a vector of factor scores ci that approximates the
true vector of skills i for each individual i. We use Bartlett's estimator which is based
on the minimization of the mean squared error (MSE) of the above equation, because
of its desirable unbiasedness properties (Saris et al., 1978; Skrondal and Laake, 2001).
Bartlett's factor scores are given by:
ciB0 = ^0^ 1^ 1 ^0^ 1Mi
Hence, Bartlett's estimator is a GLS procedure which provides the maximum likelihood
estimates of ciB0 , conditional on the data Mi.62
3.D.2 Bias Correction
Finally, to correct for the attenuation bias that arises from using estimated instead of
true factors, we use a simple estimation method proposed by Iwata (1992), which may
be applied to linear models as well as a certain class of nonlinear models. The idea is to
replace the unobserved true vector of latent factors by some estimate and then to estimate
the regression parameters in the usual way. Consider the following model:
Yi = 

i + "i
62Notice that the data are used twice: rst to obtain estimates of the factor loadings, then to predict
the factor scores, treating the factor loadings as regressors.
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where
i = i + Vi
where i is the measured 

i . Furthermore, it is assumed that i ?? Vi, E[[]Vi] = 0
and that (i; "i) are iid. Denote the covariance matrix of 

i as Cov(

i ;

i ) = ii ,
the covariance matrix of V as Cov(V; V ) = 
 and ii = ii   
. A consistent
estimator of ii can be obtained when estimating the measurement system as explained
in the previous section. If we used i instead of 

i , the OLS estimator denoted as L =
(0) 10Y would be inconsistent. However,
 = ()
 1L (3.11)
is consistent. Equation 3.11 can be rewritten as:
 = ()  (
0) 10Y
 =
 
 ()
 10()
 1
 1
 ()
 10Y
 =

^0^
 1
^
0
Y;
where:
^ = ()
 1 :
Hence, ^ is a consistent estimator of . Furthermore, Iwata (1992) shows that this
estimator retains consistency in certain classes of nonlinear models, such as the probit
model.
123

Chapter 4
A Validation Study of
Intergenerational Eects of
Early-Life Conditions on Ospring's
Economic and Health Outcomes
Potentially Driven by Epigenetic
Imprinting1
4.1 Introduction
Recently, epigenetic imprinting has become a focal point in medical, biological and
epidemiological research on intergenerational eects of nutrition, behaviors and life
circumstance. This chapter validates and extends recent ndings from this literature
according to which nutritious shocks in one generation of individuals can transmit to
later generations via epigenetic imprinting. Epigenetics is dened as the process by which
patterns of gene expression are modied in a relatively stable and heritable manner
through methylation of the chromatin. Methylation involves the addition of a methyl
group to the DNA base, which can turn down a gene's activity or switch it o entirely.
Epigenetic imprinting implies that shortly after conception, when stem cells are formed,
some of the methyl tags from previous generations remain, causing heritable changes in
gene functioning that are not caused by changes in the DNA sequence. Methyl markers
are passed on through the germ line, with potentially dierent expressions of the maternal
and paternal alleles in the ospring. Epigenetic modications may depend on the sex of
1This chapter is joint work with Gerard van den Berg.
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the parent who transmits it and can lead to intergenerational non-genetic inheritance of
lifetime experiences across generations (Hochberg et al., 2011).
So far, almost all empirical evidence on epigenetic transmission stems from experiments
on mice, while research on humans is extremely rare.2 The reason is that evidence on
humans has to rely on non-experimental data, which leads to identication problems if
nutrition in childhood is endogenously related to unobserved characteristics, that also
inuence outcomes more directly. Hence, to identify the causal eect of food deprivation
on subsequent generations, an exogenous shock in nutrition on one generation is needed,
as well as outcomes for later generations. Using famine variation from the Dutch
Hunger Winter, there exists evidence that nutrition is an important driver of epigenetic
modications in a single generation of humans (Tobi et al., 2009). Intergenerational
epigenetic transmission for three generations has only been studied in a single line of
research papers using historical harvest data and church registers from a remote are in
Northern Sweden(Bygren et al., 2001; Kaati et al., 2002, 2007; Pembrey et al., 2006). The
authors nd that low paternal grandfather's food supply in pre-adolescence is associated
with a lower mortality risk ratio of sons and grandsons, while low paternal grandmother's
food supply is linked to a lower mortality risk of their granddaughters. Besides, the authors
nd low food supply during the paternal grandfather's pre-puberty phase to be associated
with lower third generation mortality from cardiovascular diseases, and higher diabetes
mortality with a surfeit of food. The authors postulate that these eects are potentially
triggered by methylation of epigenetic marks in the sperm during the ancestor's slow
growth period (SGP), which took place at ages 8-10 for girls and at ages 9-12 for boys.
They hypothesize that the SGP is a sensitive period for the methylation of male sperm,
with methyl tags being transmitted to subsequent generations via epigenetic imprinting
(Pembrey et al., 2006).
The above-named sequence of research papers has evoked a lot of discussion and
controversy: It is explorative in a sense that the authors look at the eect of either a
surfeit of food or poor food availability for six ancestors (4 grandparents and 2 parents),
during several age periods, and on several outcomes. Furthermore, samples are rather
small, ranging from ca 100-300 individuals. For such a large number of parameters and
2Thus far, intergenerational inheritance of epigenetic states has been demonstrated in agouti-mice
and rats through paternal and maternal transmission (Anway, 2005; Rakyan et al., 2003).
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given the small sample size, it is possible to nd eects that prove unimportant in other
samples.
Hence, in this chapter we assess the external validity of these ndings and extend
the analysis to schooling and mental health outcomes. Specically, we examine adult
outcomes of subsequent generations following rst-generation exposure to the German
famine of 1916-1918 during the slow growth period. First of all, we investigate second
generation longevity. Secondly, because the third generation individuals in our sample are
too young to have died of a natural cause, we use rst and second generation height
as a universally accepted proxy for health outcomes, which is positively and almost
linearly related to life expectancy at birth (Waaler, 1984; Steckel, 2008). In addition, we
look at mental health and secondary schooling. We choose these measures, because they
are inuenced by early childhood circumstance and nutrition (Neugebauer et al., 1999;
St Clair et al., 2005; Neelsen and Stratmann, 2011) and related to epigenetic modica-
tions (Gra and Mansuy, 2008; McGowan et al., 2008; Radtke et al., 2011). Furthermore,
schooling and mental health are closely linked with cognitive and noncognitive skills, which
are developed during childhood and have an important impact on economic outcomes later
in life (Cunha and Heckman, 2008; Heckman et al., 2006).
In regard of the previous literature, we expect an individual's famine exposure during
the slow growth period to be positively associated with second and third generation
outcomes. Furthermore, if famine exposure during SGP aects methylation of the male
gametes but not the female ones3, we expect only male SGP famine exposure to aect
ospring results. Moreover, any causal impact of the famine, epigenetic or not, should be
stronger for individuals who suered from the famine for a longer period of time during
their SGP.
Using the German famine as an exogenous shifter in nutrition has several advantages
and disadvantages. First and foremost, it provides us with a large exogenous shock to
a generation of individuals whose children and grandchildren are living today and for
whom a large number of outcomes is available. Furthermore, probands were aected by
the famine at dierent ages, such that sensitive periods can be separately identied. We
also have to address a number of problems. Following the famine, Germany was hit by the
Spanish inuenza, such that famine and inuenza eects cannot be disentangled. Besides,
3The female ovum fully develops during fetal development.
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the second world war inuenced individuals, and later generations possibly survived the
war at dierent rates. Historical factors, related to environmental inuences or upbringing,
may have aected the SGP famine cohort dierently from adjacent cohorts. We control
for that by including a large number of controls on population growth and GDP at time
of birth, birth year dummies and background controls. Last, because we lack information
on methylation patterns, epigenetic imprinting cannot be pinned down as the unique
cause of our ndings and other mechanisms or explanations are possible, biological and
non-biological. Non-biologically, a famine at pre-pubertal age may lead to more mature
behavior. Elder (1999) for example, investigating the impact of the Great Depression on
children born in 1920-1921, nds that experiencing economic hardship around the age of 10
led to more resilience and psychological strength. Biologically, if the paternal grandmother
(PGM) was aected by the famine at ages 8-10, her behavior could more easily be
transmitted to granddaughters than grandsons due dierent degrees of X-chromosome
relatedness along the paternal line. Granddaughters share more genetic material with
their PGMs than grandsons do (Fox et al., 2010).
We use data from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), a large household panel that
is representative for the German population. The data are well-suited for our analysis
because they allow us to identify whether a rst generation of individuals (usually the
parents of SOEP respondents) was aected by the famine during the slow growth period.
Furthermore, they contain information on a wide range of health information, longevity
and economic outcomes for the second and third generation.
Our ndings suggest that among second generation individuals, maternal famine aect-
edness during SGP reduces mortality among males, and is associated with lower adult
height. Besides, second generation males tend to be taller if their father has been aected.
Paternal grandfather SGP-famine seems to increase mental health of third generation sons
while maternal grandmother SGP-famine has a positive eect on granddaughter mental
health. We do not nd robust eects for schooling.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section Section 4.2 gives an overview over the most
recent developments in the epigenetic literature and explains their relevance for economic
research. Section 4.3 describes the famine we use as an exogenous shock and summarizes
the evidence obtained so far for it. Section 4.4 describes the empirical approach. In
Section 5.4 we describe our data. Section 5.6 presents our main ndings for generations
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2 and 3. We investigate how the results change if we move from controlling only for a
basic set of variables to controlling for additional background variables, which potentially
account for non-biological channels. Besides, we present robustness checks where we vary
famine intensity and period. Section 4.7 concludes.
4.2 Epigenetics and Economics
Biological circumstances during early life have been shown to have important eects
on longevity, health and economic outcomes. So far, the economics literature has
focused almost exclusively on rst-generation eects that emerge from in utero or
early-life exposure to famines, inuenza or even rainfall (Maccini and Yang, 2009;
Doblhammer et al., 2013; Almond and Mazumder, 2005; Lumey and Stein, 1997). Most
of these studies nd detrimental eects of adverse shocks on adult outcomes. In biology,
such eects, termed fetal-programming, are well-known and can be produced in mammals
by exposing ospring in utero to food restrictions on the pregnant female (Barker, 1995;
Nathanielsz, 2003; Whitelaw, 2006).
Much fewer studies have investigated whether there exists an association of rst generation
exposure to reduced food supply with second and third generation outcomes. Painter et al.
(2008) nd that gestational famine exposure was associated with reduced ospring length
in the next generation and that children of famine-exposed mothers were more likely
to be in poor health from acquired neurological, auto-immune, respiratory, infectious,
neoplastic, or dermatological problems. In other studies, ancestral food supply was found
to aect birth weight, risk of stillbirth, perinatal death and longevity of the second or
even third generation (Bygren et al., 2001; Lumey and Stein, 1997; Kaati et al., 2007).
Moreover, Pembrey et al. (2006) analyze the eect of smoking during the SGP by
exploring UK data on parental interviews of newborn children. They found that the
sons of fathers who smoked during their SGP had higher body mass index as 9 year olds.
Last, Kaati et al. (2002) and Kaati et al. (2007) study an exogenous variation in nutrition
triggered by a food shortage in northern Sweden by collecting records of harvests and food
prices during the 19th Century. They show that individuals experiencing food shortages
in the SGP, had descendants with lower risks of mortality from cardiovascular disease
and diabetes. In particular, the authors nd that the mortality risk ratio of grandsons is
adversely aected by their paternal grandfather's SGP-exposure to rich food supply while
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the paternal grandmother's food supply during her SGP adversely aected the mortality
risk of her granddaughters.
The molecular basis for environmentally-triggered nongenetic intergenerational eects is
not fully known to date, but the most prominent hypothesis is that it involves epigenetics.4
Fraga et al. (2005) show that epigenetic patterns are formed over the entire life-course:
while 3-year-old monozygotic twins have almost identical methylation patterns, their DNA
methylation diers markedly at the age of 50. Besides, ndings by Heijmans et al. (2008)
and Tobi et al. (2009) support the presumption that epigenetic modications in humans
are related to nutrition. The authors nd sex-specic dierences in methylation patterns
between individuals who have been prenatally exposed to the famine and their same-sex
siblings.
Epigenetic inheritance implies that methylation patterns in one generation inuence gene
expression in the next. How such epigenetic transmissions or inheritance in humans works
biologically is not fully resolved (Harper, 2005). Shortly after conception, when the rst
cell divisions are taking place, the stem cells are generally cleared of all methylation
(Ahmed, 2010; Mayer et al., 2000). However, if epigenetic modications take place on the
part of the genome that is genetically imprinted, this could explain sex-specic epigenetic
inheritance. 'Imprinted genes' keep their methyl tags (about 1% of genes), which function
as a biological marker to ag up their maternal or paternal origin (Masterpasqua, 2009).
Economists and social scientists are merely interested in whether adverse experiences can
be transmitted non-genetically from one generation to the next rather than in the exact
mechanism.5 Any non-genetic transmission of experiences, would revolutionize economic
thinking about intergenerational transmission and human capital accumulation in at least
two ways. First, if life experiences were transmitted, not only via upbringing and social
circumstance but also biologically, from one generation to the next, this would imply that
that the costs and benets of any policy measure would have to be re-evaluated to include
such biological eects on subsequent generations. Second, nature (genetic predisposition)
and nurture (upbringing) were found to be inseparable and the long-fought nature-nurture
debate would become obsolete. In the future, models of human capital investment would
4Other potential mechanisms are DNA amplication or changes in telomere length (Kaati et al.,
2007).
5For an overview of molecular genetics and economics see Lundborg and Stenberg (2010). For
Epigenetics and Psychology see Harper (2005).
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need to account for gene expressions and gene-environment interactions as well as for
critical and sensitive periods of epigenetic transmission.
Kaati and co-authors argue that the slow growth period of a child may be such
a sensitive period. It takes place at ages 9-12 for boys and at ages 8-10 for girls
and is thus the developmental period just before onset of puberty. In this period,
the rst male gametes mature, which may make it a sensitive period for repro-
gramming of methylation imprints (Pembrey, 2002). This period of childhood is also
known as the 'fat spurt': growth is low and the body is accumulating reserves for
in anticipation of the puberty-related development spurt (Marshall and Tanner, 1968;
Gasser et al., 1994; Gasser, 1996). It is plausible that limited food availability during
the 'fat spurt' leads to worse pubertal development and imprinting on the sperm
or egg. Indeed, this growth period has previously been found to be critical for
development. Sparen et al. (2004) for example nd that a famine at this age increases
cardiovascular problems later in life. Similarly, Van den Berg and Gupta (2007) and
Van den Berg, G.J. and Lundborg, P. and Nystedt, P. and Rooth, D.O. (2010) nd this
age period to be critical for life expectancy and adult height, respectively.
4.3 The Famine
The World War 1 famine in the German empire is said to be the severest famine
experienced in Europe outside of Russia since Ireland's travail in the 1840s (Raico, 1989).
At the end of the war, the German 'Reichsgesundheitsamt' (Health Oce) calculated that
763,000 German civilians had died from starvation.6
Four factors had led to the extreme shortage of food. First, by mid-1916 the Allied Powers
had successfully enacted a complete naval blockade of Germany restricting the maritime
supply of raw materials and foodstus. Before the war Germany had imported one third
of its food, but after the blockade Germany was cut from foodstu imports of all sorts:
fodder for livestock, grain and potatoes. Importantly, the blockade continued even after
the Armistice and until June 1919 to force Germany to sign the Treaty of Versailles. In
6The overall population of the German empire at that time was about 65 million. In addition there
were about 2 million military deaths, who in a conventional ground-based war like WW1, were almost
exclusively men of age 17-60.
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fact, throughout 1919 rationing was maintained in many parts of the country at a rate of
1000-1300 calories per day (Vincent, 1985).7
Second, due to the general war mobilization, around 40% of the male agricultural labor
force was absent and a similar fraction of horses and cattle. This reduction in the male
work force was not adequately compensated by employment of prisoners of war, women,
adolescents and children (Huber and Fogel, 1920). As a consequence, between 1913 and
1919 annual production of crops, potatoes and milk decreased to about 50% between 1913
and 1919 when compared to pre-war levels (Blum, 2011).
Third, in the summer 1916, the root crop and grain harvest were particulary bad and the
potato crop failed almost completely. The latter was particularly detrimental, because
much of the German food supply was based on potatoes and during the war more
agricultural crop land had been shifted away from turnip cultivation and towards potatoes
(Klein, 1968). The Winter of 1916-1917 thus marked the climax of the famine and is today
remembered as the 'turnip winter' (Steckrubenwinter), because the only food in sucient
supply during that winter were turnips.
Last, food storage was a concern. Before the war most of the potato crop was stored in
the countryside and only supplied to the cities on demand. After the start of the war,
when transportation and dislocation became more dicult, and potatoes had to be stored
in larger quantities by individuals unschooled in the proper techniques of storage, which
led to spoilage and waste (Vincent, 1985).
The period of food scarcity started in June 1915 when bread began to be rationed, but
only in early 1916 food rationing became severe. From 1916 to mid-1919, the German
population had to live on less than 1500 calories (Starling et al., 1919). Yet, because the
portion of bran in the bread was very large, the calorie value was further reduced by
about 15 to 20 percent.8 Most Germans had to live on a meagre diet of dark bread, slices
of sausage without fat, three points of potatoes per week and turnips (Vincent, 1985).
Table 4.1 displays an overview over the amount of food consumed during the famine as
compared to prewar times. While these amounts are well below subsistence to begin with,
the situation was aggravated by the mere length of the famine which started in 1916 and
extended into 1919. At the height of the famine, purchasing foodstus on the black market
7The reason for continued food rationing was that even after the end of the blockade in June 1919
Germany could not import freely, since all funds had to be saved for war reparations.
8In comparison, a man needs about 2500 calories a day and a women needs about 2000.
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Table 4.1: Food consumption before and
during the famine
Item Before War During Famine
Calories 2280 per day 1313 per day
Protein 70g per day 30-40g per day
Fat 70g per day 15-20g per day
Bread 225g a) per day 160g per day
Meat 1050g per week 135g per week
Potatoes 100% 71%
Grain 100% 53%
Sugar 100% 49%
Vegetable oil 100% 39%
Meat 100% 31%
Butter 100% 22%
Eggs 100% 18%
Pulse 100% 14%
Cheese 100% 3%
Notes:
Adult quantities reported.
Lower part of the table (percentages) indicate ocial rations
and not actual amounts which were often lower.
Products that vanished almost entirely: cheese, fruit, leather.
a) in 1915.
Sources:
Ernest H. Starling, 1919, Report on Food Conditions in
Germany. (London: H.M. Stationary Oce) pp. 7-16.
Paul C. Vincent, 1985, The politics of Hunger.
Klein, 1968, Deutschland im ersten Weltkrieg.
For more details on food ratios and average caloric consumption
see Table 4.2 and Figure 4.1.
was the only way to prevent starvation. Black market prices in cities quickly skyrocked
(see Table 4.3) and many families had to rely on excursions to the countryside, where
blackmarket prices where somewhat lower.
The eects on the population were detrimental. On average the German population
has lost about 15-25 percent of their weight between 1916 and 1919.9 Mortality rates
for adults rose substantially during this time, but not for children aged 1-15 (Roesle,
1928). Nevertheless, many children suered from edema, tuberculosis, rickets, inuenza,
scurvy, and keratomalacia.10 There even exist studies claiming that the famine had such
a damaging eect on German youth that it impaired adult rational thinking and laid
ground for later adherence to National Socialism (Loewenberg, 1971). Blum (2011) shows
that the average height in the male population born in the period between 1914 and 1917
9Individuals who had lost 30 percent or more mostly died.
10The number of occurrences of epidemic diseases such as typhoid, rabies, trichiniasis and dysentery
stayed roughly constant in the population.
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Figure 4.1: Caloric consumption, German Empire
Sources:
reprinted from Arnulf Huegel, 2003, Kriegsernahrungswirtschaft Deutschlands wahrend des Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieges
im Vergleich (pp 180).
is around 1.5cm less than for adjacent cohorts, indicating a sharp decline in biological
living standards. Moreover, the decline is sharper for individuals of lower socioeconomic
classes.
Table 4.2: Food consumption before and during the famine
(percent of pre-war level)
Item July 1916 July 1917 July 1918
until June 1917 until June 1918 until December 1918
Meat 31 20 12
Fish 51 - 5
Eggs 18 13 15
Lard 14 11 7
Butter 22 21 28
Cheese 3 4 15
Rice 4 - -
Pulse 14 1 7
Sugar 49 56-67 80
Vegetable oil 39 41 17
Potatoes 71 94 94
Flour 53 47 48
Sources:
reprinted from Arnulf Huegel, 2003, Kriegsernahrungswirtschaft Deutschlands wahrend des
Ersten und Zweiten Weltkrieges im Vergleich (pp 180).
4.3.1 Spanish Inuenza
In 1918/1919, the Spanish Inuenza hit many countries all over the world. In Germany,
about 150,000 individuals have died as a result of the disease (Vincent, 1985). This number
is low when compared to the overall number of deaths that resulted from starvation, but
still considerable. The rst wave of the pandemic hit Germany in June 1918, the second
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Table 4.3: Prices for foodstus in Bonn (in Mark), 1914 to 1918
Product Unit Ocial Ocial Black market Increase
1914 1917/18 1917/1918 (%)
Beef 1 lb 1 2.8 4.75 375
Veal 1 lb 1 2.8 5 400
Pork 1 lb 0.8 - 6 650
Gammon 1 lb 1.2 - 13 983
Bacon 1 lb 0.7 2.75 15.5 2.114
Suet 1 lb 0.4 2 14.5 3.525
Lard 1 lb 0.8 5 18 2.15
Concentrated milk 1 can 0.5 1.7 4.5 800
Butter 1 lb 1.3 3.4 14 977
Curd 1 lb 0.2 2.3 3.5 1.65
Eggs 1 piece 0.06 0.4 0.65 983
Colza oil 1 l 0.6 5 21.5 3.483
Salad oil 1 l 1.4 - 24 1.614
Olive oil 1 l 3 - 50 1.567
Rye our 1 lb 0.15 1.85 4 2.567
Wheat our 1 lb 0.2 - 4 1.9
Rice 1 lb 0.25 - 8 3.1
Source:
reprinted from Blum, 2011 (original source Roerkohl, Anne, 1991), Government decisions before and
during the First World War and the living standards in Germany during a drastic natural experiment
(p. 558).
one in the fall and the third one in January 1919 (Witte, 2008). In our study, it is thus not
possible to separate the eects of the famine from the eects of the inuenza pandemic.
However, what characterized the Spanish Inuenza was that, for the most part, it was
lethal only for individuals of ages 20-40, such that concerns of selective survival can be
neglected for our cohorts of interest. Mamelund (2003) using data on Norway, which was
neutral during WWI, conrms this presumption. He nds that the cohorts born 1890-1910
experienced the lowest immediate death rates of the Spanish Inuenza. Nevertheless, since
the continuation of the blockade and the third wave of the Spanish inuenza extended
well into 1919, we conduct robustness checks with the year 1919 included in our famine
period.
4.4 Identication and Outcome Models
We use common coecient models and matching to identify the eect of SGP famine
exposure of rst generation (G1) ancestors on second (G2) and third generation (G3)
individuals. We thus calculate a famine eect that compares G2 and G3 individuals with
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the same background and and birth year, but who dier with respect to exogenous rst
generation SGP famine exposure. Because, rst generation famine-SGP exposure is a
historical incident that is exogenous at the individual level, our approach allows us to
identify the true impact of having ancestors of a certain age during the famine on the
second and third generation.11
4.4.1 Famine exposure
To investigate systematically how adult outcomes of G2 and G2 vary with rst generation
SGP exposure to the famine, we focus on individuals who have at least one ancestor born
during the years 1902-1913. This implies that the G1 males of our core sample were too
young to have been drafted and G1 females were too young to have conceived a child
during the war.12 Also, none of the individuals in our core sample were born during the
war, such that we neither need to account for selective fertility during war times nor for
in utero exposure to the famine.13
Table 4.4 displays the number of years the famine aected dierent birth cohorts of rst
generation individuals during their SGP, dening 1916-1918 as the famine period. Note
that all rst-generation individuals have been aected by the famine, despite at dierent
ages.14 We thus identify the eect of being famine exposed during SGP as compared
to being aected by the famine at a dierent point in time. Our data thus allow us to
separate the eect of 'being aected by a famine at some point during life' from 'being
aected by a famine during SGP'.
Our analysis relies on the assumption that there are no dierences in famine survival
between individuals aected by the famine during the SGP and the control groups. Hence,
we assume that children in their slow growth period have been about equally likely to die
from the famine than children that were slightly younger or older at the time. Historical
sources seem to back this claim: death rates of children between the ages of one and ve
11Note that our measure of famine exposure is whether someone had reached a certain age by the time
of the famine. This measure thus reects the intention to treat and not the actual treatment eect. We
cannot identify whether someone actually went hungry. It is however save to assume that the intention
to treat is similar to the actual treatment eect, because hunger during the German famine was so
widespread that compliance was very high.
12Only men of ages 17-60 were drafted into the military (Foerster, 1994).
13Note that this does not have to be true for all other ancestors. E.g. for third-generation individuals
only ONE out of four grandparents has to be born in the period 1902-1913.
14A rare exception for a historical event where there is a control group which is largely unaected is
the Dutch Hunger Winter (see e.g. Scholte et al. (2012)).
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had risen by fty percent during the famine, while for children from ve to fteen were
only slightly higher (fty-ve percent) (Vincent, 1985). Selection into fertility would be
a problem if parents from dieren social classes had been more or less likely to conceive
children in the periods 1902-1903 (1902-1904) or 1910-1913 (1911-1913) than during the
years 1904-1909 (1906-1910). Figure 4.3 however shows that for the time period of births
we are analyzing (1901-1914), overall birth rates do not show any systematic pattern. In
fact, it was impossible to anticipate a decade earlier.15
Table 4.4: Number of years of famine exposure during the slow growth
period, rst generation males and females.
Birth year 1902 1903 1904 1905 1906 1907 1908 1909 1910 1911 1912 1913
Males 0 0 1 2 3 3 2 1 0 0 0 0
Females 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 2 1 0 0 0
Age during famine 14-16 13-15 12-14 11-13 10-12 9-11 8-10 7-9 6-8 5-7 4-6 3-5
Famine years: 1916-1918. The slow growth period ranges from ages 8-10 and 9-12 for females and males, respectively.
The exogenous shifter in nutrition, ZG1 2 f0; 1g, is dened as an indicator variable of
whether G1 ancestors were SGP-exposed to the famine, i.e. of ages 8-10 (females) and
of ages 9-12 (males) in 1916-1918. We distinguish between three rst-generation cohorts.
a) males [females] whose SGP lies in the famine period (ZG1 = 1): birth years 1904-1909
[1906-1910] b) males [females] born ante 1903 [1904] and in SGP before the famine hit
(ZG1 = 0) and c) males [females] born after 1910 [1911], i.e. who were too young for the
famine to have aected them in their SGP (ZG1 = 0).
Each generation is aected dierently by the famine. For G2, ZG2;i is a 2x1 vector with
the rst entry indicating whether the mother was aected by the famine during her
SGP and the second indicating whether the father was aected during that same period.
Following the same logic, ZG3;i has four entries: whether paternal grandfather (PGF) was
SGP famine aected, whether paternal grandmother (PGM) was SGP famine aected,
whether maternal grandfather (MGF) was SGP famine aected and whether maternal
grandmother (MGM) was SGP famine aected.
15During WW1, on the other hand, the birthrate was falling from thirty per thousand to fteen per
thousand (Vincent, 1985).
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4.4.2 Outcome Models
We estimate three dierent types of outcome models to account for the dierent
distributional properties of the respective outcome variables: A duration model for
individual mortality, a discrete choice probit model for the decision to obtain a higher
secondary school degree and a linear regression model for the continuous outcomes
height and mental health. In all models, x denotes an individual-specic vector of
observable characteristics, which always comprises some basic control variables and in
some specications an additional set of background controls. f is a vector of birth year
xed eects (for G2 and G3) that captures any variation that may be cohort or birth
year specic. For the third generation (G3), this vector also comprises parental birth year
xed eects to capture for example business cycle eects.16
Duration Model
First, to estimate the impact of the famine on longevity of the second generation, we model
the hazard of mortality at any given point in time as being multiplicatively separable in
a (nonfrailty) hazard function 0 and a frailty term ():
h(t) = 0 (4.1)
Following the standard biological literature on modeling mortality, the baseline hazard
has the shape of a Gompertz distribution with ancillary parameter :
0 = exp(t)exp(
NX
i=1
Z 0i + x
0
i + f
0
t): (4.2)
The frailty distribution  follows a gamma distribution with:
   (1; ) (4.3)
Our sample is special in a sense that selection into the sample is conditional on ever
having responded to a the household questionnaire. We thus account for left truncation
by adjusting the likelihood for the fact that individuals only enter in adult life, using age
at rst interview as truncation point.
16For the eect of business cycle variation on outcomes see e.g. van den Berg et al. (2011).
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Probit Model
We model binary outcomes such as disability status or upper secondary schooling as
a binary outcome latent index model with Yit = 1[Y it>0], where Y

it denotes the latent
continuous variable. The latent variable in turn is determined by famine exposure, birth
year xed eects and observable control variables. We assume a linear structure and
additive separability in the error term:
Y it = Z
0
i + x
0
i + f
0
t + it:
The observed binary variable Yit is an indicator variable that is assumed to equal one
if the latent variable crosses zero as a threshold Y it > 0. We estimate a probit model,
assuming that P (Yit = 1jxi; ft; Zi) = (Z 0i+ x0i + f 0t) where  denotes the normal cdf.
Linear Regression Model
For continuous outcomes, we estimate the following linear model between outcomes Yit,
famine eects and covariates for adult i born in year t:
Yit = Z
0
i + x
0
i + f
0
t + it:
again xi denotes a vector of control variables and the equation comprises a vector of own
birth-year xed eects (ft) to capture any variation that may be cohort or birth year
specic.
4.5 Data
We use data taken from the German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP), a representative
longitudinal micro-dataset for Germany (Wagner et al., 2007). The data are well-suited
for our analysis in that they allow us to identify whether a rst generation of individuals
(the parents of SOEP respondents) were aected by the famine during their slow growth
period. Moreover, the data contain information on a wide range of health information,
longevity and economic outcomes for the children and grandchildren of famine aected
individuals.
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4.5.1 Sample
Our sample comprises 7233 rst generation individuals who were born 1902-1913 and had
children who later became SOEP respondents. Primary SOEP respondents and constitute
the second generation in our sample. G2 children enter the SOEP upon the age of 17
and form the third generation. All G2 and G3 individuals are sampled if at least one
parent (G2) or one grandparent (G3) has been born in 1902-1913. Table 4.5 contains the
sample sizes and birth years of G2 and G3 individuals, as well as the fraction of SGP
famine aected parents (for G2) and grandparents (for G3). The advantage of using the
SOEP is that it gives us a second-generation sample that is representative of the German
population. However, as with any study on intergenerational transmission, rst-generation
individuals are sampled only if they have reached reproductive age and conceived children.
In our case, this implies that they need to have survived the famine, the Spanish inuenza,
and World War 2, or had children early. Yet, our sample is representative of Germans
living today who, by denition, have direct ancestors that survived these events and had
children. We do however account for rst-generation individuals being more likely to be
sampled if the they had more children, e.g. by conditioning on sibship size.
Table 4.5: Sample size and ancestor famine aectedness.
Variables Second generation Third generation
Males Females Males Females
Father famine in SGP 0.40 (0.49) 0.42 (0.49) - - - -
Mother famine in SGP 0.35 (0.48) 0.33 (0.47) - - - -
PGF famine in SGP - - - - 0.29 (0.45) 0.34 (0.48)
PGM famine in SGP - - - - 0.23 (0.42) 0.24 (0.43)
MGF famine in SGP - - - - 0.26 (0.44) 0.22 (0.42)
MGM famine in SGP - - - - 0.19 (0.39) 0.16 (0.37)
Birth year 1938.86 (6.37) 1938.76 (6.63) 1973.17 (7.83) 1974.38 (7.13)
N 2063 2083 715 575
Source: German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP).
Own calculations.
4.5.2 Outcome and Control Variables
Our outcome measures (Yit) are height, longevity, mental health and whether an individual
has obtained an upper secondary school degree. In the SOEP, age at death can be
obtained for individuals who have participated in the survey at least once and who
dropped out of the survey because they died. The death year is provided by the SOEP
in the person-related metale (ppfad). Mental health and height measures are obtained
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using the most recent information from the biannual SOEP health module. Height is self-
reported repeatedly and mental health is measured by the Mental Component Summary
Scale (MCS), one of the two sub-dimensions of the SF-12 questionnaire. The MCS is
measured on a scale that ranges from 0 to 100 with mean 50 and standard deviation
10. It results from a factor analysis comprising the dimensions 'general mental health',
'emotional functioning', 'social functioning' and 'vitality' each measured on separate
scales (for details see Andersen et al. (2007)). We dene whether an individual has
obtained the German university or technical college entrance diploma (German "Abitur"
or "Fachhochschulreife") on hands of the international Comparative Analysis of Social
Mobility in Industrial Nations (CASMIN) classication. Table 4.6 comprises summary
statistics of all outcome variables.17
Table 4.6: Descriptive statistics: Age at death, height, mental health
and schooling outcomes by sex and generation.
Variables Second generation Third generation
Males Females Males Females
Age at death 71.20 (6.35) 72.36 (6.05)
Height 175.54 (6.63) 163.74 (6.02) 180.52 (7.04) 167.74 (6.07)
Mental health 52.48 (9.78) 50.43 (10.69) 49.45 (9.18) 47.60 (9.97)
Upper secondary school degree 0.36 (0.48) 0.19 (0.39) 0.49 (0.50) 0.52 (0.50)
N 2063 2083 715 575
Source: German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP).
Own calculations.
We dene two sets of control variables: basic controls and background controls. Basic
controls comprise all variables that account for any bias, that arises because G1 famine
aected individuals and their ospring were born in dierent years from adjacent cohorts.
For example, recent literature demonstrates long-run mortality eects of economic and
health conditions at birth and during infancy (van den Berg et al., 2011). Such eects
would bias our ndings if the famine aected generation was born in years with
systematically higher or lower growth rates. Hence, we are controlling for business cycle
trends and population growth during the year of birth of G1 (see Figure 4.2) Moreover,
because the data are a cross section with outcomes measured at dierent ages of the
individuals, we are controlling for age at the time of measurement whenever relevant to
the outcome variable. Last, we include parent and individual birth year xed eects (for
17We are not looking at wages, because our data are a cross section of individuals who are sampled at
dierent points in their lives, which makes the computation of permanent income very unreliable.
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G2 and G3) to captures cohort or birth year specic variation. For G3, we also include
parental birth year xed eects to capture business cycle uctuations at parental birth
and to capture some of the variation in the probability for an individual to be part of the
sample.
We include background controls as additional covariates in some specications to detect
behavioral, non-biological pathways. One of the most important pathway is parental
education, reecting parental cognitive ability, parenting skill, social class and family
earnings potential all of which are essential for health and schooling outcomes. We dene
parental education dummies for dierent educational degrees in Germany. Besides, we
include parental age at birth and the number of siblings, as a proxy for parental resources.
Descriptive statistics of all included background variables can be found in Table 4.7.
Table 4.7: Descriptive statistics: Background control
variables
Second generation Third generation
Father upper secondary school 0.10 (0.30) 0.33 (0.47)
Father intermediate school 0.09 (0.28) 0.17 (0.37)
Mother upper secondary school 0.03 (0.17) 0.21 (0.41)
Mother intermediate school 0.11 (0.31) 0.27 (0.44)
Number of brothers 0.98 (1.06) 0.72 (0.77)
Number of sisters 0.99 (1.10) 0.77 (0.87)
Father's age at individual's birth 33.04 (6.58) 31.46 (5.92)
Mother's age at individual's birth 29.52 (5.71) 28.04 (5.30)
Mother's birth year 1909.29 (4.65) 1945.70 (7.76)
Father's birth year 1905.77 (5.16) 1942.28 (7.51)
N 4146 1290
Source: German Socioeconomic Panel (SOEP).
Own calculations.
4.6 Empirical Results
The results are discussed in two stages. First, we provide a description of the main
ndings for G2 and G3 in Section 4.6.1. In particular, we investigate how the results
change if we move from controlling only for a basic set of variables to controlling for
additional background variables, which potentially account for non-biological channels.
Second, we present robustness checks where we vary famine intensity and period, by
excluding individuals who experienced the famine for only one year and by extending the
famine period to 1919. If famine exposure has a causal eect on outcomes, we expect this
eect to become larger and more signicant if individuals with weak famine exposure are
excluded from the analysis.
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4.6.1 Main Results
The coecients displayed in Tables 4.8 and 4.9 display the eect sizes of parental and
grandparental SGP-famine exposure on the outcomes under consideration, conditional on
the basic set of control variables and on the combined set of basic and background controls.
Since epigenetic inheritance is likely to be sex specic, we perform all analyzes separately
for males (left panel) and females (right panel) (Pembrey et al., 2006). We report robust
standard errors for height, mental health and schooling models. For G3, standard errors
are clustered on the household level, because siblings in that sample mostly have the same
history of ancestral famine exposure.
In Table 4.8, the left columns of coecients for each outcome are coecients from
estimated models with basic controls only. We nd that body height is signicantly
higher for males whose fathers have been SGP exposed to the famine and lower for males
with SGP exposed mothers. Mortality of second generation males on the other hand is
much lower if mothers have been exposed during SGP.18 Thus, male individuals turn out
shorter with maternal SGP exposure but mortality is lower. Furthermore, the coecient
on parental SGP famine exposure on schooling is negative and signicant for males.
The right columns display coecients for models with additional controls for parental
education, sibship size and parental age at birth. We conduct a likelihood ratio test for
the improvement in model t due to the additional coecients and nd that controlling
for parental background improves the t to the data. Famine coecients however hardly
change with this additional set of controls. Only the coecient from the regression of
sons' higher secondary schooling on parental SGP famine exposure decreases in size and
signicance.
18Results of a Likelihood ratio test for the presence of unobserved heterogeneity indicates that it is
important in the sample of females only.
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Table 4.9 gives a summary of results for G3. In this sample, there are four ancestors who
have potentially been aected by the famine during their SGP: the paternal grandfather,
the paternal grandmother, the maternal grandfather and the maternal grandmother.
Again we estimated all models separately for males and females. Kaati et al. (2007) and
Pembrey et al. (2006) argue that the SGP may be a sensitive period for the methylation
of male gametes, leading to male imprinting of nutritious shocks. The only results that
points in that direction is that paternal grandfather SGP exposure has positive eects on
mental health of grandson, while maternal grandmother SGP exposure positively aects
granddaughters' mental well-being.19 Again, background controls improve model t, but
do not reduce the size and signicance of mental health coecients. The results indicate
that having a paternal grandfather or a maternal grandmother who has been aected by
a famine during SGP improves mental health by about 1.8 points, or 18% of a standard
deviation, for males and by about 3 points, or 30% of a standard deviation, for females.
4.6.2 Robustness Checks
We repeat the previous analysis twice, including the full set of basic and background
controls in the model. First, we exclude all individuals who were only mildly aected by
the famine, i.e. who were only aected by the famine for a single year during the SGP.
Second, we extend the famine period to the year 1919, because the blockade and the third
wave of the Spanish inuenza only ceased in the middle of that year.
19Note that in our sample, almost none of the third-generation individuals have died, such that we
cannot investigate mortality eects.
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Tables 4.10 and 4.11 display the coecients of the robustness checks where the left column
shows the famine eect of at least two years of famine during SGP and the right column
shows the SGP famine eect with the extended famine period. We expect coecients to
increase if only the more highly aected individuals are included in the analysis. Contrary
to this, the maternal mortality eects for males become smaller and less signicant. This is
also the case for the schooling eect. When the famine eect is reduced to the most highly
aected individuals, the eect of paternal SPG famine exposure on male schooling becomes
insignicant at the 10% level. However, the positive eect of paternal SGP famine exposure
on son's height and the negative eect of maternal SGP famine exposure remain. As
expected, the coecients become larger in absolute terms and more signicant, indicating
that if the father (mother) was aected by the famine during his SGP, this leads to an
increase (a reduction) in son's height by 0.8cm (0.9cm). Note that the positive eect of
paternal SGP famine exposure on male height also persists if we include the year 1919 in
the famine period.
As expected, for G3 individuals, point estimates for mental health increase if we only
include the most highly aected individuals. If the paternal grandfather is aected by the
famine during his SGP, grandsons' mental health tends to be 28% of a standard deviation
higher and if the maternal grandmother is aected, the increase in mental health for
granddaughters is more than 40% of a standard deviation. Eects also remain large and
signicant when the famine period is extended to the year 1919.
4.6.3 Discussion
In the present study, we nd patterns in the data that hint towards the intergenerational
transmission of famine eects triggered by a reduction in food during the ancestors slow
growth period. In this section we try to answer: [1] whether the results we nd are indeed
likely to be triggered by the famine. [2] Whether they can be related back to epigenetic
inheritance and [3] which other explanations are possible, behavioral or otherwise.
First, to assess whether our ndings are indeed related to a food shortage in SGP, we have
excluded all individuals from the analysis, who have only been aected by the famine for
a single year during their SGP. Any causal impact of the famine during SGP, should be
stronger for individuals who suered from the famine for a longer period of time. We
nd that some of the eects, such as the positive eect of maternal SGP exposure on
sons' mortality risk, or the negative eect of paternal SGP exposure on sons' probability
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to obtain a higher secondary school degree do not persist if we exclude mildly aected
individuals. Other eects, such as the positive (negative) eect of paternal (maternal)
SGP exposure on sons height or the third generation sex specic eects become stronger
and more signicant. We interpret this as evidence that the latter are more likely related
to SGP famine eects than the former.
Concerning the channels through which these intergenerational famine eects operate,
we cannot be certain that our estimated eects are of epigenetic origin. Yet, in line
with some of the biological literature (Pembrey, 2002; Pembrey et al., 2006), we would
expect an epigenetic transmission of SGP famine eects to take place along the male line,
because during this age period the sperm is still in development, while the female ovum
is fully developed upon birth. Furthermore, if epigenetics was the cause of our ndings,
we would expect strong eects on the second generation and a fading out of eects in the
third generation. Last, we would expect SGP famine exposure to be positively associated
with height and longevity. Our results only conrm few of these hypotheses. First, we
do not nd much stronger eects of paternal and grandpaternal SGP famine exposure
than of maternal one. Furthermore, none of our results are strong among the second
generation and signicant but lower in magnitude for the third generation. Thus paternal
SGP famine exposure has a positive eect on sons height among the second generation, but
the coecient of paternal grandfather SGP famine exposure is negative and insignicant.
Similarly, paternal grandfather SGP famine exposure is positively associated with third
generation mental health among males, but paternal SGP famine exposure does not have
a signicant impact on males among the second generation. However, we nd that males
are taller if their fathers have been aected by a famine during their SGP, a nding that
may indicate positive eects of paternal SGP exposure on male mortality. A reduction in
mortality is in line with the ndings of Kaati et al. (2002), who nd that paternal SGP
famine exposure reduces cardiovascular mortality, but somewhat contrary to the ndings
in Kaati et al. (2007), where the authors nd that a surfeit in parental food supply during
the SGP leads to an increase in longevity.
Epigenetic imprinting is only one possible channel through which intergenerational
transmission of famine exposure may operate. Other explanations for potential ndings
may be that SGP exposure aects height, fertility or cognitive and noncognitive skills of
the rst generation, which then inuence later generation outcomes. For example the
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experience economic hardship around the age of 10 can lead to more resilience and
psychological strength (Elder, 1999).20. If our results were driven by these mediating
factors, we would expect the famine to have a positive impact on rst generation schooling
probabilities, family size, age at birth or socioeconomic status, which would then aect
later generations indirectly. Yet, we nd that controlling these variables, does signicantly
improve model t, but does not have an impact on the estimated famine coecients. We
thus think it is unlikely that a behavioral impact on the rst generation is driving our
results.
4.7 Conclusion
This chapter investigates how a reduction in food supply due to the German World
War 1 famine of 1916-1918 aects descendants of the second and third generation.
A highly debated line of literature in biology has found that low food availability
during the slow growth period of male individuals positively aects health outcomes of
subsequent generations. That literature argues that such eects are potentially triggered
by methylation of epigenetic marks in the sperm, with methyl tags being transmitted to
subsequent generations via epigenetic imprinting.
We nd that males are indeed taller if their fathers have been aected by a famine
during their SGP and shorter if their mothers have been famine exposed. Furthermore,
paternal grandfather SGP-famine exposure is associate with higher mental health of third
generation sons, while maternal grandmother SGP-famine exposure has a positive eect
on her granddaughters mental health. Besides, our ndings suggest that among second-
generation individuals maternal SGP-famine exposure is associated with lower height.
Both, second generation height and third generation mental health eects are likely to
be causally related to the famine, as they persist and become stronger if only the most
severely aected individuals are made part of the analysis. However, we do not nd the
same strong male line eects on second generation mortality and third generation height
(as a proxy of mortality) as in (Bygren et al., 2001; Kaati et al., 2002; Pembrey et al.,
2006).
20Eects along the female line could be driven by maternal nutrition during SGP. Recently, it has
been shown that nutrition during pregnancy matters less for birth weight than nutritional status at the
time of conception or even before (Kuzawa, 2008).
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Research on intergenerational famine eects and epigenetic inheritance is only starting.
Further research on epigenetic markers for famine aected individuals is badly needed and
similar analyses to this one, but on dierent datasets would be highly valuable to conrm
and extend our understanding on the intergenerational transmission of nutritious eects.
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4.A Additional Figures and Tables
Figure 4.2: GDP per capita and population size, German Empire
Notes: GDP per capita (logarithm) is measured in 1990 International Geary-Khamis dollars. Population growth measures
the yearly population growth in percent. GDP was detrended using the Hodrick-Prescott-Filter (=100).
Source: A. Maddison (2006). The World Economy: Historical Statistics, OECD Development Centre, Paris 2006.
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Table 4.12: G2, dierences in control variables
Variables Males Females
Father(Z=1) Father(Z=0) Pval Father(Z=1) Father(Z=0) Pval
Father's age at death 65.36 66.07 0.32 65.02 65.42 0.61
Mother's age at death 73.34 73.56 0.75 73.06 73.56 0.49
Father died before age 13 0.17 0.16 0.64 0.18 0.18 0.84
Mother died before age 13 0.04 0.05 0.90 0.04 0.05 0.21
Father upper sec school 0.10 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.07 0.32
Mother upper sec school 0.03 0.03 1.00 0.03 0.03 0.78
Father intermediate school 0.08 0.07 0.51 0.09 0.08 0.52
Mother intermediate school 0.11 0.10 0.26 0.10 0.09 0.36
Number of brothers 0.90 0.97 0.16 0.94 1.00 0.19
Number of sisters 0.96 1.01 0.33 0.91 0.99 0.08
Father's age at birth 32.68 33.23 0.07 32.68 32.88 0.51
Mothers's age at birth 29.11 29.47 0.15 29.11 29.49 0.14
Year of birth 1941.08 1939.81 0.00 1941.11 1939.33 0.00
N 2103 1977
Source: SOEP, waves 1982-2009. Own calculations.
Notes: p-values of a two-sided t-test for dierences in means are reported.
'Age at death' is conditional on having died. Standard deviation in brackets.
Table 4.13: G3, dierences in control variables
Variables Males Females
PGF(Z=1) PGF(Z=0) Pval PGF(Z=1) PGF(Z=0) Pval
Father upper secondary school 0.27 0.26 0.81 0.29 0.23 0.09
Mother upper secondary school 0.23 0.16 0.05 0.21 0.18 0.50
Father intermediate school 0.15 0.16 0.90 0.13 0.14 0.60
Mother intermediate school 0.19 0.25 0.07 0.26 0.16 0.00
Number of brothers 0.66 0.50 0.02 0.55 0.70 0.02
Number of sisters 0.62 0.62 0.93 0.63 0.67 0.63
Father's age at birth 31.25 32.24 0.05 31.20 31.46 0.57
Mother's age at birth 28.66 28.37 0.56 28.33 28.26 0.88
Year of birth 1974.04 1973.48 0.38 1972.75 1971.98 0.23
N 625 811
Source: SOEP, waves 1982-2009. Own calculations.
Notes: p-values of a two-sided t-test for dierences in means are reported.
'Age at death' is conditional on having died. Standard deviation in brackets.
Figure 4.3: Birth rate, German Empire
Source: H. Birg, 2001, Die Demographische Zeitenwende.
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Chapter 5
Instrumental Variable Estimation of
the Causal Eect of Hunger Early in
Life on Health Later in Life1
5.1 Introduction
During the past decade, the eect of early-life conditions on health outcomes late in life has
become a focal point of research in economics, demography, epidemiology, biology, and
related elds.2 Empirical studies use non-experimental data of real-life individuals and
typically relate indicators of early-life conditions to outcomes of the same individuals at
high ages. A major concern is that (a) observed conditions in the parents' household early
in life, including conditions in utero as captured by birthweight, and (b) outcomes later in
life, are jointly dependent on unobserved confounders. To be able to detect causal eects,
one needs to observe exogenous variation in the early-life conditions, and relate this to
outcomes later in life. Moreover, this variation should only aect high-age health by way
of the individual early-life conditions and not through secular or cohort-specic changes
in society after the early-life period of interest. As a result, candidate indicators are often
not some unique characteristic of the newborn individual or his family or household, but
rather a temporary state of the macro environment into which the child is born. In that
case they are also called contextual variables.
In the literature, the most frequently used indicator is whether the individual has been
exposed to a famine at a specic childhood age, notably in utero. Lumey et al. (2011)
provide an excellent overview. The underlying idea is that in many households birth in
1This chapter is joint work with Gerard van den Berg and Johannes Schoch. An earlier version of
this chapter is published as IZA working paper number 6110.
2For overviews, see e.g. Pollitt et al. (2005), Barker (2007), Lawlor (2008)
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a famine involves nutritional shortages, in terms of quality and/or quantity of nutrition.
Birth outside of a famine is expected to involve better nutritional conditions. A negative
association between birth during a famine and a favorable health outcome later in life is
interpreted as evidence for a causal eect of early-life conditions on that health outcome.3
Studies have detected associations with adult height, schizophrenia, mortality, fertility,
hospitalization, next generation birthweight and even gene expression. Interestingly, a
few studies have also reported associations between exposure to a famine at the onset of
puberty and late-life health outcomes. For example, Sparen et al. (2004) nd that boys
who had been exposed around age 9 to the Leningrad siege famine of 1941 have higher
rates of cardiovascular morbidity and mortality much later in life. Oppers (1963) nds an
eect of the Dutch Hunger Winter famine exposure at ages 7-14 on adult height.4
However, exposure to a famine is not equivalent to exposure to a nutritional shortage.
During a famine, a fraction of all households does not face food shortages, for example
because the household belongs to the ruling or wealthy class, or because it is self-sucient
in terms of food, or, in a war context, because it is allied to those responsible for the cause
of the famine. Similarly, in non-famine eras, a fraction of households faces food shortages
because of poverty. This means that the comparison of famine-born individuals to non-
famine-born individuals does not provide a quantitative estimate of the average causal
eect of nutritional shortages around birth. Most likely, the latter eect is under-estimated
in absolute value by such a comparison.
To advance on this, it is necessary to observe the nutritional status in the households at
the time interval in which the child is in utero or at the childhood age of interest. But
this is almost impossible given that the study outcomes concern health at high ages. To
observe these outcomes, the individuals in the data need to have been born a long time
ago. This means that the critical period of interest necessarily occurred say before 1950.
At the time, data on household conditions were not systematically collected. Moreover,
3Note that also this requires that the composition of newborns is not systematically dierent between
famine-born and non-famine born, in terms of unobserved characteristics of the newborns.
4Many qualitative results from the famine-based studies are in agreement to those
in studies using other contextual indicators of conditions around birth, such as business
cycles and seasons. Van den Berg, G.J. and Lindeboom, M. (see e.g. 2012) for an overview.
Van den Berg, G.J. and Lundborg, P. and Nystedt, P. and Rooth, D.O. (2010) use immigrant siblings to
study the eect of economic conditions at later childhood ages, and they nd a signicant eect on adult
height. They also survey other studies concerning later childhood ages.
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for some of the sample, the critical period must have occurred during a famine. During
famines, data are typically not collected, as societies are in a state of disruption.
In this chapter we deal with these problems by using self-reported retrospective data on the
individual occurrence of a period of severe hunger at certain childhood ages. Specically,
we relate these data to the occurrence of famines, and we use Instrumental Variable
(IV) estimation techniques to estimate average causal eects of nutritional shortages
during certain childhood ages on adult height. Height is a universally accepted proxy
of adult health and observable for individuals of all ages, while chronic diseases manifest
only relatively late in the life cycle. In terms of the IV treatment evaluation literature,
our instrumental variable is the exposure to a famine early in life, our treatment is the
experience of a nutritional shortage early in life, and our outcome is adult height. With
heterogeneous eects, the IV estimation provides so-called local average treatment eects
(LATE; Imbens and Angrist (1994)).
Our approach is novel. We are the rst to use the occurrence of famines to obtain an
estimate of average causal eects of nutritional shortages during specic childhood ages
on health later in life. Notice that IV is generally not applicable in studies of long-run
eects of early-life conditions, because of non-observability of household conditions early
in life. This is not specic for famines as early-life indicators but also applies to other
contextual indicators such as business cycles, seasons, weather, and infant mortality rates.
As a by-product, our study provides estimates of the strength of the association between
a famine and an actual hunger episode. In terms of the IV treatment evaluation literature,
we look at \compliance" to the instrument.
Our individual data are from the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE), a European longitudinal survey based on a random sample of individuals aged
50+. The most recent available (third) wave asks respondents for retrospective accounts
of specic aspects of their lives. The birth cohorts in the data include cohorts that were
exposed to the famines in the Netherlands, Germany, or Greece, in various time intervals
in the 1940s. These are the three famines in the countries participating in SHARE in its
observation window.5 Their origins are well-established in the literature, and they have
been used to study long-run eects (see the literature discussion in Section 5.2). Notice
5Barring famines that aected only a few respondents, like the German 1916/18 famine; see
Van den Berg and Pinger (2011). Our analysis restricts attention to births in 1920-1955.
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that evidence based on multiple famines is less sensitive to culture or cohort-specic
conditions.
Strictly speaking, it is the cause of the famine that is the ultimate instrumental variable,
instead of the famine itself. After all, any period or era in which many people are hungry
may be called a famine. What matters for the study of long run eects is that the famine
is an exogenous event with no long-run impact apart from the eect running through
household-specic nutritional conditions. This is more likely if the famine is due to an
external intervention in society and if the famine is short and is not anticipated. The three
famines in our data satisfy these requirements, as they are all due to trade blockades in
combination with government rule by foreign occupying forces.
Nutritional shortages that only took place in utero will not be reported as episodes of
hunger early in life. Even with a perfect recollection of past periods of hunger (e.g. if
the individual obtained this information from his parents), a spell in utero will only be
reported if it stretches past the day of birth. More in general, recall of a period of severe
hunger may be more dicult if this period took place around birth. Indeed, in our data, the
reporting of hunger during a famine is low if the age during the famine was close to zero.
We deal with this by estimating the probabilities in the denominator of the nonparametric
Wald estimator from a sample of older children. Intuitively, when we consider long-run
eects of nutritional shortages for newborns, we relate famines around birth to health
later in life, but we may use a sample of older children to estimate the connection between
famine exposure and nutritional shortage. This requires the assumption that the latter
connection is the same for all children. This is not innocuous. As we shall see, there is
evidence of special food support for young children during famines that was not available
for older children. In that case, our estimates provide a lower bound for the average causal
eect.
The SHARE data have established a high reputation in terms of quality, and by now
many studies have been published using these data (see e.g. Borsch-Supan et al., 2008).
Our particular empirical analysis faces two data design limitations. First, for our purposes,
the sample is not large. The number of respondents per country is around 1500 and since
we only use men, this number is halved. However, to be exposed to a famine at a specic
age, the respondent needs to have been a child (or in utero) in one of three countries in a
birth cohort interval with a length equal to the famine, where the famine duration ranges
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from a few months to at most a few years. Secondly, the survey questions concerning the
period of severe hunger ask for an interval in terms of full calendar years. In each analysis
we therefore need to dene and align three dierent intervals early in life: the relevant
age interval in which nutritional shortage may cause long-run eects, the calendar time
interval for which the individual reports severe hunger, and the calendar time interval
in which the famine took place. Inevitably, we have to make several shortcuts, and it is
important to address the sensitivity of the results with respect to this. In fact, given the
relatively small sample size, moderate changes in the denitions of these intervals only
aect the status of few respondents, and the results are often insensitive to this.
Since we aim to estimate a causal eect of nutritional shortages in general, the relevance
of our ndings should stretch beyond famine-stricken societies. Child hunger is not only
prevalent in many parts of the developing world, but also in industrialized countries.
\Feeding America" reports that even in the US 11.9 million citizens regularly suer from
hunger. From these, around a third are children under the age of 18.6 Undernutrition is
essentially an economic problem that can be mitigated by public policy. From an economic
point of view, it matters to nd out at which age of the children exposure to nutritional
shortages is most detrimental in the long run. This helps to address which policy measures
are most ecient and cost-eective in preventing adult health problems.
The chapter proceeds as follows. In Section 5.2 we review the explanatory frameworks to
understand the long-run eects. Section 5.3 describes the three famines in our observation
window and summarizes the evidence obtained so far for those famines. In Section 5.4 we
describe our data. Section 5.5 formally presents the econometric methods. Here we also
examine selectivity issues associated with the famines. Section 5.6 presents our results. We
do not only study eects of adverse conditions around birth but we also identify whether
periods in early adolescence are critical with respect to nutritional shocks. We also consider
the strength of the association between famines and actual nutritional shortages. This is
of importance for the empirical literature in which the three famines have been used as
indicators of early-life conditions. In Section 5.6 we also carry out placebo estimations
using cohorts from countries that were not aected by famines. Moreover, we use cohorts
6The data come from the United States Department of Agriculture which characterizes households
in which one or more people were hungry at times during the year as households with "very low food
security" or as "food insecure with hunger" because the household could not aord enough food. "Hunger"
in that description referred to "the uneasy or painful sensation caused by lack of food."
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from other countries (Belgium, France and Italy) as control cohorts, as an additional way
to verify that the eects of hunger do not reect the eects due to exposure to World War
II and its aftermath. Section 4.7 concludes.
5.2 Explanatory Frameworks for Causal Long-run
Eects of Conditions Early in Life
5.2.1 Conditions around birth
Most explanations for long-run eects of nutritional conditions around birth build on
Barker's fetal origins or fetal programming hypothesis (Barker, 1994). Eects of fetal
undernutrition on metabolic adaptation in utero may aect the phenotype such that
the risk of cardiovascular disease later in life is increased (Hales and Barker, 1992;
Bateson, 2001; Gluckman and Hanson, 2004a). Underlying this model is the idea that
several critical periods early in life inuence the development of humans. During these
periods, developing systems modify their settings in response to social and biological cues
(Kuzawa and Quinn, 2009). This includes durable epigenetic changes that modify gene
expressions.
Along this way, adverse conditions are known to inuence inammation, measured
in terms of interleukin-6 production, in adolescence and adulthood, plausibly through
changes in gene expressions (see e.g. Morozink et al., 2010). An episode of hunger
early in life may thus engender a proinammatory phenotype. Over time, this takes
an allostatic toll on the body, resulting in a higher risk of chronic diseases later
in life (Morozink et al., 2010; Miller and Chen, 2010; Miller et al., 2009; Zhang et al.,
2006; Cole et al., 2011), notably cardiovascular diseases, diabetes and hypertension.
Yet, such mechanisms should be seen as a predictive adaptive response to the future
environment (Gluckman and Hanson, 2004a; Cole et al., 2011). The long-run eects of
reduced nutrition in utero are stronger if the aected individuals are exposed to a much
more favorable environment in childhood (Schulz, 2010).
Of course, severely adverse nutritional conditions may also directly aect the build-up of
organs and other body parts. This involves the postneonatal period but also puberty (see
e.g. Cameron and Demerath, 2002).
The above causal pathways are all biological after the initial nutritional shortage.
However, non-biological mechanisms are also possible. An episode of hunger may lead
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to a permanent change in the role of food in the household. After such an episode, adults
may cook more greasy food or force their children to nish their plates by any means
(See e.g. Hamelin et al. (1999), for changes in household behaviors in response to food
insecurity). This may cause adverse long-run health outcomes of the children. Also, an
episode of hunger may induce ghts for resources and thus a higher level of stress, changing
within-household relationships and leading to a prolonged exposure to a higher stress level
(Hadley and Patil, 2006; Whitaker et al., 2006).
5.2.2 Conditions in later childhood
Recently, interest has increased in long-run eects of nutritional conditions after birth.
Gluckman et al. (2005) and Barker (2007) give overviews of the underlying medical
mechanisms. Particular attention has been given to the onset of puberty as a sensitive
period. As documented and surveyed by Marshall and Marshall and Tanner (1968),
Gasser et al. (1994), and Zemel (2002), the earliest manifestation of puberty concerns
the so-called \fat spurt" around age 9-10. In this spurt, the body collects resources in
anticipation of the adolescent growth spurt. Sparen et al. (2004) argue that nutritional
distortions and stress at this stage may lead to a permanent disruption of blood pressure
regulation, leading to long-run cardiovascular health problems. Other studies have related
the calcium intake around age 9 to adult height.
A nutritional shortage may also have an instantaneous adverse eect on schooling decisions
and outcomes (see e.g. Jyoti et al., 2005) and thus aect health outcomes via realized
education or adult socioeconomic status (Leigh, 1983). Last, adverse conditions may aect
children positively by inducing more responsible behavior. For example, Elder (1999)
investigates the impact of the Great Depression on children born in 1920-1921 and nds
that the experience of economic hardship around the age of 10 led to more resilience and
psychological strength.
5.3 The Famines in European Countries in the 1940s
5.3.1 The Dutch famine
The Dutch famine has been studied for decades as a cause of adverse living conditions.
Therefore, the following account can be brief. The relevant literature starts with
contemporaneous studies, notably Dols and van Arcken (1946), who provide a detailed
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description of the famine and report data on rations and agricultural production, and
Banning (1946), who focuses on public health issues.
Prior to World War II, food standards had been high in the Netherlands, both in terms of
caloric value as well as composition of the diet. There were no notable disruptions in food
availability during the rst years of the occupation of the Netherlands, which started in
May, 1940. In September 1944, parts of the South of the country were liberated, and the
London-based Dutch Government in exile called out a railroad strike in the occupied parts
of the Netherlands in order to support Operation Market Garden and in order to display
its authority over the occupied nation. As a reaction, the occupying forces initiated an
embargo that prohibited any food transports to the densely populated western part of
the country, i.e. the provinces of North and South Holland and Utrecht. This sanction, in
combination with the early onset of the harsh winter of 1944/45, the freezing of waterways,
and the generally bad state of transport infrastructure eectively closed o the western
part of the country from any imports of food, fuel, medication etc. This triggered the
Dutch \hungerwinter". Individuals had to live on rations as low as 500 kcal per day. For
school children, average rations amounted to 664 kcal in the rst quarter of 1945. The
situation lasted until the end of the occupation which coincided with the end of World
War II (early May 1945). Immediately, rations rose to 2,400 kcal per day. Following most
of the literature on the Dutch famine, we take November 1944 to be the onset of the
famine spell. This is later than the onset of the strike in mid-September 1944.7
The excess death rate in the rst half of 1945 over the rate in 1944 amounts to 269 percent
for men and 173 percent for women (Dols and van Arcken, 1946). Banning (1946) reports
a higher incidence of tuberculosis and hunger oedema and an increased infant mortality
rate. Inhabitants of large cities were struck hardest by the famine. However, Banning
(1946) notes that in small towns mortality rates rose to a level almost as high as those in
large cities. Special aid was targeted at starving children and young adults by the \Inter-
Church Council", an organization formed of dierent clerical associations (rst, the focus
was on children aged 5 to 16; the inclusion of children aged 3 to 5 followed later on).
Help was provided in the form of additional food rations but in addition, eort was taken
to send adversely aected children to districts where the food situation was somewhat
7For school children, ocial rations dropped below 1,200 kcal in early November 1944 and to 1,000 kcal
at the end of November 1944 (Dols and van Arcken, 1946). On average, caloric consumption amounted
to 1,073 kcal in the last quarter of 1944 (Dols and van Arcken, 1946).
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better. Reports on the activities of the council yield information about the situation of
the children in the famine-struck areas: Banning (1946) mentions that of the potential
candidate children examined, 29% had been severely undernourished, while 31% suered
moderate undernourishment. About 27% of the children displayed a weight loss of about
10% of their weight.
Studies based on the Dutch famine indicate signicant long-run eects on adult
morbidity.8 The overview in Painter et al. (2005) lists long-run eects on the risk of
cardiovascular diseases, obesity, breast cancer, cholesterol levels, diabetes, and self-
perceived health. See also the survey in Lumey et al. (2011) for eects of prenatal famine
in particular. Lumey et al. (2007) nd eects on anthropometric measures indicative of
the reposition of fat, dermatoglyphic characteristics and a modest relationship with blood
pressure. An elevated risk of schizophrenia at adult ages after prenatal exposure has been
found for both genders (e.g. Susser and Lin, 1992). Susser and Stein (1994) nd that adult
stature is susceptible to the postnatal but not the prenatal environment. Oppers (1963)
nds a negative eect of the Dutch Hunger Winter famine exposure at ages 7-14 on adult
height among men. In a landmark study, Heijmans et al. (2008) show that individuals who
were exposed to the famine in the early stages of pregnancy had, 60 years later, less DNA
methylation of a certain imprinted gene, compared with their unexposed same-sex siblings.
The gene is the insulin-like growth factor II, which is a key factor in human growth and
development. Their study provides strong empirical evidence for the epigenetic pathway
discussed in Section 5.2.1 above.
5.3.2 The Greek famine
At the end of April 1941, Greece surrendered to Axis forces and was subsequently divided
into 13 dierent zones occupied by Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria.9 These areas were
isolated from each other and the transfer of goods and individuals was often close to
impossible. The famine was triggered by a naval blockade of the Allies which made it
impossible to supply foodstus to Greece. Despite being an agricultural country, Greece
heavily relied on food imports (Hionidou (2006), mentions that in 1939, over 20 percent of
the wheat consumption had been imported). In addition, the blockade prohibited shing
8Recall that in this section we only cite studies based on the famines we consider in our empirical
analysis. Results based on other famines are discussed in the overview studies listed in Section 5.2.1.
9This subsection relies heavily on Hionidou (2006) and Valaoras (1946b).
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at sea.10 The food situation quickly deteriorated. While the caloric value of the rations
allocated by the occupiers in the Athens area had already been below any subsistence
level in July 1941 (600 kcal), the rations were cut even further such that they amounted
to only 320 kcal in November 1941 Neelsen and Stratmann (2011). The regions of Greater
Athens and Piraeus were aected most severely. Mortality rates suggest that there was a
general positive correlation between the famine's severity and the degree of urbanization.
Furthermore, Hionidou (2006) notes that society was very unequally aected by the famine
during this period; the low social classes suered the most from deprivation, which can
be attributed to the fact that soon after the rationing system had been superimposed by
the occupiers, black market activity ourished with prices beyond the levels an ordinary
worker could ever aord. The winter 1941/42 marked the maximum of the famine period
in terms of fatalities.
The blockade was formally called o in February 1942. As of then, the Red Cross provided
assistance targeted mostly at young children in Athens (Neelsen and Stratmann, 2011).
At the end of March 1942, shipments by the \Joint Relief Commission" under Swedish
command arrived. Subsequently, the situation in most parts of Greece improved. Hionidou
(2006) reports declines in excess mortality from April 1942 onwards, even though in urban
areas mortality remained high longer. We dene the Greek famine to run from May 1941
until and including June 1942. The ending date is somewhat later than in Hionidou (2006)
and somewhat earlier than in Neelsen and Stratmann (2011).
Valaoras (1946b) reports death rates for Athens to have been six times higher than under
usual circumstances. Both Valaoras (1946b) and Hionidou (2006) state that the largest
fraction of the excess mortality during the famine is attributable to starvation, whereas
epidemics and infectious diseases are of minor importance. Of special interest for our
present study are the gures cited in Valaoras (1946b) on the situation of children and
adolescents. The results of surveys conducted during the famine and shortly afterwards
found children aged 4 to 14 to be massively underweight, while babies and young children
up to age 4 had almost normal weight. Moreover, growth retardation was found among
many children 8 to 14 years old.
10In the sense that the famine was caused by an external intervention in society, and in the sense that
a large fraction of the excess mortality during the famines was due to starvation, the famines discussed
in this section are \modern famines" in the terminology of Grada (2009).
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Neelsen and Stratmann (2011) consider long-run eects of the Greek famine on economic
outcomes. They nd eects of exposure during infancy on the attained level of education
and on prime-aged labor market outcomes. Eects of exposure in utero are very small.
5.3.3 The German famine
After World War II, Germany faced various structural problems that led to the
catastrophic situation we label the German Famine. Specically, (i) many cities and much
of the industry and transportation infrastructure were destroyed by Allied bombardments,
(ii) millions of citizens and military had died, (iii) factories were dismantled and shipped
o to the occupying powers, (iv) the agricultural land in the East which had been a
major provider of food had been lost to Poland and the Soviet Union, (v) about 10
million refugees from the lost lands in the East had ed to the new German mainland,
and (vi) Germany was divided into 4 occupation zones that were administered separately.
Inter-zone trade was dicult because of political and bureaucratic barriers and because
of a lack of transportation means. See Klatt (1950), Farquharson (1985), Trittel (1990),
Hausser and Maugg (1985) and Reichardt and Zierenberg (2008) for overviews.
Before World War II, estimated daily caloric consumption amounted to about 3000 kcal,
while during the war, civilians used foodstus of about 2500 kcal per day (Klatt, 1950). At
the end of the war (European Theater) in May 1945, nutritional conditions deteriorated
to levels far below those before or during the war. For May 1945, Trittel (1990) reports an
average caloric ration of only 1200 kcal. After May 1945, these values decreased further.
For example, in the British-administered Ruhrgebiet, only approximately 600 kcal per
person was assigned in June 1945. The situation further deteriorated during the so-called
\Hungerwinter" of 1946-47, which was an unusually cold winter. From mid-December
1946, the distribution of food collapsed in many areas. Until March 1947, real average
daily caloric intake was around 800 kcal per day for some cities in the Ruhrgebiet. The
crop of 1947 failed to meet the demand of the starving population, so the period of hunger
lasted until the spring of 1948, when a combination of foreign help and political reforms
managed to improve nutritional conditions. Conditions improved spectacularly with the
currency reform in June 1948. We therefore dene the famine to last from June 1945 until
June 1948.
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As usual, the severity of the famine exhibits regional variation on top of the above-
mentioned temporal variation (see Willenborg (1979), and the references above). Notably,
the dierent occupation zones were aected dierentially, mostly due to dierences in the
policies of the occupying powers. For example, the average daily food intake of a standard
consumer in 1946 is estimated to equal 1610, 1430, 1535, and 1340 kcal in the US, the
Soviet, the British, and the French zone, respectively, while the corresponding ocial
food rations equaled 1330, 1083, 1050, and 900 kcal, respectively (see Cornides (1948),
and Echternkamp (2003)).
Apart from excess deaths due to starvation, sources imply that the famine also exerted
additional adverse eects on the population. For instance, Klatt (1950) reports cases of
retarded growth of children in the Ruhrgebiet and a weight decit among children of
about 20 percent of the normal weight. The decit was most pronounced for children
above age 10. In a study of undernutrition in the city of Wuppertal, Dean (1951) analyzes
birth registers of a local hospital and reports reduced birth weights for the years of the
famine with the greatest decline for the year of 1945.
Jurges (2012) analyzes the eect of birth during the German famine on educational
attainment and occupation in the labor market in 1970. He nds strong evidence that
these outcomes are particularly adverse for those born in the winter of 1945/46. This
suggests that an indirect causal pathway from early-life conditions through education and
occupation to health later in life may be possible. Some epidemiological studies consider
cohort-specic adult health outcomes without focusing a priori on famine cohorts. Notably,
Hermanussen et al. (2001) use data on male conscripts; they observe that the 1946 cohort
stands out in terms of low obesity at age 19 even though the average weight is not much
lower than for the surrounding cohorts. To a small extent, this also applies to the cohorts
born during World War II. It is possible that this is because these cohorts faced childhood
conditions that were less out of tune with conditions in utero than the cohorts later in
the German famine (recall the discussion in Section 5.2.1). In this sense, individuals born
in World War II may face less adverse long-run eects than those born in the 1946/47
\Hungerwinter". Onland-Moret et al. (2005) use large samples of women from a large
range of European countries. They report the average height by country and by 5-year
birth cohorts. The average height among women born in Germany in 1945-49 is much
lower than that in the surrounding 5-year cohorts. For Greece and the Netherlands no
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such patterns are found, which is not surprising in the light of the fact that the famine
spells in those countries spanned only a small part of a 5-year interval.
5.4 Data
For the empirical analysis we use the Survey of Health, Aging, and Retirement in Europe
(SHARE), a pan-European multidisciplinary and longitudinal data set on individuals aged
50 and over. By 2011, three waves of SHARE have been made available. The rst two
waves provide information on health, socioeconomic status, family characteristics and
well-being. The third wave (called SHARELIFE), collected in 2008 and 2009, provides
detailed life-cycle histories of individuals for specic thematic elds, such as employment
or accommodation.11 To date, this is the most recently available wave. Additional waves
are under construction.
Sample construction We use 3100 men born 1920 to 1955, who lived in Germany,
the Netherlands or Greece during their youth and who participated in the SHARELIFE
survey. This excludes foreign citizens as well as individuals who, due to physical and
cognitive limitations, were unable to complete the interview themselves.12 We also exclude
individuals with missing information in the hunger variable, covariates, or the outcome
measure adult height. Since height has been collected in waves I and II, individuals who
have not participated in either of these surveys are dropped as well.13 Our working sample
consists of about 2700 men.
We restrict attention to male individuals. This is because the literature on the eects
of early-life conditions on CV morbidity and mortality has found the strongest eects
on men (see the surveys: Poulter et al. (1999), Rasmussen (2001), Lawlor et al. (2004),
and Huxley et al. (2007)). For the Finnish famine of 1866-1868, Doblhammer et al. (2013)
nd that the long-term eects of early life circumstances dier by gender, and that the
results for women are less conclusive than for men. Also, the eect of the business cycle
11For general information on SHARE and SHARELIFE, see Borsch-Supan et al. (2008) and Schroder
(2011).
12We drop the full proxy interviews but keep assisted interview information. Moreover, we employ this
criterion only for the interviews yielding the outcome measures and the undernutrition indicator.
13Conversely, there are men for whom we observe height but not the hunger variable since they
participated in the rst two waves of the survey but not in SHARELIFE. Sample attrition is high in
SHARE. We treat these observations as missing at random, keeping in mind that even if attrition was
somehow related to health performance, this would make our estimates more conservative.
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at birth on late life mortality is stronger for men than for women in the Danish twin data
(Van den Berg et al., 2009), and in Dutch data (Van den Berg et al., 2006). This is also
true for the eect of the Dutch Potato Famine on late-life mortality (Lindeboom et al.,
2010).
A medical study on the relation between birth weight and mortality from heart disease
nds stronger eects for men (Leon et al., 1998). Men with certain health problems that
might originate earlier in life are more likely to die than women with the same conditions
(Case and Paxson, 2005). Pitkanen (1993) found large sex dierences in the Finnish
famine mortality gures, with males being far more likely than females to die. Although
this sex dierential is particularly large for ages 10 to 40 in the high-impact areas of the
famine, it also exists for younger ages.14
One exceptional feature of SHARE is that respondents were asked whether they had
ever experienced periods of hunger in their lives and if so, in which year of their life this
period began and in which year it ended. The survey question reads \Looking back at
your life, was there a distinct period during which you suered from hunger?". Although
this question alludes to an unhappy period of life, nonresponse is very small and amounts
to less than 0.5%. However, the information may be prone to recall bias, since it is self-
reported and dates back many years.15 Moreover, recall bias is likely to by systematically
higher if a period of severe hunger took place around birth. At the extreme, nutritional
shortages that only took place in utero can not be reported as episodes of hunger.
To deal with systematic, age-related recall bias, we distinguish between two samples of
dierent ages when we dene the undernutrition indicator: an \infant sample" and a
\child sample". The infant sample is composed of individuals who potentially experienced
hunger/famine in utero or at ages 0-4. They may have been too young to have formed a
recollection of the hunger, so if family members or others have not informed them of any
actual hunger spell in the earliest years of life, they may not recall it. The individuals
in the so-called child sample potentially experienced hunger from ages 6-16. Hunger is
dened as a binary indicator (or treatment variable) which equals one if a person has
14It has been hypothesized (see e.g. Low, 2001) that the smaller impact for females may be explained
by a so-called male vulnerability because males are the heterogametic sex: they have an unprotected Y
chromosome and, therefore, they may be more vulnerable to adverse environmental conditions in the
short as well as in the long term. See also Eriksson et al. (2010) for a biological explanation of these
ndings.
15Also, only one period of hunger can be reported, such that individuals are likely to choose the period
where nutrition was shortest in supply.
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Figure 5.1: Probability to report hunger conditional on famine experience at respective
age
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experienced a period of undernutrition during age interval [age 1; age4) for the infant
sample and during [age6; age16) for the child sample. A respondent is considered to have
suered undernutrition if he reported that he experienced an episode of severe hunger and
if this period either started before agestart and ended thereafter, or if the period started
within the specied interval. The intervals are dened with an eye on the small sample
sizes. In sensitivity analyses we assess the robustness of the results with respect to these
denitions.
Graph Figure 5.1 provides evidence on the extent of recall among the infant and child
samples. The graph displays the probability of reporting hunger only for those individuals
who lived during a famine period. Individuals in the infant sample often do not report
to have lived in a period of hunger, while individuals in the child sample report to have
suered from undernutrition at a stable rate of just under 20%. If an individual has lived
during a famine, his probability to report hunger increases if the famine happened until
age 6, and it remains stable for increasing ages at famine.
Famine instrument The famine periods are dened in Section 5.3,
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Figure 5.2: Example treatment denition
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Example of critical, famine and hunger periods for 3 individuals
1. Greece: May 1941 to end of June 1942
2. The Netherlands: November 1944 to end of April 1945, only the Western part16
3. Germany: June 1945 to end of June 1948
We construct a binary instrumental variable that takes the value one if a famine aected
the individual in utero/at ages 0-4 or 6-16, respectively. This uses the information on
individual's month of birth. Notice that changing the start or end months of the famine
aects our results only very little, since only individuals born at the margin of a specic
year and month will switch from being declared as potentially famine exposed to not
being exposed and vice versa.
Figure 5.2 provides a graphical illustration of an example of our hunger (treatment)
and instrumental variable denition for the child sample of German individuals. In this
16To select the Dutch sample into those exposed to a famine or not, we use information on the
accommodation a respondent lived in the year the famine started, i.e. 1944; if a respondent moved
house in the very same year, we use the previous accommodation in order to rule out endogeneity due
to internal migration. The SHARELIFE variable distinguishes ve possible regions for the Netherlands:
Noord-Nederland, Zuid-Nederland, Oost-Nederland, West-Nederland, and Midden-Nederland. The famine
instrument is set to one only for West-Nederland.
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Figure 5.3: Probability for episode of hunger by calendar year (given observations of
sample already alive)
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example, individual i1 did not report an episode of hunger, whereas i2 reported such a
period at ages 3 to 5, that is, it has been aected by undernutrition prior to the relevant age
window; the individual, however, did experience a famine in this window. For individual
i3, both the treatment status and the famine instrumental variable are set to one since
both the period of hunger as well as the famine occurred within the window when i3 was
6 to 16.
Figure 5.3 and Figure 5.4 provide graphical assessments of the hunger periods we nd
in the data. Figure 5.3 shows the fraction of observations reporting to have had hunger
in a given year among all individuals alive at that time. For Germany, the graph shows
low propensities of hunger for the pre-war years, an increase during the war and a drastic
peak toward the end of the war, which marks the beginning of the period we dene as
the famine; even though the fraction of those reporting hunger for this period declines
somewhat after this peak, it stays high until the end of the famine. For the Netherlands,
we can distinguish one single peak for the famine period while propensities for hunger
amount to basically zero before and afterwards. The fraction of observations reporting
hunger during the famine years is lower for the Netherlands, because only the Western
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Table 5.1: Reaction of hunger at age 0 { 16 to famine exposure at the same time (cohorts
1920 { 1955)
Greece Germany The Netherlands Sum
treated non-treated treated non-treated treated non-treated treated non-treated
Famine-exposed 66 406 73 334 30 79 169 819
Not Famine-exposed 22 670 11 246 20 719 53 1635
part of the Netherlands was aected by the famine. For Greece we also nd a spike around
the famine period but the level remains relatively high for the 1920s (given the small
number of individuals born in the early cohorts, it is likely that a few outliers drive these
high rates). The impact of the famines becomes even more obvious when taking a look
at the other SHARE countries: Here, the overall fraction of those reporting episodes of
hunger is comparably small and increasing only somewhat during the second World War.
The subsequent exclusion of Spain, which suered from civil war in the 1930s, reveals that
it accounts for a relatively large fraction of those reporting hunger in the pre-war years.
The graph implies that the experience of hunger in the famine countries was dierent
from that in the other countries. In the famine countries, hunger was a severe, transitory
shock, while in the other countries hunger can be ascribed to general suering during the
war.17 This provides a rationale to exclude the other countries from the baseline analyses.
We return to this in Section 5.6 when we discuss sensitivity analyses.
Figure 5.4 shows the average duration of a hunger period for hunger periods starting in
dierent years. The graph shows that hunger periods get shorter when coinciding with a
famine. This supports our presumption that some individuals experience short but intense
periods of severe undernutrition because of the famine. Table 5.1 shows that a fraction
of approximately 17 percent of those having experienced a famine before age 16, report
hunger for the same period. For non-famine periods, this is only 4.6 percent. Hence, famine
is a powerful instrument for periods of undernutrition, although the overall propensity to
report hunger remains rather low.
Adult height As an outcome and proxy for late life adult health we use adult height,
measured in centimeters. Height is frequently used in the literature as a marker of early
17The three countries with famines were also exposed to turbulent episodes around the famine spells.
For example, many German citizens were exposed to bombardments and stress during World War II,
i.e. just before the German famine (see Akbulut-Yuksel (2009); recall also the literature discussions in
previous sections), whereas Greek citizens were exposed to the Greek Civil War shortly after the Greek
famine. The non-famine periods should therefore not be seen as tranquil eras of auence.
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Figure 5.4: Average length of hunger periods by calendar year
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Table 5.2: Descriptive statistics for famine countries (cohorts 1920 to 1955)
All (N= 2676) Control (N=2454) Treated before age
16 (N=222)
Treated before age
4 (N=54)
Variable mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.) mean (s.d.)
Year of Birth 1942 ( 8.501) 1942 ( 8.490) 1936 ( 5.609) 1938 ( 6.541)
Episode of Hunger being 0-16
(1 = yes)
0.083 ( 0.276) 0.000 ( 0.000) 1.000 ( 0.000) 1.000 ( 0.000)
Experienced famine being 0-16
(1 = yes)
0.369 ( 0.483) 0.334 ( 0.472) 0.761 ( 0.427) 0.722 ( 0.452)
Born in rural area (1 = yes) 0.409 ( 0.492) 0.414 ( 0.493) 0.353 ( 0.479) 0.340 ( 0.478)
Adult Height in cm 175.547 ( 7.248) 175.669 ( 7.235) 174.203 ( 7.269) 173.426 ( 7.895)
life health and has the advantage of being constant during adult life (Costa, 1993).18 It
is universally viewed as the best single observable indicator of an individual's dietary
history during childhood to the extent that it is of importance for health later in life
(Elo and Preston, 1992). Moreover, for men, there exists evidence that height it is almost
linearly related to life expectancy (Steckel, 2008). Height is measured in the second wave
of the survey. Table 5.2 compares relative magnitudes of adult height between those who
experienced hunger before age 16 and those who did not.
18The second wave of SHARE contains information on a large number of other health conditions
and chronic diseases. However, many of these conditions, such as hypertension or diabetes only manifest
relatively late in life. Hence, the use of these outcomes generates problems of cohort and age eects.
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Covariates In the analysis, we control for country and gender and for a linear time
trend.19 Besides, we include controls for the degree of urbanization of the place of birth or
of the place where an individual lived at the time of our reference age.20 We consider
this information as a proxy for socio-economic background. Table 5.2 provides basic
summary statistics for the overall sample, for the subsample of respondents who reported
an incidence of hunger sometime before age 16, and for the subgroup which never reported
an incidence of hunger.
5.5 Empirical Strategy
5.5.1 Instrumental variable methods
Our model framework is as follows,
Yi =  (Di; Zi; Xi; i) (5.1)
Di = (Zi; Xi; "i); (5.2)
whereDi 2 f0; 1g denotes severe hunger during a respective childhood period of individual
i. Zi 2 f0; 1g is a binary instrumental variable, where Zi = 1 if an individual has
experienced a period of major exogenous food restriction in her area of residence and
Zi = 0, otherwise. Y denotes adult height in centimeters. The vector of covariates X
comprises country and gender.
If eects of nutrition on adult height is heterogeneous, we can identify the so-called local
average treatment eect (LATE): the average eect among the "compliers", that is, those
whose nutritional status is aected by the presence of a famine. The size of the complier
group and the estimated eect may depend on the severity of the famine (Angrist et al.,
1996). In this respect, an advantage of our approach is that the famines are regarded to
19The SHARE data, especially the third wave, provides a great deal of background information.
However, the information in the childhood module of SHARELIFE refers to a respondent's living
conditions at age 10. Since we are interested in incidence of hunger occurring before age 10, any such
measure may be endogenous.
20If an individual changed the accommodation in the year he turned six, information on the
accommodation inhabited the year before was used in order to prevent bias from selective internal
migration.
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be severe. Formally, the LATE is dened as:
LATE = E[YD=1   YD=0jDZ=1 > DZ=0]
=
R
( (1; Z;X; )   (0; Z;X; )) dFX;Z;jDZ=1>DZ=0
(5.3)
Identication of the eect is based on the assumption that the famine causes are valid
instruments: For example, we assume that the allied food embargo in Greece did not have
a direct inuence on the health status of individuals 50 years after the event, other than
through the eect on individual access to nutrition. Furthermore, we assume that our
sample contains a subpopulation of compliers but no deers, and that the probability of
suering from hunger in a famine is the same for individuals who actually suered from
a famine as for those who did not. Moreover, stratifying on additional covariates requires
their supports to be the same for famine and non-famine groups.
We estimate the LATE nonparametrically using a Wald estimator that allows for
conditioning on covariates,
LATE =
R
E[Y jX = x; Z = 1]  E[Y jX = x; Z = 0] f(x)dxR
E[DjX = x; Z = 1]  E[DjX = x; Z = 0] f(x)dx: (5.4)
Equation (Equation (5.4)) allows us to compute the dierence in mean outcomes for
the group of compliers without having to specify a functional form for the eect of
hunger on health outcomes. With only discrete covariates, we compute the numerator and
denominator cell-wise and then integrate over the distribution of X, where the integral is
a sum over various combinations of X-values. As a parametric alternative and robustness
check, we also present results from the standard two stage least squares (2SLS) estimator.
5.5.2 Two-sample estimation
As explained above, imperfect recall in the infant sample may cause the incidence of severe
hunger for that group to be misreported. We tackle this problem by replacing the estimate
of E[DjX = x; Z = 1] E[DjX = x; Z = 0] in the denominator of the nonparametric Wald
estimator (Equation (5.4)) by the estimate of [E[DjX = x; Z = 1]  E[DjX = x; Z = 0]]child
from the child sample but integrating over the marginal distribution of covariates in the
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infant sample.21 Note that this assumes that the true distributional eect of a famine on
the probability of malnutrition is the same among infants as among older children.22
This assumption may be incorrect if parents or society at large respond to a famine
by redistributing resources towards either the older or the younger children. During the
famines, dierent food support policies were used for dierent child age classes. Food
rations for pregnant mothers and babies were often relatively high and could be supple-
mented by direct food delivery (see e.g. Dols and van Arcken, 1946; De Rooij et al., 2010;
Klatt, 1950; Valaoras, 1946a; Neelsen and Stratmann, 2011). For babies, breastfeeding
provides an additional protective factor. The fraction of mothers who breastfed their
children was not reduced during the Dutch famine (Hutchinson et al., 1951). At the same
time, as we have seen in Section 5.3, special food aid programs were available for children
in school-going ages. However, this was a response to the severity of nutritional shortages
among those children, instead of an indication that society favored food allocation to
those children over the allocation to infants.
More in general, parents may redistribute food supply across children with dierent ages
within the household. For parents it may be more ecient to allocate resources towards
stronger and older children, as these are more likely to survive a famine. Conversely,
they may prefer to invest more into their younger children if they favor more equal
outcomes, or if they prefer all of their children to survive even if this comes at a cost
for the older children's development. Whether decisions are driven by equity or eciency
concerns depends on the number of children, their probability of survival, parental
preferences, and the parental budget constraint (Becker and Tomes, 1976; Behrman,
1997; Behrman et al., 1982). In developing countries, parents' child investment decisions
are generally driven by eciency concerns (see e.g. Rosenzweig and K., 1988). For the
developed economies, most research indicates that parents follow equity considerations
(Griliches, 1979; Del Bono et al., 2008), although Datar et al. (2010) point in the opposite
direction. The famine-stricken countries in our data would perhaps classify in-between
current developed and developing countries, although parents living through the famines
21We bootstrap standard errors using 500 bootstrap iterations.
22As a robustness check, we estimate the eects of hunger around birth with information from two
samples using linear models instead of the nonparametric Wald estimator. We use the two-sample two-
stage least squares estimator (2S2SLS) proposed by Inoue and Solon (2010), which adjusts the original
two sample IV (2SIV) estimator developed by Arellano and Meghir (1992) for use in small samples.
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may have expected the famines to pass by relatively fast and to be followed by more
prosperity.
All in all, it seems plausible that individuals in the infant sample were not more likely to
suer from undernutrition in response to the famine than individuals in the child sample.
This suggests that if our two-sample assumption is violated and the resulting estimates
are biased then most likely they provide a lower bound of the true eect.
5.5.3 Selection issues in famine studies
As in any study of long-run eects of in-utero exposure to famines, the survivors who
were exposed to the famine may be systematically dierent in terms of unobserved
characteristics than the survivors who were not exposed to the famine. This selectivity
may lead to biased inference.
In our setting, one may distinguish between selective fertility and selective mortality after
birth. Concerning fertility, it may be that families living in poor conditions experience a
particularly strong fertility reduction during the famine. The same may apply to death in
utero, spontaneous abortions, and stillbirths. As a result, the exposed birth cohorts may
on average have less frail characteristics than the corresponding control cohorts. It is also
conceivable that mortality in between birth and the moment of observation in our data
depends on famine exposure, in the sense that such mortality may disproportionally aect
the frailer individuals in the cohort. Both types of selectivity would then tend to reduce
the observed dierence in outcomes between the exposed cohorts and the control cohorts,
which would imply that the estimated eect may underestimate the eect of exposure, in
absolute value. Notice that any bias in the causal eect of hunger may be smaller than the
bias in the reduced-form over-all eect of famine exposure, because less frail individuals
may also be less likely to suer from hunger.
Our data are not suitable to study the extent of selective mortality, since they only contain
the exposed cohort members who are still alive at ages around 50 to 55. Selective fertility
can only be controlled for to the extent that it is captured by the region of birth. Some
of the studies listed in Section 5.3 that examine long-run eects of the Dutch, Greek
and German famines argue that, with these famines, selective fertility does not create a
major source of bias. Retrospective information on the parents' social class is typically
unavailable. However, Susser and Stein (1994), using military conscription data on men,
report that the higher the occupational category of the father, the lower the reduction of
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Table 5.3: Eects of hunger at age 6 { 16
Reduced Form Instrumental Variables Models
Famine at age 6 { 16 2SLS cond. Wald cond. Wald { Trend corrected
Eect -0.011 -0.065 -6.999 0.698
(S.E.) ( 0.339) ( 1.949) ( 1.885) ( 1.630)
t-stat. -0.033 -0.033 -3.712 0.428
Note: Size of treated population = 203; control group = 2470. Signicance computed using
standard errors clustered by country-year cells. Signicance computed using bootstrap (500
replications) when applying Wald estimators. Control Variables are a dummy for whether the
accomodation at age 6 has been in rural area, country xed eects, and year of birth.
the birth rate of the cohorts exposed to the Dutch famine, as compared to the non-exposed
cohorts.
To proceed, we consider the household's main income earner's occupational category when
the respondent was 10 years old, provided by SHARELIFE. Famine-related changes in
this distribution can yield at most suggestive evidence, since the household situation at
age 10 may be endogenous to events that happened before. For example, the famine may
have permanently driven individuals out of occupations like shing. We compare cohorts
born within our predened famine periods including up to nine months thereafter, to those
born within ve years before and after this interval. We do not nd statistically signicant
dierences (results available upon request) for any of the 10 occupational categories. This
suggests that selective fertility is not likely to dominate the estimated eects of interest
in the remainder of the chapter.
5.6 Estimation Results
5.6.1 Causal long-run eects of hunger in later childhood
In this section we estimate models in order to reveal whether hunger spells in later
childhood causally aect adult height. First, we relate the outcome measures to the famine
indicator while purposely dropping the actual undernutrition indicator. This corresponds
to the commonly used approach of using contextual variation or, put dierently, not
estimating the structural eect of hunger but rather obtaining a reduced form estimate.
We can thus show what the prediction would be in studies that have to remain agnostic
about actual individual-specic undernutrition status, and see whether these studies yield
accurate estimates of the causal eects. After this, we discuss the IV estimation results.
Table 5.3 shows the rst set of results. The set of covariates is listed in the notes
underneath the table; it is kept very limited because of the reasons detailed in the data
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section. The rst column concerns the reduced-form estimates of famine exposure. We
nd that famine exposure in the age window 6 to 16 does not signicantly aect adult
height.
Table 5.4: First-stage coecients for probability
of experiencing hunger at ages 6{16
Experienced famine being 6-16 (1 = yes) 0.205 0.173
(0.021) (0.023)
Germany 0.017
(0.016)
The Netherlands 0.004
(0.012)
Lived in rural area at age 6 -0.028
(0.011)
Year of Birth -0.003
(0.001)
Constant 0.031 6.217
(0.005) (1.228)
R2 0.103 0.114
F-Stat. 96.667 27.107
N 2673 2669
Note: Standard errors clustered within country-birthyear cells in
parentheses. ,, indicates signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
Next, we verify that the famine instrument is informative, by presenting rst-stage results.
Table 5.4 shows the results linear regression models where the dependent variable is
the undernutrition indicator. We show results from both univariate regressions relating
hunger to famine exposure only and the full rst stage results. In all specications, the
famine indicator is highly signicant. The models yield F-statistics beyond 30, i.e. values
exceeding the typically recommended value of 10. We conclude that the instrumental
variable is informative.
We use IV analyses to assess the causal eects of hunger at ages 6 to 16. We provide
estimates of two-stage least squares estimations for all outcomes and augment this set
of results by estimates of local average treatment eects using a non-parametric Wald
estimator to assess what dierences in causal eects occur when dropping any functional
form or treatment eect homogeneity assumptions inherent in the models. Using a Wald
estimator, we cannot control for a linear time trend (the number of strata dened by
all possible combinations of covariate values would be too large). This is likely to bias
our estimates if height follows a secular trend. We may address the latter to some extent
using the following ad-hoc approach. In a rst step, height is regressed on a time trend.
The residuals are then used as the dependent variable in regressions using the Wald
estimator. The results of this last estimation approach are reported in the last column of
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Table 5.5: Eects of hunger at age 6 {
16, instrument is famine duration in age
interval
Reduced Form Estimate Two Stage Least Squares
Eect -0.001 -0.013
(S.E.) ( 0.215) ( 2.879)
t-stat. -0.005 -0.005
Note: See table 5.3 for details.
Table 5.3. The IV results suggest that famine induced hunger at age 6 to 16 does not have
an impact on adult height. The 2SLS estimates are very small in magnitude. The fully
nonparametric Wald estimate is large and signicant but loses both size and precision
when rst detrending height.
We test the robustness of the above results by replacing the binary famine instrument
with the length of famine exposure within the dened age interval in months; we rescale
this variable by dividing by twelve.23 We should note that we use this reformulation of the
instrument to account for a further dimension of the famine exposure, namely severity.
The validity of this proxy is, however, debatable. The length of exposure in our opinion
is only an inferior way of including this aspect in our analysis, but it is probably the only
one. Estimating the same models as before with the new instrument produces eects as
depicted in Table 5.5. The results remain unchanged.
5.6.2 Causal long-run eects of hunger around birth
The analysis so far has used retrospective information on hunger experiences in childhood.
The self-reported nature of this information precludes an analogous approach when
analyzing hunger eects in the very rst years of life. We thus proceed as detailed above by
estimating hunger propensities conditional on background factors for the rst years of life
by using information on the famines' impact on cohorts born earlier. We report ndings
for famine exposure in the rst four years of life and pool this information with potential
exposure in utero. Gestation is dened to begin nine months before birth. We require
gestation and the famine period to overlap more than two months in order to preclude
additional noise. For Dutch individuals we take the region of the accommodation at birth
23To be more clear on this, this variable is just the overlab between the treatment window age [6; 16)
and the famine interval dened by the calender dates given in the data section.
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Table 5.6: Reduced form estimates and treatment eects
of hunger at age 0 { 4 or in utero
Famine at age 0 { 4 Cond. Wald cond. Wald { Trend corrected
Eect -0.856 -3.249 -3.413
(S.E.) ( 0.342) ( 1.991) ( 1.722)
t-stat. -2.499 -1.632 -1.983
Note: Size of population = 2673; thereof famine-exposed at age 0 { 4: = 423;
thereof treated / famine-exposed at age 6 { 16 = 203 / 619. Regressions include
control country xed eects and a dummy for urbanization of birthplace and year
of birth (last variable cannot be included when using Wald estimator). Signicance
for Wald estimator computed using a bootstrap (500 repetitions). All standard
errors clustered by country-year cells.
as a criterion for famine exposure and set it to one when this accommodation was located
in the Western part of the Netherlands.
We start our discussion by presenting reduced form estimates of the eect of famines at
this early age on outcomes. The results are displayed in the rst column of Table 5.6 and
show that famine exposure and accompanying potential suering from hunger reduces
adult height by about 0.85 centimeters. If we now take a crude estimate for the eect of
famine exposure on the marginal propensity to report hunger to amount to 20 percent,
we would expect the true underlying causal eect of hunger on adult height to be around
-4.25 centimeters (applying the Wald estimator's formula).
In what follows now, the reports for ages 6 to 16 are taken as the reference point. Hence,
we predict hunger propensities for the early years by using conditional expectations
for hunger at this later age. This analysis allows to directly compare the size of the
commonly computed reduced form eects we presented in the rst column of Table 5.6
with quantitatively more reliable causal eects of actual hunger. To this end, we use the
2-sample IV methods outlined above. The last columns of Table 5.6 shows the results of
both the fully nonparametric Wald Estimator and the Wald estimator when applied to
a detrended version of adult height as the dependent variable. We nd that a famine-
caused hunger experience early in life has a negative impact of 3 centimeters when using
the Wald estimator both with and without correcting for a secular trend in height.24
The results show that the reduced form estimate presented above underestimates the
24The fact that a trend correction does not produce dierent results as it did for the age window 6 to
16 may be due to the fact that cohorts exposed to famine early in life may now be on average as old as
those not exposed while for later childhood, the non-exposed group may be on average younger.
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Table 5.7: Robustness of eects at ages 0{4 or in utero:
placebo famine exposure and sensitivity and inclusion of
other countries
Placebo Famine Exposure Inclusion of other countries
Eect 0.032 -0.851
(S.E.) ( 0.032) ( 0.343)
t-stat. 0.111 -2.485
Note: For column 1, original sample has been replaced by individuals from France
(pseudo famine exposure as in Germany), Italy (pseudo famine exposure as in Greece),
and Belgium (pseudo famine exposure as in the Netherlands). Sample Size = 2864;
thereof pseudo-famine exposed = 640. For column 2, original sample has been extended
to include France, Belgium, and Italy. Sample Size = 2864; thereof famine exposed =
0. Signicance computed using standard errors clustered by country-year cells. Control
variables are a dummy for whether the accomodation at birth has been in rural area,
country xed eects, and year of birth.
underlying causal eect of hunger on height by a factor 4 amounting to more than 2
centimeters.25
Adding data from other countries Recall that the famines we consider took place
around the time of World War II and its aftermath. To examine whether the estimated
eects reect the eect of the turbulences around the war instead of the famine, we
perform a placebo test and a sensitivity analysis. In the placebo test, we select Belgium,
France, and Italy as \clones" for the Netherlands, Germany, and Greece, respectively,
and pretend that each of these countries was exposed to a famine in the same period
as its companion country. We select SHARE samples for these countries analogous to
the description in Section 5.4. We rst estimate a rst stage, i.e. the eect of pseudo
famine exposure on the probability to report hunger for ages 6 to 16. These turn out to
be statistically signicant; however, the size of the eects is less than half the size we nd
in the original analysis. As noted in Section 5.4, this may reect the eect of World War II
and its aftermath in Belgium, France and Italy. Next, we estimate placebo reduced-form
relationships of pseudo famine exposure on health outcomes for both ages 6 to 16 and in
utero to age 4. These results are displayed in the rst column of Table 5.7 and provide no
signicant evidence along the lines of the patterns we found in the main analyses. This
conrms that we identify causal eects of hunger, in the main analyses in this section.
To proceed, we add Belgium, Italy and France as famine-free countries to the sample
from the Netherlands, Greece and Germany, and we perform reduced-form estimations of
25We also used a 2S-2SLS estimator for this exercise. However, this restricts both the relationship of
height on hunger and the rst stage to be linear. Using this alternative estimation technique produces
causal eects in the same order of magnitude and signicance.
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Table 5.8: Reduced form estimates and treatment eects
using varying treatment windows
Reduced Form Eect Cond. Wald cond. Wald { Trend corrected
Treatment Window: Age 0{6 and/or in utero
Eect -0.683 -3.616 -2.897
(S.E.) ( 0.337) ( 1.871) ( 1.580)
t-stat. -2.028 -1.933 -1.833
Treatment Window: Age 0{3 and/or in utero
Eect -0.657 -1.903 -2.551
(S.E.) ( 0.356) ( 2.048) ( 1.829)
t-stat. -1.848 -0.929 -1.395
Note: Size of population = 2673; thereof famine-exposed at age 0 { 6 (0 { 3): =
563 (341); thereof treated / famine-exposed at age 6 { 16 = 203 / 614; Regressions
include control country xed eects and a dummy for urbanization of birthplace
and year of birth (last variable cannot be included when using Wald estimator).
Signicance for Wald estimator computed using a bootstrap (500 repetitions). All
standard errors clustered by country-year cells.
actual famine exposure on this extended sample. Since these countries also experienced
turbulent conditions around World War II, we would expect the reduced-form impacts
of the famine to lose size and precision compared to the baseline results, if the baseline
results were driven by these turbulences rather than by the famine. The reduced form
estimate from this exercise is displayed in the second column of Table 5.7. It turns out
that for all means and purposes, the results are the same as in the original analysis. If
anything, the estimates slightly gain in precision, which can be attributed to the increase
in the sample size. This conrms that the results are not driven by exposure early in life
to adverse non-famine conditions.
Additional sensitivity analyses In addition to the sensitivity analyses discussed so
far, we performed a range of estimations to assess the robustness of the results with respect
to a number of assumptions and decisions concerning the operationalization of the key
variables. This concerns, rst of all, the precise starting and ending dates of each of the
famines. For example, for Germany, one may argue that May 1945 should be included in
the famine period.
Further, we may vary the age intervals within which early-life conditions are assumed
to extern their inuence. For example, we may exclude in utero from the age interval
that merges in utero with age 0-4, or we may exclude age 4 from these intervals, or
consider a wider treatment window. Table 5.8 gives two examples where we dene the
treatment window to be in utero or at ages 0 to 6 or 0 to 3, respectively. For the extended
treatment window, we can see that the eects remain relatively stable even though the
reduced form estimate somewhat shrinks in absolute value; this may be suggestive for the
183
CHAPTER 5. INSTRUMENTAL VARIABLE ESTIMATION OF THE CAUSAL
EFFECT OF HUNGER
very early years of childhood being the most critical age driving our results. Dening the
the treatment window as running from 0 to 3 shows that we here run into sample size
problems: even though the reduced form estimate is signicant and negative, the results
from using the Wald estimators are not despite being negative and relatively large in
absolute value. We thus conclude that our original choice of ages 0 to 4 or in uetro exposure
as the treatment window is the best solution to the trade o between eect relevance and
statistical precision. Additionally, we note that changing the correctly recalled reference
age window from 6 to 16 in a similar way does also not change the results (results can be
made available upon request).
Last, we may drop our measure of urbanization at the reference age from the covariates
in order to see whether results are sensitive to this change. Concerning the outcome
measures, we may trim extreme values. It turns out that all results are insensitive with
respect to such changes. The \in utero" age interval for exposure (using the recording
of hunger in the birth year) does not give a sucient number of exposed individuals for
a meaningful analysis. Finally, we perform separate estimations by country. It turns out
that the current samples by country are too small for meaningful analyses. Furthermore,
results by country are more sensitive to eects of cohort-specic events.
5.7 Conclusions
This chapter investigates the causal eect of undernutrition in infancy and childhood
on adult height as a proxy for late life health using instrumental variable estimation.
We deal with the problem of selective recall and systematic underreporting of hunger
periods in utero or infancy by using two-sample IV estimation. Specically, we estimate
the probability to report hunger when exposed to a famine around birth by examining the
observed association between hunger and famine at teenage ages. To this end, we adjust
the nonparametric Wald estimator for estimation on data from two dierent samples. We
bootstrap the standard errors.
For men aged 6-16, we nd average adult-height eect of undernutrition of about 6 cm,
which is however levels out after introducing a secular time trend in height. If restricted
in nutritional supply in the interval from in utero until age 4, men who suered from
low nutrition in infancy, display a negative height eect of more than 3 cm. This eect
remains after controlling for trends in height over time.
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What distinguishes our results from the literature on contextual famine eects is that
we are the rst to use the occurrence of famines to obtain an estimate of the average
causal eect of nutritional shortages during childhood on health later in life. We can
thus compare the reduced-form famine eects that are usually reported in the literature
with the causal eects of undernutrition. Our estimated reduced-form famine eects are
in accordance to those in the reduced-form studies of the long run eects of exposure
to the famines that we consider (those studies were discussed in Section 5.3). However,
our estimated causal eects are about four times larger than our reduced-form famine
eects. This emphasizes the importance of nutrition in early childhood - over and above
the ndings and statements in the famine literature.
The dierence between contextual and causal eects is related to the rate of \compliance"
to the famine. In our study, the fraction of \compliers" is close to 20%. To the extent
that reduced-form studies implicitly assume perfect compliance, this assumption seems
untenable even for shocks as severe as the famines used in this study.26
The analyses in this chapter are restricted by some notable data limitations. First, the
samples are small. Admittedly, the full SHARE data cover many European countries and
include over 20,000 elderly respondents, but we only use men in the subsamples from the
three countries with famines. Within these, the subsets of individuals who were exposed to
famines during childhood are of even smaller size, because the famines had a duration of at
most a few years. This implies, among other things, that we can only examine exposures
within age intervals of say 4 years, since otherwise the numbers of \treated" and \controls"
are insucient for reliable inference. Another data limitation is that the individual spells
of severe nutritional shortages are only measured in full calendar years. Inevitably, then,
the assignment rules for the actual treatment status are open to debate. Fortunately, the
results are not sensitive to moderate changes in these rules, and in general, the results
are in agreement to the ndings in the reduced-form literature where famine exposure is
directly related to health outcomes later in life.
Nevertheless, the data limitations rule out the analysis of a number of interesting issues.
This concerns, rst of all, the connection between the timing of the spell of nutritional
26Some of the reduced-form studies do explicitly acknowledge the dierence between famines or
episodes with reduced food availability on the one hand and nutritional shortages early in life on the
other, and they carefully dene the parameter of interest to be the over-all "intention to treat" eect.
See for example Almond and Mazumder (2011) and Lumey et al. (2011) for excellent expositions.
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shortage and the age of the child. The famine literature distinguishes between dierent
reduced-form eects at dierent stages of pregnancy, for dierent outcomes. More in
general, the developmental origins literature nds that long-run reduced-form eects of
conditions in utero and right after birth are larger than those at subsequent ages. The size
of the eects may be non-monotonous during the pre-puberty and puberty ages. Our data
do not enable us to go into such details. A second issue concerns the temporal and spatial
variation in the strength of the famine instrument. Contextual information can be used to
create an indicator of famine severity. For example, one may use ocial food rations per
region and month. However, the meaning of a ration size depends on the country, since in
some countries charities and the informal sector are more important than in others. As we
have seen, the sample sizes are too small to allow for meaningful estimation by country,
and on top of that, the temporal connection between a famine and the observed spell of
nutritional shortage is insuciently tight to exploit ne temporal contextual variations.
The present study may therefore motivate the construction or usage of data sets that are
larger and/or more focused on specic spatial areas, where ideally, such data sets would
have more elaborate retrospective information on childhood episodes of hunger.
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Chapter 6
Intergenerational Eects of
Economic Distress: Paternal
Unemployment and Child Secondary
Schooling Decisions
6.1 Introduction
Does an economic crisis have adverse eects on the next generation? A large body of
literature shows that job loss reduces future earnings, future employment prospects,
marital stability and (mental) health of the unemployed. However, if the children of the
unemployed are equally aected, a crisis may have long run consequences even on next-
generation human capital. This chapter investigates how unemployment resulting from
temporary shocks in the paternal labor market aects child schooling decisions.
There are at least two potential mechanisms that link paternal unemployment with
child human capital. First, paternal joblessness may reduce parental monetary and non-
monetary investments into child skills and competencies. Second, paternal unemployment
may act as a temporary shock to a child's condence in being able to graduate
successfully if it occurs during a critical decision period. This chapter shows that paternal
unemployment adversely aects children's educational choices but not immediate school
performance.
To understand the impact of labor market uctuations and paternal unemployment on
upper secondary schooling decisions, I estimate a latent variable model for the joint
probability of paternal unemployment and child upper secondary school choice using the
cyclical component in adult male unemployment as an exogenous shifter for paternal
unemployment. I focus on paternal instead of maternal unemployment because the father
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tends to be the main breadwinner and because psychological eects of unemployment
tend to be higher for men than for women (Theodossiou, 1998). Moreover, I show that
the association between paternal unemployment and child schooling is much stronger for
paternal than for maternal unemployment (for similar ndings on the eects of paternal
and maternal unmeployment, see Kalil and Ziol-Guest, 2008; Rege et al., 2011).
The decision whether to complete upper secondary schooling is vital in the German
context. An upper secondary schooling certicate entitles individuals to a large range of
white-collar vocational training positions and is a prerequisite for university attendance
(Jenkins and Schluter, 2002). Children make this choice approximately at age 16, a time
where they are still highly dependent and inuenced by familial distress factors, such as
parental unemployment.
The relationship between paternal unemployment and child education decisions cannot
be investigated using experimental methods. Hence, a major concern is that paternal
unemployment and child schooling may be jointly dependent on unobserved confounders.
I address this concern by matching German household panel data with macro data on
97 regional economic centers for the years 1998-2009, including the years of the most
recent crisis. I construct the cyclical component of regional labor market uctuations
in the labor market of the father and use this as an exogenous shifter for paternal
unemployment. The identication strategy relies on the assumption that temporary
unemployment shocks in the paternal labor market only inuence child schooling
decisions through paternal employment. This assumption is not innocuous if regional
unemployment is correlated with youth unemployment. Therefore it is important to
control for apprenticeship vacancies, youth unemployment, changes in the tax base as
well as permanent unemployment in the region of residence. The underlying model
also comprises indicators for urbanization, parental age and parental education and
a number of other background variables because regions with dierent characteristics
may be aected by recessions. I nd that the null hypothesis of child schooling and
paternal unemployment being independently determined by unobservables can no longer
be rejected. Therefore, part of my results build on a matching assumption.
The data come from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), a representative
longitudinal micro-dataset that contains a wide range of socio-economic information on
individuals in Germany, comprising yearly follow-ups during 1984-2010 (Wagner et al.,
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2007). Information on the children stem from a special youth survey comprising
information on 17-year-old children of the responding households, collected in the years
2000-2010. The data are well-suited to my analysis because they can be linked to a
large number of regional economic indicators and contain a vast number of parental
and child characteristics. These allow me to study heterogeneity in the eect of paternal
unemployment with respect to paternal cognitive ability, education, age, school tracks and
gender. Moreover, detailed information on child characteristics and economic preferences
allow me analyze several potential channels through which the paternal unemployment
eect operates, such as the eect of paternal unemployment on expected school success.
The main nding of this chapter is that paternal unemployment causally reduces ospring
educational attainment and that a child's subjective probability of school success is an
important mechanism. Detailed results are (1) the reduced form eect of a one percentage
point increase in the cyclical component of regional unemployment amounts to a decrease
in the probability of child upper secondary school choice by 2 percentage points, of a base
level of 52%. (2) paternal unemployment lowers the probability of upper secondary school
completion by 18 percentage points. (3) paternal unemployment reduces the subjective
probability of successful school completion by 11 percentage points and if an individual
believes that school completion is rather unlikely, the probability of upper secondary
school choice decreases by 6.5 percentage points. After controlling for parental background
variables, this subjective probability of school success accounts for 2 - 7.5 percent of the
overall unemployment eect. (4) my ndings can be explained by a theoretical framework
that allows paternal unemployment to aect the assessment of the return to education
through expected school success.
The contribution of this chapter is fourfold. First, it is the rst chapter that uses variation
in the cyclical component of regional adult male labor market uctuations as an exogenous
shifter for paternal unemployment.1 In a linear IV-setting with heterogenous eects, the
eect I identify is thus a weighted local average treatment eect for children of individuals
that suer from unemployment due to a regional labor market downturn. This is the
relevant eect for policy makers who want to obviate second order eects of an economic
crisis (Carneiro et al., 2011). In this regard the chapter is related to literature on other
1To my knowledge it is also the rst chapter to use cyclical macro variation for the most recent crisis
years to investigate second order eects on next generation outcomes.
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topics using regional unemployment shocks as exogenous shifters for endogenous variables
(e.g., Ham and Jacobs, 2000; Ginja, 2010).
The second contribution of this chapter is related to the use of household data.
While most studies in this literature use administrative data with limited background
information, household data allow me to investigate the impact of paternal unemployment
on behavioral traits of the child and heterogeneity in the eect of paternal job loss for
dierent groups of individuals. Whereas most of the existing literature focuses on income
or parental investments as potential mechanisms (see e.g. Dahl and Lochner (2012);
Blau (1999); Rege et al. (2011)) this chapter innovates by laying the main focus on the
psychological channels.
The third contribution is to explain my ndings within a simple theoretical framework
where paternal unemployment aects the return to education through the subjective
probability of successful school completion. In this model children make upper secondary
schooling decisions by comparing discounted wage ows for each schooling choice, where
the high-education wage stream is weighted by the probability of actually achieving the
higher education level. This study thus takes the standpoint of the child and does not
focus primarily on parental investments.
The chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 reviews the related literature and describes
the institutional setting. Section 6.3 describes a simple framework that relates paternal
unemployment with the subjective school success probability and child upper secondary
education decisions. Section 6.4 describes the data, and Section 6.5 discusses the empirical
estimation strategy and econometric models used. Section 6.6 presents the results of the
analyses. Section 6.7 concludes.
6.2 Literature and Institutional Background
It is well-established that job loss has large adverse consequences on adult individuals.
Fewer studies investigate the impact of parental job loss on child outcomes. Hence,
Section 6.2.2 reviews the related literature whereas Section 6.2.3 and Section 6.2.4 describe
the institutional labor market context as well as relevant parts of the German education
system.
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6.2.1 Literature on paternal unemployment and child outcomes
It is well-established that job loss has large adverse consequences on adult individuals.
Recently, a limited number of studies have also investigated impacts of parental job loss on
various child outcomes. I use household data that are ideally suited to answer the question
at hand. Since these data were collected in Germany, it is important to understand the
institutional context in which school decisions are made. Hence, Section 6.2.2 reviews the
related literature whereas Section 6.2.3 and Section 6.2.4 describe the institutional labor
market context as well as relevant parts of the education system.
6.2.2 Literature on paternal unemployment and child outcomes
A large number of studies investigate how unemployment and involuntary job loss
aect an individual's well-being. Jacobson et al. (1993) and Ruhm (1991) nd that
permanent earnings of displaced workers are lowered by 25 and 10-13 percent respectively.
It is also well-established that unemployment has quite dramatic eects on health,
mental health and life satisfaction (Sullivan and Von Wachter, 2009; Eliason and Storrie,
2009; McKee-Ryan et al., 2005; Theodossiou, 1998; Kassenboehmer and Haisken-DeNew,
2009).2 It also has negative eects on family well-being, marital disruption and family relo-
cation (Charles and Stephens, 2004; Astone and McLanahan, 1994; Kind and Haisken-DeNew,
2012).
Despite the importance of the subject, few studies relate parental unemployment to child
outcomes. Important exceptions are Oreopoulos et al. (2008), Bratberg et al. (2008) and
Rege et al. (2011).3 Rege et al. (2011) use Norwegian register data to estimate the causal
eect of parental job loss due to plant closures during grade seven on the Grade Point
Average (GPA) after grade ten. The analysis is based on a matching assumption and the
authors control for a large number of region, industry and school xed eects. They nd
that paternal job displacement reduces GPA by 6 percent of a standard deviation, while
maternal job loss leads to a nonsignicant increase in GPA. Furthermore, the eect is
2McKee-Ryan et al. (2005), in a meta study summarizing 104 other studies, nd large eects of
unemployment but no signicant eects of the current unemployment rate on mental health.
3Kalil and Ziol-Guest (2008) and Stevens and Schaller (2011) nd that paternal job loss results in
a higher probability of ospring grade retention in the Survey of Income and Program Participation
(SIPP).Gregg et al. (2012) in a recent publication using the British Cohort Study Using the British
Cohort Study nd that children with displaced fathers obtain lower grades, lower wages and are at a
higher risk of youth unemployment.
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largest in municipalities with non-decreasing unemployment rates and below median pre-
closure earnings. Focusing on paternal investment channels, the authors report that the
eect of paternal job loss does not pass through subsequent earnings or time allocation of
mothers, divorce or residential reallocation. Therefore, the authors conclude that parental
mental health is the driving mechanism. A second paper by Bratberg et al. (2008) uses
Norwegian data, too, and investigates the eect of paternal displacement when children
are of age 12-16. The authors analyze matched employer-employee panel data but nd
no signicant eects on earnings, non-employment or registered unemployment of the
next generation. The third paper uses information about plant closures in Canadian
administrative data (Oreopoulos et al., 2008). The authors show that sons in the age
group 10-14 of displaced workers have adult annual earnings that are about 9 percent
lower than similar children of fathers who did not experience an employment shock. The
eect is largest for families in the lowest quartile of the income distribution. When it comes
to mechanisms, they nd displacement to slightly aect mobility but mobility not to aect
child outcomes. Moreover, their results indicate that displacement does not aect marital
status or spousal income. Therefore, Oreopoulos et al. (2008) conclude that income is the
driving mechanism. The results of these studies are specic to individuals aected by plant
closings. Also, fathers employed at closing plants are likely to be less skilled at foreseeing
the future or less willing to change jobs beforehand (Pfann and Hamermesh, 2001).
From a methodological point of view, this chapter is close to other studies that
use exogenous variation as a shifter for unemployment or family resources. Examples
are Ham and Jacobs (2000) who use the unemployment rate in the household head's
occupational category as an instrument for family resources or Fougere et al. (2009)
and Gould et al. (2002) who use predicted changes in employment shares of dierent
demographic groups in dierent regions as instruments for youth unemployment.
A large body of literature studies the eects of parental income and maternal employment
patterns on child outcomes (Blau, 1999; Dahl and Lochner, 2012).4 These studies nd that
the eect of income on child development is signicant but modest, and less important
than child characteristics and other family background variables.5
4Maternal employment tends to have small negative eects, especially while the children are small
(Ruhm, 2004).
5Jenkins and Schluter (2002) also nd small income eects for child achievement in Germany.
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Most of this literature investigates the eect on small children. But while it is well-
established that parental investments and parental income matter more for the younger
the child, other mechanisms may be more important when children are older (Tominey,
2009; Cunha and Heckman, 2007).
6.2.3 Institutional changes and the German labor market during
the great recession
The exogenous variation used in this chapter comes from temporary unemployment
shocks, and the identication of the model is based on temporary employment uctuations.
Therefore, it is important to note that the period under study includes the 2008/2009
world recession. The crisis has hit Germany harder than most other OECD countries,
mainly because the country heavily depends on export markets, which more or less
collapsed during the crisis. However, despite a 5% drop in GDP, the crisis has aected the
German labor market much less than in many other European countries. There were
almost no mass layos and no general feeling of panic. Assisted by short-time work
schemes, many rms buered capacity (Moller, 2010).
The crisis has aected German industries very unequally. 37% of all rms reported to be
aected by the crisis, but as many as 70% of metal producers (Moller, 2010). Because many
of these producers are located in Western and Southern Germany, there were some regions
that were quite heavily aected. These were mostly regions that had been economically
strong before the crisis (Fuchs and Kempermann, 2011).
The period under investigation comprises the so-called Hartz reforms (I to IV) between
2003 and 2005, which was a substantial reform of the unemployment benet system
that lead to an increase in unemployment hardship. In 2005, unemployment and social
assistance were merged into a single means-tested welfare payment. Since then, eligibility
for unemployment benets depends on being physically and mentally capable of working
for at least 15 hours per week, active job search and the willingness to participate in welfare
to work programs. Moreover, non-compliance to the unemployment benet rules or the
rejection of job oers can be sanctioned by means of temporary benet cuts (Huber et al.,
2011). The reforms have lead to a decline in the so called natural rate of unemployment
by increasing the incentives for unemployed to search for and accept new jobs.
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6.2.4 School choice in the German context
School choice at age 16 is an important stepping stone towards obtaining an upper
secondary school degree (Abitur/Fachabitur). Taking 2-3 years to complete, it serves
as a school graduation certicate and university entrance exam. Moreover, it grants
access to colleges and universities and is a prerequisite for many apprenticeship and
vocational training positions. Individuals who do not complete an upper secondary school
degree mostly continue vocational training and eventually take up work in blue collar
occupations.
Upper secondary school choice in Germany is inuenced by a system of early tracking.
At age 10-12, children are tracked into one of three separate hierarchical school strands.
Although, formally, students from all three tracks can obtain an upper secondary school
degree, the latter is more dicult if tracked into Haupt- or Realschule (the lower tracks)
than Gymnasium (the highest track) (Jenkins and Schluter, 2002).
Results by Dustmann et al. (2012) imply that, at least for individuals at the margin, track-
ing is less decisive for obtaining a certain educational degree than upper secondary school
choice itself. This is explainable by the substantial amount of student up- and downgrading
between track types at the time of upper secondary school choice (Dustmann et al.,
2012). At that time, individuals holding a German general secondary school degree
(Hauptschulabschluss) or a German intermediate school degree (Realschulabschluss) can
obtain an upper secondary school degree (Fachabitur or Abitur) if they change school
after grade 10 or if they graduate from specialized vocational schools.
Rules and regulations concerning degrees and compulsory schooling ages vary greatly
between the dierent federal states. While, in most states, schooling is compulsory
until age 18 (secondary school + vocational school), some states only require 9 years
of schooling.6 Furthermore, secondary general schools nish after grade 9 in most
federal states and after grade 10 in others. When investigating the impact of paternal
unemployment at child age 16, it is thus very important to control for state of residence.
6These are Saarland, Thuringia and Hesse.
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6.3 A Theoretical Framework for the Impact of Pa-
ternal Unemployment on Child Upper Secondary
School Choice
Education choices are pivotal to the amount of human capital an individual accumulates in
life. While skills and abilities are predominantly a function of parental investments during
early childhood, human capital accumulation is essentially a matter of own choice at later
ages. Section 6.3.1 considers a simple theoretical framework where each individual chooses
between obtaining upper secondary education or not. Paternal unemployment inuences
this choice through its impact on the subjective probability of upper secondary school
success as laid out in Section 6.3.2.
6.3.1 A human capital investment model
The eect of paternal unemployment can be incorporated into a Roy model of human
capital investment decisions where individuals weigh the discounted ow of wages of
the upper secondary school degree wage path with the subjective probability of being
successful at obtaining the degree.
In a typical model of human capital investment, individuals make human capital
investment decisions based on the present value of future wages (Becker, 1993). Individuals
weigh the benets of continued upper secondary schooling against the benets of dropping
out at age 16 when they decide whether to continue schooling.
Assume that there are two education levels, S = f0; 1g, where S = 1 denotes holding an
upper secondary school degree and S = 0 denotes all lower education levels. Furthermore,
suppose that there are two wage paths wl and wh over T periods of time, where wl(t)
represents the wage in period t for a low educated individual and wh(t) represents the
wage in period t of an individual who holds an upper secondary school degree. Assume
that, while wage path l can be obtained with certainty, wage path h depends on successful
school completion (S = 1) which is uncertain. That is, at age 16, an individual cannot
be sure she will be successful at obtaining the corresponding degree whether after 2-3
years. Let p 2 [0; 1] denote the subjective probability of successful upper secondary school
completion at age 16. Expected future wages conditional on choosing the high schooling
195
CHAPTER 6. INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC DISTRESS
path then depend on p according to:
E

wS=1(t)

= pwh(t) + (1  p)wl(t) (6.1)
If an individual chooses to drop out at age 16, this implies p = 0 and:
E

wS=0(t)

= wl(t): (6.2)
In that case the low wage path is a deterministic process from the point of view of the
individual.
Agents maximize the expected net present value of education to make their decision. Let
V  denote this latent variable. Then an individual attends upper secondary schooling,
S = 1, if:
V   0;
and S = 0 otherwise. Using Equations 6.1 and 6.2, the net present value of upper
secondary schooling, accounting for the discounted ow of ex post earnings is:
V (w1; w0; ; ts; p) =
TX
t=ts
tE

w1(t)
  TX
t=0
tE

w0(t)

; (6.3)
where ts represents the time required to achieve upper secondary schooling, T is the
life horizon, and  denotes the discount rate, which for is assumed to be constant over
time for simplicity. If the decision process is also inuenced by monetary costs of upper
secondary school choice, such costs would be subtracted in Equation (6.3). However,
German schools are almost exclusively public and do not charge fees. One can estimate
the eect of an individual's characteristics on the probability of an individual to choose
upper secondary schooling school with a reduced-form model using variables that inuence
earnings, determines the discount rate, , and determine the subjective probability of
obtaining an upper secondary schooling certicate.
6.3.2 The role of paternal unemployment
Teenagers whose fathers become unemployed are likely to receive a temporary shock
to their mental health, self-condence and locus of control. Furthermore, these children
may expect that school support and assistance of their parents will go down in the future.
Paternal unemployment therefore reduces the subjective success probability p of obtaining
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an upper secondary school degree:
p(D = 1) < p(D = 0) (6.4)
where D = f0; 1g denotes paternal unemployment. It is easy to see that the net present
value of upper secondary schooling is increasing in p as long as wages in the high education
sector are higher than in the low education sector:7
@V (w1; w0; ; ts; p)
@p
=
TX
t=ts
t

wh(t)  wl(t) > 0 (6.5)
It follows that paternal unemployment has a negative eect on the net present value of
upper secondary schooling:
V 
D
< 0: (6.6)
If p can be observed by the econometrician, this simple theoretical framework provides a
testable mechanism for the eect of paternal unemployment on upper secondary school
choice. Note that I make the assumption that paternal unemployment at age 16 does
not have a direct impact on wages or the discount rate of individuals. This is a strong
assumption, which fails to hold, for example, if paternal unemployment has a dierential
impact on an individual's work related skills needed in either of the two wage sectors.
Note also that, in order to be able to use uctuations in the local unemployment rate as
an exclusion in the schooling equation, I need to make the assumption that future wage
paths are not inuenced by labor market uctuations. E.g., my results would be biased
upwards if a recession today permanently reduced wages more along the high education
wage path than along the low education wage path. Research shows that temporary labor
market downturns can indeed have lasting impacts but that the eect is larger for lower
educated workers (Oreopoulos et al., 2012). This research shows that it is important to
control for youth unemployment and the availability of vocational training positions.
6.4 Data
I match German representative household data with labor market information on 97
regional economic centers for the years 1998-2009. Section 6.4.1 describes the dataset
and Section 6.4.2 explains the coding of the main variables. Section 6.4.3 lays out how
7Implicitly I assume that te is low enough, such that, if p = 1, education pays o in general.
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I construct the cyclical component of adult male unemployment in the paternal labor
market, and Section 6.4.4 describes the sample.
6.4.1 Dataset and sample construction
My sample is drawn from the German Socioeconomic Panel (GSOEP), a representative
longitudinal household dataset that contains a wide range of socio-economic information
on individuals in Germany comprising follow-ups for the years 1984-2010. Information
was rst collected in 1984 for about 12,200 randomly selected adult respondents in West
Germany. After German reunication in 1990, the GSOEP was extended to around 4,500
persons from East Germany, and subsequently supplemented and expanded by additional
samples.
This study draws on 3,138 individuals, born 1983-1993, from the GSOEP "youth survey",
covering the children of all GSOEP panel members. A comprehensive set of background
variables, schooling choices, preferences, opinions and traits of these individuals were
collected over the years 2000-2010, when the subjects were 17 years of age.
The data provide four advantages. First, using a household's region of residence, the data
can be matched with regional labor market information as well as a large battery of other
regional measures, such as regional tax income or regional development indicators. Second,
the data contain information on youth upper secondary school choice one year after the
decision was made, such that revealed education preferences can be observed. Third, the
youth data can be linked to detailed parental information including parental investments,
skills, living patterns, labor force participation and unemployment histories. Fourth, the
data contain rich information on child traits as well as the subjective probability of an
individual to successfully complete her education.
I use the following sample selection criteria. First, I exclude all individuals who in
elementary school received a track recommendation for the lowest track. The reason is
that in most federal states the low-track schools only take 9 years to complete. Moreover,
individuals in the lowest track may lack the cognitive ability or opportunity to obtain an
upper secondary school degree. Second, I only include individuals who live in the same
household with both of their parents. Third, I exclude individuals for which paternal
unemployment in the previous year is missing. Fourth, some subjects were already 18 or
19 years of age when rst completing the questionnaire in 2001. I exclude these individuals
from the sample. Moreover, I also drop individuals with implausible values for paternal
198
CHAPTER 6. INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC DISTRESS
age, missings for the subjective school success probability (very few) and missing regional
indicators.8 Last, I exclude all students with missing information in any of the covariates
displayed in Table 6.3. Table 6.1 displays the nal sample size (N=2,326), the fraction of
individuals who choose upper secondary schooling and the fraction of individuals whose
father is unemployed when they are 16 years of age. 52% of all individuals in the sample
have chosen upper secondary education, compared to an average of 54% in Germany
(in 2012) (OECD, 2012). The unemployment rate of 10% for the fathers in the sample
is slightly higher than the average ocial unemployment rate of 9.6% over that period,
which is due to the fact that I also include non-employed fathers who are currently not
part of the labor force. The third reports the mean and standard deviation of the cyclical
component of regional unemployment in the paternal labor market.
Table 6.1: Proportions of youths with higher education (outcome), paternal
unemployment (treatment) and cyclical component of regional unemployment in
paternal labor market (exclusion)
Youths, age 17
Proportion SD N
Upper secondary education .52 .5 1205
Father unemployed .1 .296 225
Regional unemployment .66 1.377 2326
Source: GSOEP youth sample 2000-2010.
6.4.2 Coding of main variables
Upper secondary school choice is the main outcome of interest. This study classies all
individuals as having chosen upper secondary education, if according to the international
Comparative Analysis of Social Mobility in Industrial Nations (CASMIN), they have an
education level that corresponds to CASMIN-categories (2c), (3a) or (3b).9 Here, I use the
latest available information. Furthermore, all youths who have not yet completed their
education at the time of the last interview are classied as having chosen upper secondary
education if they are still in school and are planning to take an upper secondary school
exam that entitles them to enter a teaching college or university (German Abitur or
Fachabitur) at the time of the interview.10
8I drop all individuals with fathers who are younger than 32.
9See Section 6.2.4 for a description of the German institutional context.
10A second measure of upper secondary schooling is whether an individual is still at school at age 17.
This measure is used for robustness checks.
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Paternal unemployment is the central explanatory variable. Fathers are classied as
unemployed if they are not working at the time when the child is 16 years of age. This
also discouraged workers who are not currently looking for a job count as unemployed.
The assumption behind this is that voluntary unemployment among the fathers of school
age children is rare. Business cycle uctuations and sanctioning (see Section 6.2.4), on
the other hand, may cause part of the unemployed workforce not to actively search for
a job. Table 6.2 displays raw correlations between upper secondary school choice and a
variable that indicates whether father or mother became unemployed in the past year. The
table shows that (a) in terms of correlations, it hardly matters whether all unemployed or
only those actively searching for a job are classied as unemployed;11 (b) The association
between paternal unemployment and school choice is three times as large as between
maternal unemployment and school choice.12
Table 6.2: Raw correlation: paternal/maternal change to non(un-)employment and child
upper secondary schooling
Newly unemployed Upper Secondary Education
Father becomes unemployed -0.3160
(0.053)
Father becomes involuntarily unemployed -0.3472
(0.050)
Mother becomes unemployed -0.1167
(0.057)
Mother becomes involuntarily unemployed -0.1024
(0.068)
Observations 2120 (father) 2092 (mother)
Covariates included NO
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: GSOEP Youth Sample.
Note: Standard errors are robust.
Raw correlations displayed, no covariates included.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
The subjective probability of school success is the main potential mechanism of interest.
In the youth survey, individuals are asked "What is the probability that you will
successfully complete your training or further studies?"13 Individuals can indicate a
probability in decimal steps. Note that the question is framed rather broadly and does
11All robustness checks show that the results with this coding of unemployment are conservative. If
only those individuals are classied as unemployed who are not working and actively looking for a job,
coecients increase slightly and become somewhat more signicant.
12Table 6.15 repeats the same correlations with GPA instead of upper secondary school choice and
shows that there is no signicant negative association between parental unemployment and child GPA as
dened by the average of the most recent grades obtained in German, math and rst foreign language.
13"Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass Sie Ihre Ausbildung oder Ihr Studium erfolgreich abschlieen?"
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not specically address upper secondary schooling. Yet, what this study is interested in
is whether an individual loses condence in her abilities to complete further education or
training due to paternal unemployment, which this question should adequately capture.
I use the subjective probability as described above as well as an indicator variable
1 [Percentage > 50] for whether an individual believes she is rather likely to complete
her education.
To be able to control for childhood circumstances, I construct a large set of background
variables comprising parental age, family size paternal education, parental investment
variables, nationality and region. Moreover, in order to proxy cognitive skills and to
account for the fact that schooling decisions may depend on prior track attendance (see
Section 6.2.4), I include an individual's track recommendation after elementary school.
In Germany, every student receives a track recommendation during 4th grade by her
elementary school teacher. In most German states, track recommendations are non-
mandatory. In some states they are compulsory. Last, I construct time and state xed
eects.
6.4.3 Regional labor market information
Using individual identiers for 97 regional economic centers in Germany, I match the
GSOEP data with external data on local economic and labor market variables for the
year in which the child was 16 years old.14 Macro variables are obtained from the German
Federal Institute for Research on Building, Urban Aairs and Spatial Development
(Bundesinstitut fur Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung (BBSR), 2011). Specically, I take
the regional unemployment for male individuals in the age group of the father and deduct
mean unemployment in that region over the entire observation period. Besides, I use year
xed eects in all specications to account for institutional changes and country-wide
shocks over time.15 The exogenous labor market shifter is given by:
Zt;r;a = At;r;a   r;a;
14The 97 labor market regions are planning entities of the federal states in Germany and borders
were drawn such that they reect local labor markets and commuting areas. They are comparable to US
commuting zones (see e.g. Autor and Dorn, 2009).
15See Section 6.2.3.
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where Zt;r;i denotes the cyclical component of adult male unemployment in year t, region
r and age group a. The average unemployment rate r;a is given by:
r;a =
1
T
TX
t=1
At;r;a for t = 1998; :::; 2009
Region-age-gender specic unemployment rates imply, for example, that, if the father is
56 years of age, the unemployment rate At is given by the regional unemployment rate
for males aged 55+.16 Fluctuations in the regional unemployment rate for older men
are included in the data, because they are likely correlated with youth unemployment,
taxed-based school nancing and the availability of apprenticeship training positions.
Table 6.3: Summary statistics, background variables
Variables Youths
Father employed Father unemp P-value
Outcome
Secondary schooling 0.55 0.25 0.00
Background variables
Maternal age 44.54 44.56 0.95
Paternal age 47.04 49.14 0.00
One sibling 0.50 0.28 0.00
Two siblings 0.26 0.30 0.17
Three or more siblings 0.12 0.28 0.00
Father secondary intermediate 0.33 0.25 0.03
Father grammar school 0.31 0.16 0.00
Mother secondary intermediate 0.45 0.30 0.00
Mother grammar school 0.25 0.14 0.00
Childhood in large city 0.20 0.24 0.13
Childhood in medium city 0.19 0.20 0.55
Childhood in small city 0.27 0.23 0.21
Sex, male=1 0.51 0.48 0.46
Permanent component of unemployment 7.36 8.21 0.00
German nationality 0.95 0.84 0.00
Father has German nationality 0.92 0.80 0.00
Father cognitive skills 0.11 -0.30 0.00
Youth local labor market (mean deviation)
Vocational training positions per 100 applicants -0.78 -0.74 0.85
Youth unemployment 0.07 0.20 0.03
N 2326
Source: SOEP youth data, waves 2000-2010. Own calculations.
Notes: p-values of a two-sided t-test for dierences in means are reported.
6.4.4 Characteristics of the sample
Table 6.3 summarizes characteristics of the pooled sample of the 2,326 youths I analyze.
The summary statistics clearly show that the children of unemployed fathers dier from
16An alternative way of dening the cyclical component of regional labor market uctuations would
be to subtract trend unemployment, as computed using the Hodrick-Prescott Filter. However, due to
the extremely short time series available for each region, this approach would be dominated by endpoint
problems. Robustness checks show that the results are robust to this alternative denition.
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children of employed fathers in almost all characteristics. First, only 25% of the children
of unemployed fathers choose upper secondary schooling, while these are 55% among
families with employed fathers. Individuals with unemployed fathers tend to have more
siblings, older fathers, less educated parents, fathers with lower cognitive skills, and are
more likely to have a non-German background. Concerning child characteristics, Table 6.4
shows that children of jobless fathers are less likely to believe that they will successfully
complete their education and display a signicantly lower locus of control and a lower
GPA.17 Youth mental health is measured by the Mental Component Summary Scale
(MCS), one of the two sub-dimensions of the SF-12 questionnaire and risk aversion is
measured by an individual's willingness to take risks (for a description of the risk measure
see Dohmen et al., 2011). Locus of control, youth mental health and risk aversion are
standardized to have mean zero and standard deviation one. GPA is coded by averaging
last school grades in math, German and their rst foreign language. German grades have
been reversed now ranging from 1 to 6 where more is better. Certainly, some of the
Table 6.4: Summary statistics, subjective school success and child traits
Variables Youths
Father employed Father unemp P-value
Subjective school success
Probability, successful school completion 78.59 74.67 0.00
Probability, successful school completion>50 % 0.88 0.81 0.01
Child trait channels
Youth mental health -0.01 0.12 0.07
Youth risk aversion -0.01 0.04 0.52
Youth locus of control 0.02 -0.21 0.00
GPA
Youth grade point average 0.02 -0.11 0.08
N 2326
Source: SOEP youth data, waves 2000-2010. Own calculations.
Notes: p-values of a two-sided t-test for dierences in means are reported.
observed dierence in child upper secondary schooling cannot be ascribed to the causal
eect of unemployment but is driven by observed and unobserved confounders. Panel (a)
of Figure 6.1 provides a graphical assessment of the average dierence in upper secondary
schooling probability between youths whose fathers were employed or unemployed at
dierent ages of the child. The graph shows that this dierence in outcomes increases the
closer in time paternal unemployment occurs to the education decision of the child. This
17For a description of the locus of control measure and underlying construct in the GSOEP see
Piatek and Pinger (2010).
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indicates a likely causal eect of unemployment. Panel (b) shows that no such relationship
exists when looking at child GPA as an outcome.
Figure 6.1: % upper secondary schooling and GPA by paternal employment status and
age.
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Notes: GSOEP youth sample 2000-2010. Sample contains all individuals whose parental unemployment history is
available for at least the past 3 years.
6.5 Estimation Strategy
The theoretical framework of Section 6.3 has shown that paternal unemployment is likely
to reduce the probability of upper secondary schooling and that the perceived probability
of school success is a crucial parameter for the decision about upper secondary schooling.
This section explains how I identify and estimate (a) the overall causal eect of paternal
unemployment, (b) a latent factor model for paternal cognitive ability, (c) the direct,
indirect and total eect of paternal characteristics, (d) the eect of paternal joblessness
on the subjective school success probability, and (e) the impact of that probability on
schooling decisions.
6.5.1 Simultaneous equation bivariate probit model
The utility of upper secondary schooling and the disutility of unemployment are
unobserved latent variables, for which only nal outcomes are observed. Because
unobservables that drive paternal unemployment (D) and child secondary school choice
(E) are likely to be correlated, it is important to jointly estimate the probability of
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paternal unemployment and of child upper secondary schooling. The model is:
US;i = Di + 
0
SXi +
RX
r=1
Sdr;i +
TX
t=1
Sdt;i + Si + S;i; Si = 1

US;i  0

UD;i = 
0
DXi + Zi +
RX
r=1
Ddr;i +
TX
t=1
Ddt;i + Di + D;i; Di = 1

UD;i  0

;
(6.7)
where US and U

D denote latent (dis-)utility from education and unemployment respec-
tively. X is a vector of background variables, Z denotes the cyclical component of adult
male unemployment as dened in Section 6.4.3, and  is latent paternal cognitive ability.
dr;i and dt;i denote state (or region) and time dummies. A list of all included explanatory
variables in each equation is given in Table 6.6. (S;i; D;i) are jointly distributed as
standard bivariate normal with correlation  and independent of Z. I use standard
maximum likelihood methods to estimate the parameters , , D, S, D, S, S, D,
S, D and .
18 I compute standard errors that are robust and clustered at the level of the
regional economic centers. For each model, I conduct a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test for the
absence of correlation in the model under the null hypothesis that  equals zero. If the
null hypothesis cannot be rejected, I report parameters of a restricted model with  = 0.
There is a large number of dierent marginal eects that can be computed for this model. I
compute average marginal eects for the unconditional probability that S = 1 (or D = 1),
which is the eect of interest in this chapter. The marginal eect for continuous covariates
is given by:
@E[Sjx]
@x
= (x0); (6.8)
where x denotes a combined vector of all explanatory variables and  a vector of all
coecients, some of which may be zero for variables that only appear in the other equation.
For discrete variables, nite dierences are computed. Standard errors of the marginal
eects are bootstrapped using 200 bootstrap replications.
18The likelihood is given by:
lnL =
NX
i=1
ln2(ai;S ; ai;D; )
where 2 denotes the bivariate normal cdf, ai;S = (2S 1)(Di+0SXi+
PR
r=1 Sdr;i+
PT
t=1 Sdt;i+Si)
and ai;D = (2D   1)(0DXi + Zi +
PR
r=1 Ddr;i +
PT
t=1 Ddt;i + Di).
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6.5.2 Latent factor model
In order to account for paternal cognitive ability, I use a factor model as an integral
component of the simultaneous equation model described above. Paternal cognitive skills
are assumed to depend on multiple measures Mk where k 2 f1:::Kg and K is the total
number of measures available.
A factor model is necessary here to account for the fact that dierent measurements are
going to be correlated to a dierent degree with the latent construct. In a factor model,
dierent weights, called factor loadings, are estimated. By estimating a factor model, one
can account for measurement error in proxies and avoid attenuation bias. The cognitive
skill measurement system is:
MCk;i = CkC;i + Ck;i for k = 1; :::; K:
where Ck are factor loadings associated with measurement k. Factor loadings are allowed
to dier across equations giving measurements dierent weights. Since the scale of each
factor is arbitrary, I restrict the variance of the factor to equal unity and require K > 2
for identication. In addition, E[Ck] = 0 and E[C;i] = 0. I use the Bartlett method to
obtain unbiased factor scores (Bartlett, 1937).
Cognitive skills are measured using a test of symbol correspondence (administered in 2006)
that was specically developed for the GSOEP and corresponds to a sub-module of the
Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (Lang et al., 2007). Missing cognitive ability measures
were imputed on hands of information about an individual's education as well as family
education measures using linear regression.
6.5.3 Linear IV
To investigate the eect of paternal unemployment on the subjective probability of school
success, child mental health and locus of control, I use the Two-Stage-Least-Squares
(2SLS) estimator with paternal unemployment as a treatment and the cyclical component
of adult male unemployment in the region as an instrument. The estimator is:
2SLS = (D^
0D^) 1D^0Y; (6.9)
where Y denotes the outcome of interest and D^ = Z(Z 0Z) 1Z 0D. To use Z as an exclusion
in Equation (6.7) or as an instrument in Equation (6.9), it is important that the reginal
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Table 6.5: First stage regression of paternal unemployment on the age-specic regional
unemployment rate
Paternal unemployment All
OLS Probit
Cyclical component of adult male unemployment 0.01476 0.01294
(0.005) (0.004)
Observations 2326 2326
Covariates included YES YES
F-stat ( (instrument)=0) 9.673
R-squ adj./Ps R-squ. 0.086 0.139
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: GSOEP Youth Sample.
Note: Standard errors clustered by region. Coecients of probit
equations are average marginal eects. The analytical sample
on which these estimates are based consists of all
GSOEP youths that have no missings in any of the covariates.
For covariates included see Table 6.6.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
labor market instrument is informative. Table 6.5 shows the results of a linear regression
model and of a probit model, where the dependent variable is paternal unemployment. In
both cases, the instrument is highly signicant and the F-statistic of a test for  = 0 is
close to 10.
6.5.4 Decomposition of the unemployment eect
In order to investigate how much of the overall gap in dierent upper secondary school
choice probabilities is due to dierences in the subjective probability of school success or
due to other child characteristics, I use a nonlinear decomposition in the spirit of Fairlie
(2005). It is the same decomposition used and described in Heckman et al. (2013b) except
for nonlinear models. Assume that school choice is independent across children of employed
and unemployed fathers conditional on a large vector of exogenous variables X that are
not aected by paternal unemployment. The decomposition is based on the following
non-linear probit model:
P (SDi = 1jXDi ; pDi ) = (S 0XDi + pDi ); with D 2 f0; 1g (6.10)
where region and time dummies are also controlled for, but excluded from Equation
6.10 for notational simplicity. XDi is a vector of all background characteristics listed in
Table 6.6 and pi again denotes the subjective success probability of individual i. The
above equation implies the assumption that the eect of background characteristics and
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the subjective school probability is the same for individuals of employed and unemployed
fathers 0S = 
1
S and 
0 = 1. I test and do not reject this hypothesis.
The goal of the decomposition is to decompose the eect of paternal unemployment into
components attributable to a change in the subjective school success probability. Following
the notation used in Fairlie (1999) and using coecients from a probit regression for a
pooled sample, the contribution of p to the dierent in school choice probabilities  S
between children of employed (D = 0) and unemployed (D = 1) fathers can be written
as:
 Sp =
N1X
i=1
1
N1
(S
0X0i + p
1
i )  (S 0X0i + p0i )19 (6.11)
The contribution of each variable to the in upper secondary school choice probabilities
is thus equal to the change in the average predicted probability from replacing the
distribution of the subjective school success probability for children of unemployed fathers
with the one of children from employed fathers. To this end both samples are matched
on the basis of their rank in the distribution of school choice probabilities. Because
there is a lower number of children from unemployed fathers a number of 100 repeated
random subsamples of children from employed fathers are drawn and matched to compute
Equation 6.11.
The percentage of the unemployment eect explained by p which cannot be accounted for
by background variables can then be expressed as a percentage of the observed dierence
in school choice probabilities that cannot be accounted for by the exogenous variables.
For most models this amounts roughly the percentage of the treatment eect explained
19In practice the value of  Sp depends on whether background variables are xed at X
D
i = 0 or X
1
i .
To account for this a random ordering of variables is used.
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by p. In addition I express p as a percentage of the treatment eect computed in Equation
6.7 (to be done!).
Table 6.6: Covariates in the dierent model equations
Unemployment Upper secondary schooling
C
o
v
a
ri
a
te
s
Constant X X
Paternal age X X
Maternal age X
2 children X
3 children X
4 or more children X
1 sibling X
2 children X
3 or more siblings X
Father secondary intermediate school X X
Father grammar school X X
Mother secondary intermediate school X X
Mother grammar school X X
Father German X
Large city X X
Medium city X X
Small city X X
Permanent unemployment component X
Father industry dummies X X
Youth sex (male=1) X
Youth German X
Youth track recommendation X
Father cognitive ability (X) (X)
Vocational training positions per applicant in region (X)
Youth unemployment in region (X)
Subjective school success probability (X)
Year FEs X X
Federal state FEs X X
Region FEs (X) (X)
Note: See table 5.3 for details.
6.6 Empirical Results
The results are presented and discussed in several stages. I rst provide a description
of the main ndings in Section 6.6.1, including the reduced form eect, the causal
eect of paternal unemployment and a comparison of the secondary school choice
results with results for child GPA. Section 6.6.2 elicits further results displaying the
heterogeneity of the paternal unemployment eect for dierent groups of children and
families. Section 6.6.3 presents the impact of paternal unemployment on child traits and
the subjective school success probability, as well as the eect of their eect on upper
secondary school choice. Section 6.6.4 elaborates on some robustness checks.
209
CHAPTER 6. INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC DISTRESS
Figure 6.2: Paternal unemployment and youth upper secondary schooling by regional
cyclical component of adult male unemployment.
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Notes: Graphs display kernel-weighted local polynomial regression outputs of paternal unemployment on the regional
component of adult male unemployment. Smoothing is obtained from Epanechnikov Kernel weighted local polynomial
estimates. Bandwidth selection follows Silverman's rule of thumb (Silverman, 1986). Shaded area displays 95% condence
bands.
6.6.1 The eect of paternal unemployment on education choices
and GPA
If labor market uctuations inuence secondary school choice via paternal unemployment,
one would expect to nd an association between the cyclical component in regional adult
male unemployment and child upper secondary school choice. Columns (1) and (2) of
Table 6.7 show that, after controlling for background variables, the linear reduced form
eect of an increase in the unemployment rate of the paternal labor market leads to a
reduction in the probability that a child chooses upper secondary schooling by a little
more than two percentage points.20 This eect remains strong even after controlling for
youth unemployment and the number of vocational training positions per applicant in the
region.21 The eect of unemployment uctuations in the maternal labor market, on the
other hand, displayed in columns (3) and (4), is close to zero and insignicant. The
reason for why child school choice and unemployment in the maternal labor market
are unrelated after controlling for background variables is probably that (a) female
employment decisions are correlated less with local labor market developments, and (b)
20See also Figure 6.2 for a graph of the raw association between regional unemployment uctuations
and paternal unemployment and child schooling decisions, respectively.
21This strong reduced form eect is consistent with ndings by Rampino and Taylor (2012) who report
that changes in the unemployment rate have an eect on youth attitudes towards schooling in Britain.
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the association between maternal unemployment and child schooling decisions is lower
than for paternal unemployment.
Table 6.7: Reduced form regressions
reduced form Upper Secondary Education
Cyclical component of adult male unemployment -0.0228 -0.0237
(0.011) (0.011)
Cyclical component of adult female unemployment 0.0005 0.0005
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 2326 2326 2326 2326
Covariates included YES YES YES YES
Labor market controls included NO YES NO YES
R-squ adj./Ps R-squ. 0.202 0.202 0.201 0.201
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: GSOEP Youth Sample.
Note: Standard errors are robust. Covariates are sibling dummies,
parental education, size of region, nationality, year FEs, region FEs.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Going beyond the reduced form estimation, I use a simulatenous equation bivariate probit
model to assess the causal eects of paternal unemployment on child upper secondary
school choice. The rst row of Table 6.8 displays the average marginal eect of paternal
unemployment on child upper secondary school choice for dierent model specications.
Paternal unemployment reduces the probability of upper secondary school choice by
around 18 percentage points. This eect seems very robust even after including youth labor
market and vocational training measures, paternal cognitive skills and several interaction
eects. The latter comprise cross terms between paternal unemployment and paternal
schooling, paternal cognitive skills and paternal age on the one hand, and between paternal
labor market uctuations and the three paternal traits, displayed in lines 2-4 on the other
hand. The table also displays the estimated marginal eect of unemployment uctuations
in the second equation of model (5.1). It shows that a one percentage point increase in
the cyclical component of adult male unemployment translates also into a one percentage
points higher unemployment probability among the fathers in my sample. Note that the
LR-test does not reject the null hypothesis of  = 0 for any of the models displayed in
the table. Hence, marginal eects of a restricted model are presented.22
22Estimates that restrict  = 0 are much lower in size than for the unrestricted model. Compare
Table 6.18.
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Table 6.8: Bivariate probit results of the eect of paternal unemployment on youth
higher education decision
Upper secondary education 1 2 3 4 5
Schooling equation
Father unemployed -0.1899 -0.1896 -0.1836 -0.1938 -0.1852
(0.036) (0.037) (0.038) (0.040) (0.037)
Father grammar school 0.3245 0.3253 0.3050 0.3098 0.3209
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)
Father cognitive skills 0.07373 0.07440
(0.018) (0.018)
Paternal age 0.004277 0.004277 0.003641 0.002527 0.003294
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Unemployment equation
Cyclical component of adult male unemployment 0.01130 0.01130 0.01077 0.01283 0.009684
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Observations 2326 2326 2326 2326 2326
P-val LRtest of rho=0 0.48 0.52 0.94 0.01 0.50
Covariates included YES YES YES YES YES
Labor market controls included NO YES YES YES YES
Father cognitive Skills included NO NO YES YES NO
Interaction eects NO NO NO YES NO
Fixed Eects state, time state, time state, time state, time region, time
Sample All All All All All
log-lik -1,900.67 -1,900.33 -1,870.71 -1,862.44 -1,785.39
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: GSOEP Youth Sample.
Note: Standard errors clustered by region and bootstrapped using
200 replications. For all covariates included see Table 6.6.
Interaction eects are interactions between paternal education/cognitive ability/age and
unemployment/local labor market variation, respectively. Biprobit coecients displayed are
average marginal eects for the probability Pr(Upper secondary education = 1)
and Pr(Paternal unemployment = 1) (for regional unemployment variation) are reported.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Table 6.9 repeats the analysis of Table 6.8 for child GPA as a dependent variable, using
the linear IV estimator and OLS.23 The IV results suggest that paternal unemployment
does not have an impact on child GPA. The 2SLS estimates are insignicant, and the
coecient of the OLS estimator even changes signs. At rst sight these results deviate
from the ndings of Rege et al. (2011). Note, however, that, while I use grades in the
same year as paternal unemployment, Rege et al. (2011) look at school grades around
three years after paternal job loss.
Nevertheless, this result is striking because it indicates that paternal unemployment aects
child upper secondary schooling decisions but not child school performance or abilities.
In the context of the theoretical framework described in Section 6.3, this also indicates
23Again, a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test does not reject the H0 of paternal unemployment being
exogenous.
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Table 6.9: The eect of paternal unemployment on youth GPA
GPA 2SLS OLS
Treatment
Father unemployed 4.1189 6.9192 -0.07813
(3.287) (5.995) (0.073)
Vocational training positions per 100 applicants 0.05034 0.02031
(0.034) (0.010)
Youth unemployment -0.1298 -0.08605
(0.103) (0.036)
Observations 2302 2302 2302
Covariates included YES YES YES
Labor market controls included NO YES YES
Father cognitive Skills
P-val DWH-test (H0: unemp exogenous) 0.094 0.016
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: GSOEP Youth Sample.
Note: For covariates included see Table 6.6.
GPA ranges from 6 (best grade) to 1 (worst grade).
German grades have been reversed.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
that paternal joblessness does not have an immediate eect on potential wages in either
of the two education sectors, because wages are driven by child abilities and GPA is an
indicator of ability and subsequent wages (Rose and Betts, 2004).
6.6.2 Heterogeneity of eects across dierent groups of individ-
uals
For policy makers it is important to know which children are particularly vulnerable to
paternal unemployment. This section rst presents results generated by stratifying the
sample on dierent parent and child characteristics. Then, I use my model results to show
the degree of heterogeneity in the unemployment and labor market eects for fathers of
dierent ages and cognitive abilities.
Regional labor market uctuations only aect individuals who work in a respective region.
Therefore, it is interesting to investigate this in order to see whether fathers who are willing
to commute larger distances may be more likely to nd a new job quickly and may be less
aected by local labor market uctuations. Column (1) of Table 6.10 indicates that the
unemployment eect stays roughly constant after excluding those fathers from the sample
who commuted more than 30km to work in the past year. This eect may be caused by
similar unemployment uctuations in neighboring regions. Section 6.2.4 explained that
schools in the German school system usually belong to one of three dierent tracks,
where only the highest track provides automatic access to an upper secondary school
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degree. Hence, ex ante one may expect that paternal unemployment is more harmful
for individuals with a lower track recommendation, who are more likely to attend the
lower tracks where access to upper secondary schooling is not automatic. Columns (2)
and (3) show that the marginal eect of paternal unemployment for individuals attending
the highest school track is larger in absolute terms than for the middle track (recall that
individuals of the lowest track are not part of the sample). However, note that the marginal
eects are expressed in terms of percentage points. Regarding percentages the eect for
individuals who had a low track recommendation (38 percent) is indeed signicantly larger
than for individuals with a high track recommendation (23 percent). Stratifying across
gender in Columns (4) and (5) indicates that daughters are more prone to dropping out
in response to paternal unemployment than boys. It may be that parents are more willing
to cushion shocks towards their sons rather than daughters. What is also likely is that
females lose condence more easily in response to a family shock than boys. However,
the dierence in the eect between girls and boys is not signicant. Due to institutional
changes in the regulation and amount of unemployment benets, unemployment hardship
has increased in Germany from 2005 onwards. Hence, it is not surprising that the adverse
eect of paternal unemployment is larger after the reform (Column (7)) than before
(Column (6)). Again, the dierence in the eects between Column (6) and Column (7) is
not signicant.
In late 2008 the most recent economic crisis started and if the exclusion restriction is
violated this is most likely the case for the crisis years when newspapers were full of bad
news about the economy. Hence, in Column (8) I reestimate the model also for all years
except the crisis years. Again, the point estimate is slightly larger but not signicantly
dierent from the point estimate in Column (1).24
6.6.3 The role of the subjective school success probability
In Section 6.3 I argued on theoretical grounds that the subjective school success
probability is an important channel through which paternal unemployment aects child
upper secondary school choices. For this to be true, three circumstances need to hold: First,
paternal unemployment has to have a causal eect on the success probability. Second,
24Heterogeneity results for fathers with high/low cognitive ability, fathers with upper secondary
schooling or below and fathers of dierent ages are displayed in the appendix.
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the subjective probability of school success has to be a predictor for upper secondary
school choice. Third, the fraction of the paternal unemployment eect explained by this
probability has to be suciently large. This section will explore all three of these conditions
in turn.
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I again use the cyclical component in an adult male unemployment as an instrumental
variable for paternal unemployment to investigate the eect on the probability of school
success and on the binary indicator 1 [Percentage > 50] using 2SLS and probit models
respectively. Table 6.11 shows that the eect of paternal unemployment on that probability
is signicant and large in absolute terms. The estimate generated by the linear IV
estimator in Column (1) indicates that the causal eect of paternal unemployment on
the subjective school probability is a non-signicant reduction of 11 percentage points of
this probability. With a binary probit, I nd that the probability of nding it rather likely
to graduate is signicantly reduced by 6.3 percentage points.
Table 6.11: The eect of paternal unemployment on subjective school success
Probability of school success 2SLS Biprobit
Treatment
Father unemployed -11.109 -0.06333
(26.025) (0.032)
Observations 2326 2326
P-val LRtest of rho=0 0.342
Covariates included YES YES
P-val DWH-test (H0: unemp exogenous) 0.784
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: GSOEP Youth Sample.
Note: For covariates included see Table 6.6.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
Except for the subjective school success probability, other child traits and preferences
are also likely to be aected by paternal unemployment. Table 6.12 displays the eect
of paternal unemployment on child locus of control, child risk aversion and child mental
health. The table shows that paternal unemployment reduces child mental health and child
locus of control by a little over one standard deviation. The coecient on risk aversion is
positive but strongly insignicant.
After having shown that paternal unemployment has a large and signicant negative eect
on the subjective school success probability, I investigate whether that probability also
has eects on child schooling decisions by including it as an additional covariate into the
upper secondary school equation of Equation (6.7). The results are reported in Table 6.13.
Column (1) includes the subjective school probability as a linear measure and Column
(2) as a binary indicator for 1 [Percentage > 50]. Only the marginal eect reported in
Column (2) is signicant and equals 0.07. Thus, if an individual thinks she is rather likely
to succeed at school her probability to opt for upper secondary schooling increases by 7
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Table 6.12: Child preferences and traits through which paternal unemployment can aect
youth higher education decisions (IV-2SLS estimator)
Child traits Mental Health Risk aversion Locus of control
Treatment
Father unemployed -1.0312 0.2146 -1.1190
(0.565) (0.759) (0.612)
Observations 2115 1909 2085
Covariates included YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: GSOEP Youth Sample.
Note: Standard errors clustered by region.
The analytical sample on which these estimates are based
consists of all GSOEP youths that have no missings in any of the covariates.
For covariates included see Table 6.6.
Trait measures are standardized with mean zero and standard deviation one.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
percentage points. The nding that only the the marginal eect in Column (2) is signicant
suggests that the eect of that probability is nonlinear and that individuals need to pass
a certain threshold to choose higher schooling.25. This result is easily explained on hands
of the model presented in Section 6.3. Departing from Equation (6.3), individuals will
choose upper secondary education if it holds that
TX
t=te
tE

w1(t)
  TX
t=0
tE

w0(t)

> 0:
Solving this inequality for p gives:
p >
teP
t=0
twl
TP
t=te
t (wh(t)  wl(t))
(6.12)
p >
foregone earnings
gain from education
Hence, the eect of the subjective probability in shifting an individual into upper
secondary education is nonlinear. Individuals will choose upper secondary education only
if that probability passes a certain threshold. Moreover, if individuals use the market
interest rate to discount future earnings and have roughly equal wage streams in the two
sectors, this threshold should be similar across individuals.
25Robustness checks show that this threshold is somewhere between 50% and 60%. Unfortunately, the
coding of the variable in steps of 10 does not allow a more precise analysis.
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Table 6.13: Bivariate probit results of the eect of subjective school success on youth
higher education decision
Upper secondary education 1 2
Probability, successful school completion 0.0001189 0.07259
(0.000) (0.025)
Schooling equation
Father unemployed -0.1908 -0.1862
(0.038) (0.038)
Unemployment equation
Cyclical component of adult male unemployment 0.01130 0.01130
(0.005) (0.005)
Observations 2326 2326
P-val LRtest of rho=0 0.522 0.604
Covariates included YES YES
Labor market controls included YES YES
Measure of school success probability linear binary (>50%)
Fixed Eects state, time state, time
Sample All All
log-lik -1,900.296 -1,896.733
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: GSOEP Youth Sample.
Note: Standard errors clustered by region and bootstrapped using
200 replications. For all covariates included see Table 6.6.
Biprobit coecients displayed are marginal eects.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
After having shown that paternal unemployment has a large and signicant eect on
the subjective school success probability and that this probability also aects upper
secondary school choice, it is interesting to see what part of the overall unemployment
eect can be explained by that probability. I use the decomposition laid out in Section 6.5.4
and investigate how much of the dierence in the unemployment eect can be ascribed
to the probability that p is larger than 50 percent and to other child characteristics,
after controlling for a large number of background variables.26 Using the decomposition,
paternal unemployment is estimated to reduce upper secondary schooling by 20 percentage
points as can be seen from Table 6.14. Moreover, 2% of that reduction can be explained
by the probability that p is larger than 50 percent. In Column (2) I add locus of
control as an additional indicator of the school success probability. Hence, I make the
assumption that locus of control is another measure of that same probability, because it
evaluates whether an individual thinks that she can aect future wages by e.g. choosing
education (Coleman and DeLeire, 2003). Doing so increases the explained part through
upper secondary school success to 7.5 percent. Column (3) reveals that also adding mental
26All background variables of Column 2 in Table 6.6 are included.
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health and risk aversion does further increase this explained part. Hence, both child mental
health and risk aversion are not associated with a higher probability of upper secondary
school choice.
Table 6.14: Decomposition of the probability of child upper secondary education into
subjective success probability, traits and background variables: fractions of overall
eect ascribed to investments and parental background
Decomposition (1) (2) (3)
SuccessProb 0.004177 0.01445 0.01559
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004)
Observations 1728 1728 1728
N(treated) 1,568.000 1,568.000 1,568.000
N(control) 160.000 160.000 160.000
Unemployment eect 0.201 0.206 0.206
%of unemployment eect explained by p 2.081 7.019 7.553
Variables included Success prob adding Loc adding risk, mhealth
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: GSOEP Youth Sample.
Note: Observations are weighted using coecients of a pooled probit model.
Randomized ordering of variables used. Estimates based on 100 replications.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
6.6.4 Additional sensitivity analyses
In addition to the sensitivity analyses discussed so far, I have performed a range of
further estimations to assess the robustness of the results with respect to the choice of
covariates, outcome denition, coding the treatment and estimation strategy. First, much
of my analysis hinges on the assumption that uctuations in the regional unemployment
rate only inuence child schooling decisions via their eect on paternal unemployment.
Admittedly, local labor market conditions may impact educational choices in ways that
may not be transmitted solely through the father's unemployment experience. Regional
uctuations in GDP may also aect the general wage development in that region or a
decline in tax revenue may aect school operations. Therefore, I conducted robustness
checks where, in the rst equation of the bivariate probit model, I also control for
mean deviations in regional tax income and for mean deviations in the general wage
development. Both of these variables do not aect my main coecient estimates and do
not signicantly aect upper secondary school choice.
Second, I use a dierent coding of the outcome variable. While in my main estimations I
use nal level of schooling if observed and planned level of schooling if the nal level is
not yet observed, Table 6.17 shows the main results of this analysis when using a binary
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indicator for whether an individual is still in school at age 17. In this case, the results are
still signicant, but the marginal eect size reduces by about 5 percentage points. I focus
on nal schooling for two reasons. First, an indicator for whether a child is still in school
at age 17 is likely to be awed for individuals who started school at a dierent age or had
to repeat a grade. Second, nal schooling is a much better predictor of later outcomes.
Third, I estimate the eect of involuntary unemployment instead of non-employment on
child education decisions. The results are displayed in Table 6.19, and the marginal eects
obtained are extremely similar to the ones in Table 6.8.
Last, I use linear 2SLS-IV and OLS instead of nonlinear probit estimators. Using 2SLS
entails considerable increase in eect sizes as can be seen in Table 6.16. Note that the IV-
estimator provides a weighted local average treatment eect for children of fathers who are
shifted into unemployment due to a regional labor market downturn, while the bivariate
probit results are average marginal eects. Hence, a straightforward explanation for the
larger eect size is treatment heterogeneity and that children of individuals aected by
a regional downturn (compliers) are worse o when compared to children of individuals
who do not experience a change in employment in times of recession (never-takers and
always-takers).27
6.7 Conclusion
This chapter shows that paternal unemployment has a large and signicant eect on child
upper secondary school choice and that the subjective probability of successful school
completion is a driving mechanism behind this eect. Moreover, the study identies
heterogeneity in the paternal unemployment eect for dierent groups of children and
fathers. I estimate a simultaneous equation latent variable model for the joint probability
of child upper secondary school choice and paternal unemployment using regional variation
in the cyclical component of adult male unemployment in the labor market of the father
as an exogenous shifter for paternal unemployment. To interpret my ndings and to link
them to the theory of human capital investment decisions, I present a simple theoretical
framework that explains how paternal unemployment aects schooling decisions by means
of the perceived school success probability. Within this framework, young individuals make
272SLS is also biased in small samples, such that part of the increase may be ascribed to that bias
(Chiburis et al., 2012).
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upper secondary schooling decisions by comparing discounted expected wage ows for each
schooling choice.
Paternal unemployment reduces the probability of upper secondary school choice by
roughly 18 percentage points or 34 percent. Paternal unemployment reduces the prob-
ability that an individual nds it rather likely that she will graduate successfully by
7 percentage points. It also reduces child locus of control and child mental health by
roughly one standard deviation. The theoretical framework that motivates my analysis
predicts that the subjective school success probability has a nonlinear eect on child upper
secondary school choice, and the empirical analysis conrms this presumption. Overall,
the subjective school success probability explains about 2-7.5 percent of the overall gap in
dierent upper secondary school choice probabilities between employed and unemployed
fathers.
Some of the results are specic to the German institutional system. First, in percentage
terms, children who visit schools of the lower secondary school tracks are more
aected from paternal unemployment than children who visit higher-track schools.
Second, unemployment has a more detrimental eect after a substantive reform of the
unemployment benet system as of January 2005, the so-called Hartz IV reform, although
the dierence is not signicant.
Given the nding that regional labor market downturns are an important driver of child
education decisions via their eect on paternal unemployment, this chapter contributes
to the discussion on second order eects of economic crises. Using the structure of my
model to predict the eect of a recession on the marginal probability of upper secondary
school choice, I nd that a labor market downturn that is similar in size to that in the
US during the Great Recession leads to a reduction in the upper secondary school choice
probability by 2 percentage points.
My nding that paternal unemployment has adverse eects on child outcomes conrms
earlier ndings by Rege et al. (2011); Oreopoulos et al. (2008); Kalil and Ziol-Guest
(2008) as well as Stevens and Schaller (2011). Yet, this chapter diers substantially from
these other studies in the literature focusing primarily on the psychological and behavioral
impacts of paternal unemployment on the child rather than on paternal investments. The
children of unemployed fathers in this study are substantially older than in any of the
above-named papers. At age 16, cognitive skill production is largely completed which
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explains why in contrast to Rege et al. (2011) I nd that child GPA is not aected by
paternal unemployment.
This chapter shows that economic crises can have very important second order eects in
terms of education outcomes of the next generation. From a policy perspective, this is
relevant because it shows that part of the negative eect of paternal unemployment on
education decisions can be mitigated by policy interventions focused on changing self-
condence and expectations about the future. Such policies are likely to be more cost-
eective than seeking to directly improve cognitive abilities. Arguably, this chapter is
limited in scope. First, it focuses on teenage children only, and second it only investigates
the impact of paternal unemployment on child secondary school choice. The present
chapter may, therefore, be seen as a motivation to construct models, which allow for
dierent channels and mechanisms linking familial distress to human capital investment
decisions.
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6.A The Eect of Labor Market Fluctuations
I also consider the impact of regional labor market downturns. Figure 6.3 displays the
association between regional unemployment deviations and unemployment or education
by showing kernel densities of the cyclical component of adult male unemployment by
education and employment, respectively. Unsurprisingly, densities for unemployed fathers
and children without upper secondary schooling are shifted to the right. The overall
eect of uctuations in the cyclical unemployment component as predicted from the
model can be seen in Figure 6.4. The gradient of the line shows the degree to which
regional unemployment inuences child upper secondary schooling decisions via the eect
on paternal unemployment. Note that this gradient is surprisingly steep indicating that
economic crises have considerable second order eects on next generation schooling
choices.
Figure 6.3: Cyclical component of adult male unemployment by paternal unemployment
and youth upper secondary education.
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Figure 6.4: Eect of cyclical unemployment uctuations in paternal labor market on
youth upper secondary schooling.
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Notes: Model simulation results. Simulation based on estimates of model (4) in Table 6.8. 95% pointwise condence
interval between dashed lines.
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6.B The Role of Paternal Characteristics
The analysis in the main part of the chapter investigates average marginal eects for
dierent models and dierent strata of the sample. Model (4) contains interaction eects
for dierent paternal characteristics, which are important when thinking about the
intergenerational transmission of disadvantage in response to labor market shocks. When
using interaction terms in nonlinear models, coecients are hard to interpret. Therefore,
I use the structure of the model and the interaction terms to predict probabilities for
three dierent groups of fathers: Fathers with high/low cognitive ability, fathers with
upper secondary schooling or below and fathers of dierent ages.28 The main prediction
results are based on coecients of model (4) in Table 6.8. Figure 6.5 and Figure 6.6
show the predicted unemployment and education probabilities for fathers with dierent
cognitive abilities and ages. Even after conditioning on schooling, higher paternal cognitive
skills signicantly reduce the unemployment probability and signicantly increase the
probability of child upper secondary schooling. If a father could be moved from the lowest
Figure 6.5: Eect of paternal cognitive ability (after conditioning on education) on
paternal unemployment and youth upper secondary education.
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to the highest decile of the cognitive ability distribution, his child would be 15 percentage
points more likely to choose upper secondary schooling. Paternal age also has a positive
eect on child schooling decisions but a negative eect on the employment probability.
Unsurprisingly, Figure 6.7 shows that individuals with upper secondary schooling are
28Goodness-of-t statistics for using the model to predict outcomes are presented in Table 6.20.
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Figure 6.6: Eect of paternal age on paternal unemployment and youth upper secondary
education.
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interval between dashed lines.
Figure 6.7: Eect of paternal upper secondary education on paternal unemployment and
youth upper secondary education.
0
.
05
.
1
%
 P
at
er
na
l u
ne
m
pl
oy
m
en
t
lower secondary upper secondary
Paternal unemployment probability by paternal schooling
(a) Paternal unemployment
0
.
2
.
4
.
6
.
8
%
 Y
ou
th
 u
pp
er
 se
co
nd
ar
y 
ed
uc
at
io
n
lower secondary upper secondary
Youth secondary schooling probability by paternal schooling
(b) Youth higher education
Notes: Model simulation results. Simulations based on estimates of model (4) in Table 6.8.
less likely to become unemployed while their children are more likely to choose upper
secondary education.
Figure 6.8 investigates the overall eect of paternal unemployment for fathers with
high/low cognitive abilities, with high and low education levels and with dierent ages.
For each of these graphs, a move along the x-axis leads to a widening in the dierence of
upper secondary school probabilities between employed and unemployed fathers. Hence,
the eect of unemployment tends to be somewhat more detrimental for fathers with high
cognitive abilities, high education and higher age. This seems surprising at rst, given
that families with higher ability endowments should be able to cushion shocks more easily.
227
CHAPTER 6. INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC DISTRESS
However, at the same time, the graphs display the average treatment eect of individuals
with dierent endowments. Hence, given that the event of unemployment is very unlikely
for fathers with high cognitive abilities, it may simultaneously be psychologically more
detrimental to these individuals.
Figure 6.8: Heterogenous eect of paternal unemployment on child upper secondary
schooling by paternal cognitive ability, education and age
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Notes: Model simulation results. Simulation based on estimates of model (4) in Table 6.8.
I also use the model to predict the eects of a recession where unemployment increases
in all regions by 4 percentage points. This is about the eect that the most recent crisis
had on US unemployment rates. When predicting probability of upper secondary school
success for dierent levels in regional unemployment rates, I nd that overall there is
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not much heterogeneity in the response of child upper secondary schooling to regional
labor market downturns for fathers with dierent characteristics. Panel 1 of Figure 6.9
shows that children of fathers with an upper secondary school degree suer slightly more
from a regional labor market downturn than children from fathers with lower education.
Moreover, children of older fathers are slightly less aected by labor market downturns
(Panel 3 of Figure 6.9).
Figure 6.9: Heterogenous eect of regional cyclical unemployment uctuations on child
upper secondary schooling by paternal cognitive ability, education and age
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
Y
ou
th
 se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
in
g
−3 −2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Cyclical component of regional unemployment
high cog low cog
Child secondary schooling probability by paternal cognitive skills
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
.
8
Y
ou
th
 se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
in
g
−3 −2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Cyclical component of regional unemployment
upper secondary schooling lower secondary schooling
Child secondary schooling probability by paternal secondary schooling
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
.
7
Y
ou
th
 se
co
nd
ar
y 
sc
ho
ol
in
g
−3 −2 1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Cyclical component of regional unemployment
young (<=45) father old (>45) father
Child secondary schooling probability by paternal age
Notes: Model simulation results. Simulation based on estimates of model (4) in Table 6.8.
229
CHAPTER 6. INTERGENERATIONAL EFFECTS OF ECONOMIC DISTRESS
6.B.1 Direct, indirect and total eects of paternal characteris-
tics
From a policy perspective, it is interesting to see how the eect of regional labor
market downturns and paternal unemployment varies for fathers with dierent observable
characteristics. Dierent paternal characteristics may aect the probability to choose
upper secondary schooling either directly or because they aect the probability of paternal
unemployment. The total eect of a paternal characteristic cj can be decomposed into a
direct and an indirect eect according to:
Total eectz }| {
dP (S = 1jX = x)
dcj
=
direct eectz }| {
1X
D=0
P (D = djX = x;Cj = cj)@P (S = sjX = x;C
j = cj; D = d)
@cj
+
indirect eectz }| {
1X
D=0
@P (D = djX = x;Cj = cj)
@cj
P (S = sjX = x;D = d; Cj = cj)
The indirect eect represents a reduced probability to opt for upper secondary schooling
induced by a change in the probability of paternal unemployment, which is induced by
a change in the respective paternal characteristic. The direct eect is the part of the
eect of a characteristic that is unrelated to unemployment and directly inuences the
education probability. The results of the decomposition of Section 6.B.1 are displayed in
Figure 6.10. The graphs show that paternal cognitive abilities and paternal education have
large positive direct eects on child upper secondary schooling. The eect of paternal age,
on the other hand, is very small. Moreover, the indirect eect of paternal age is negative
because higher paternal age leads to a reduction in the employment probability.
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Figure 6.10: Decomposing the eect of a change in paternal cognitive ability, schooling
and age on child upper secondary schooling decisions.
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6.C Additional Tables
Table 6.15: Correlation: paternal/maternal change to non(un-)employment and gpa
Newly unemployed GPA
Father becomes unemployed -0.06062
(0.113)
Father becomes involuntarily unemployed -0.08875
(0.126)
Mother becomes unemployed 0.07079
(0.127)
Mother becomes involuntarily unemployed -0.06773
(0.141)
Observations 2098 (father) 2071 (mother)
Covariates included NO
R-squ adj. -0.00
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: GSOEP Youth Sample.
Note: Standard errors are robust.
Raw correlations displayed, no covariates included.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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Table 6.20: Model simulation, goodness-of-t statistics
goodness-of-t
Predicted Actual Dierence P-val chi2 Pct corr pred
Unemployment .0937 .0967 -.003 0 .8491
Child upper secondary education .4966 .5181 -.0215 0 .6028
Note: Statistics for simulation of model (4) in Table 6.8 shown.
Table 6.21: Probit model results for the probability of child upper secondary education
on child traits
Probit base for composition (1) (2) (3) (4)
Success Probability
Probability, successful school completion > 50% 0.1036 0.08325 0.06852 0.08247
(0.036) (0.032) (0.032) (0.033)
Traits
Youth mental health -0.004553 0.003031
(0.011) (0.011)
Youth risk aversion 0.002757 -0.0003157
(0.011) (0.011)
Youth locus of control 0.04711
(0.011)
Observations 1728 1728 1728 1728
R-squared adj. 0.003 0.200 0.207 0.200
Variables included all all all excl Locus
Background variables included YES YES YES YES
Standard errors in parentheses
Source: GSOEP Youth Sample.
Note: Model serves as a basis for the decompositions displayed in Table 6.14.
Average marginal eects reported.
 p < 0:10,  p < 0:05,  p < 0:01
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